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Abstract
3
This thesis presents three papers that contribute to our understanding of economic 
development. In particular, I explore the role of natural resources and political actors 
on economic development and provide empirical evidence from Latin America.
Chapter 1 draws on joint work with Juan Pablo Rud. In this chapter we study the 
impact of a large Peruvian gold mine on the local population. Using annual household 
data from 1997 to 2006, we find evidence of a positive effect of the mine’s demand 
of local inputs on real income, household welfare and poverty reduction. The effects 
are only present in the mine’s supply market and surrounding areas. We examine and 
rule out that the results are driven by the fiscal revenue windfall from mining levies. 
Using a spatial general equilibrium model, we interpret these results as evidence of 
welfare gains generated by the mine’s backward linkages.
Chapter 2 explores empirically the effect of party nomination procedures on polit­
ical selection and governance. Using a new data set of Latin American parties, I find 
evidence of a positive relationship between primaries, electoral performance and qual­
ity of government. I interpret these results as evidence of primaries improving political 
selection. To address relevant identification concerns, I use an instrumental variable 
approach based on determinants suggested by a model of endogenous primaries, which 
I test on the data.
Chapter 3 studies the role of costly taxation as an explanation of the flypaper 
effect: the observed greater response of public spending to grants than to increments 
of the tax base. I develop a model of local spending with costly taxation and test the 
model using data from Peruvian municipalities. I find that differences in tax collection 
costs explain almost one third of the flypaper effect.
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A recurrent element of economic development is that accumulation of factors of pro­
duction is not always sufficient. Institutions, technology and political actors, among 
other factors, also play a vital role by shaping societies’ ability to use their existing 
resources to improve their living conditions. Without this ability, societies may simply 
fail to exploit their development opportunities and remain trapped in a vicious circle 
of poverty. For example, they may fail to exploit their abundance of natural resources 
to promote development, to use democratic institutions to improve governance, or to 
spend a fiscal revenue windfall to provide public goods.
In this thesis, I study these phenomena in the context of Latin America. First, I 
study whether access to natural resources benefit local communities and the mecha­
nisms for this to happen. Second, I explore the role of party institutions, in particular 
nomination procedures, on political selection and quality of government. Finally, I 
investigate how tax collection costs shape the responsiveness of local governments’ 
spending to grants from the central government.
Developing countries have an abundance of natural resources. They are among 
the largest producers of oil, gas and minerals like iron, copper, gold and aluminium 
and account for most of the recent growth on mining production (Humphreys, 2009). 
They attract a significant, and increasing, proportion of the exploration spending, a 
good indicator of future production. For example, Latin America attracts 29 percent 
of the global exploration budget and Africa, around 14 percent (World Bank, 2002b).
A main question, however, is how to transform this resource abundance into eco­
nomic wealth. A body of theoretical and empirical literature suggests that natural 
resources may fail to benefit societies and may even hinder development (Sachs and 
Warner, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Caselli and Michaels, 2009) These results 
contrast with historical experiences of resource-rich countries such as United States, 
Canada, United Kingdom and Sweden, now among the most developed ones.
There are two main explanations for this “curse of natural resources”: the crowding 
out of a productive sector with better long-term prospects (also called the “Dutch 
disease”), or some political economy factors such as conflict, rent-seeking, or ineffective 
government. We know less, however, about alternative mechanisms linking natural 
resources and development such as the linkages between extractive industries and 
the rest of the economy. Moreover, the available empirical evidence uses aggregated 
country-level data. While informative of broader economic phenomena, this evidence 
cannot address relevant questions about the effects at local level, where most of the 
negative effects of natural resources, such as pollution or population displacement, 
occur.
The first chapter of this thesis explores these issues using the case of Yanacocha, a 
large gold mine in Peru.1 In particular, we study the effect of the mine expansion on
1 This chapter draws on joint work with Juan Pablo Rud.
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the income and welfare of the local population. We focus on the general equilibrium 
effects of the mine demand for local inputs and study the role of backward linkages 
as a mechanism to generate positive effects in a local economy.
We first develop an economic geography model that provides testable predictions 
about the effect of the demand shock from the mine on real income and relative prices 
at different locations. Then, we use household data to study the effect of the mine 
on local conditions. The identification strategy exploits variation on the mine’s local 
procurement and distance from the household to the city where the mine buys local 
inputs.
We find evidence that the expansion of the mine has a positive effect on the income 
and welfare of the local population. The benefits accrue to both residents of the city 
and of the surrounding rural areas, but decrease with distance. We also document 
increments on the relative price of locally produced food crops such as potatoes and 
maize. This phenomenon explains the increase of real income in the rural areas, not 
directly providing goods or services to the mine.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the demand shock from the mine creating 
a multiplier effect in the region that is transferred from the city to the rural area via 
trade of agricultural products. We also discuss and rule out that the effects axe driven 
by the fiscal revenue windfall associated to the mine activities.
These results highlight the importance of backward linkages as a mechanism for 
natural resources to benefit a society. In the Peruvian case, this mechanism seems to 
be more important, at least in the short run, than the expansion of public spending. 
Moreover, these findings suggest a possible reason for the failure of natural resources: 
the lack of linkages between extractive industries and local economies.
A second theme in this thesis is the importance of political actors and institutions 
for development. Politicians play a crucial role in economic life. They implement 
policies, participate in the provision of public goods and contribute to enforcing the 
rule of law. In sum, they play a key role in setting the environment in which economic 
activity, and growth, takes place.
The extent to which politicians actions are aligned to the public interest is shaped, 
however, by the institutional setup. For example, contestable electoral processes may 
create incentives for self-interested politicians to act on the benefit of the majority 
in order to be re-elected (Besley and Case, 1995) or for parties to enhance quality of 
politicians to attract swing voters (Besley et al., forthcoming).
Most of the literature studying the effect of institutions on economic performance 
considers institutions as predetermined factors. An alternative view, however, con­
siders that societies can choose institutions, and hence institutions are endogenous 
(Barbera and Jackson, 2004; Alesina and Trebbi, 2004). This endogeneity may con­
found the identification of the effects of institutions and suggests the importance to 
understand also the determinants of institutional adoption.
In the second chapter of the thesis I explore this issue in the context of Latin
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American political parties. I focus on a specific party institution: the candidate 
nomination procedure, and explore both its determinants and the effect on political 
selection.
Parties play an important role in politics. They create the bridge between voters 
and politicians and provide the organizational support to participate in political life. 
By selecting politicians to run in elections, parties effectively become the gatekeepers 
of the political arena (Hazan and Rahat, 2006; White, 2006).
Parties use a variety of nomination procedures ranging from nomination by party 
leaders to more democratic procedures such as primaries (Gallagher and Marsh, eds, 
1988; Hazan and Rahat, 2006). In the last 25 years, for example, around 15 percent of 
major Latin American parties have used primaries while the rest used less participative 
procedures.
Given this institutional heterogeneity, a relevant question is how nomination pro­
cedures affects political selection. This question is particularly important in contexts 
with weak democratic checks and balances. In those cases, existing institutions may 
not be enough to shape politicians incentives and societies must rely on selecting good, 
honest politicians to improve the quality of government (Besley, 2005).
The main problem to answer this question is that, in most cases, parties choose 
their internal procedures (Serra, 2007). The endogeneity of candidate selection meth­
ods has long been noted by political scientists who consider it one of the most im­
portant party decisions, even more than writing the manifesto, and a main feature to 
understand the internal balance of power (Katz, 2001; Lundell, 2004). I address this 
concern by exploring some of the determinants of institutional adoption. To do so, 
I first develop a model of endogenous primaries which relates its adoption to politi­
cal competition and the incumbency advantage of the party leader. Then, I test the 
model predictions on the data. Finally, I use these determinants as instruments to 
identify the effect of primaries on quality of government.
Consistent with the model predictions, I find a positive and significant relationship 
between measures of political competition and the likelihood of primary adoption. 
This effect becomes insignificant when the candidate is also the party founder, a 
measure of strong incumbency advantage.
More importantly, I find evidence that primaries improve quality of government. In 
particular, during the mandate of primary-nominated presidents there is an improve­
ment of more than one standard deviation in the measures of government efficiency 
(such as corruption and bureaucracy quality) as well as an increase of government 
size and real income per capita. I also observe that primary-nominated candidates 
obtain a larger vote share. The vote premium is decreasing in the size of the party 
-measured as the seat share obtained in legislative elections. These findings suggest 
that primaries improve the candidate’s quality and attract non-partisan voters.
The final theme I explore is the performance of local governments in the con­
text of fiscal decentralization. In recent years, there has been a significant increase
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in devolution of responsibilities, and financial resources, to sub-national governments 
(USAID, 2000). This process of fiscal decentralization involves allocation of tax re­
sponsibilities to local governments, but also increase of transfers from the central 
government. These phenomena raise the need to understand how local governments 
react to additional fiscal resources. Do they increase spending and provide better 
public goods? or do they simply replace local taxes by grants? These are relevant 
questions specially when the political success of decentralization requires that local 
governance improves.
In the last chapter of this thesis I explore a particular phenomenon associated to 
local governments’ response to transfers: the flypaper effect. This effect refers to the 
greater responsiveness of public spending to grants than to increments of the local 
tax base. This empirical regularity has been widely reported in the fiscal federalism 
literature (Hines and Thaler, 1995; Gamkhar and Shah, 2007).2 This result, however, 
is paradoxical in the standard grants-in-aid theoretical framework (Oates, 1999).
I develop a model that emphasizes the role of costly taxation as an explanation 
of the flypaper effect, a mechanism first proposed by Hamilton (1986). The model 
provides testable predictions about the effect of grants on local spending and taxation 
and relates them to tax collection costs and tax rate. Then, I test the model predictions 
using data from Peruvian local governments and the tenure of administrative tools as 
measures of tax collection costs.
I find that the spending of local governments with lower tax collection costs is less 
responsive to additional grants: a result consistent with a smaller flypaper effect. In 
particular, differences on tax collection costs explain almost one third of the observed 
flypaper effect. The model also predicts substitution of local taxes by grants. I find 
evidence of this phenomenon among local governments with lower tax collection costs. 
Overall, these findings support the argument that costly taxation plays a relevant role 
on the response of local governments to intergovernmental transfers.
2 A similar phenomenon has been document in the aid literature and refers, more broadly, to the 
lack of fungibility of grants.
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1 Natural Resources and Local 
Development
Access to natural resources has hardly been associated with development. A body of 
theoretical and empirical literature suggests that natural resources may not translate 
into better living standards or may even hinder development (Sachs and Warner, 1999; 
Sachs and Warner, 2001; Caselli and Michaels, 2009). The current explanations for 
this “natural resource curse” focus on conflict, bad institutions, ineffective government 
or displacement of other productive sectors like in the Dutch disease (Benjamin et al., 
1989; Torvik, 2002; Caselli, 2006). The available evidence, however, tells us little about 
alternative channels such as the backward linkages between the extractive industry 
and the rest of the economy, or the consequences at local level where many of the 
negative effects, such as pollution or population displacement, occur.
This chapter fills this gap in the literature by investigating whether natural re­
sources benefit local communities and exploring the economic mechanisms for this to 
happen. We use the case of Yanacocha, a large gold mine in Peru, as a testing ground 
and evaluate the effect of the expansion of the mine on the income and welfare of 
the local population. In contrast to the existing literature, we focus on the general 
equilibrium effects of the mine’s demand of local inputs as the main transmission 
channel.
To inform the empirical exercise, we first develop a spatial general equilibrium 
model based on Fujita and Krugman (1995). In this setup, there is a single city sur­
rounded by a rural hinterland. The city specializes in the production of manufactured 
goods while the rural area produces food. Both areas engage in costly intra-regional 
trade and are also able to import goods from other regions. The model treats the 
expansion of the mine as a demand shock on local labor in the city and delivers two 
testable predictions. First, if the mine expansion increases city’s real income, then 
the agricultural real income also increases. The effect wanes the longest the distance 
to the mine’s input market due to transportation costs. Second, there is an increase 
in the relative price of locally produced food due to the relative larger demand. The 
increase in agricultural prices transmits the income gains to the rural population, not 
directly supplying goods or services to the mine.
We test these predictions using household data from repeated cross sections. The 
data comes from household surveys -representative of the region where the mine is 
located- for the period 1997 to 2006. We exploit two sources of variation to identify 
the effects of the mine expansion. First, we use the significant increase in Yanacocha’s 
local purchases and wage bill since 2000. This phenomenon was driven by the in­
crement on gold extraction and the implementation of a corporate policy directed at
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increasing local procurement and employment. Second, we use the distance from the 
household location to Cajamarca city -the mine’s local supplying market- as a source 
of heterogeneous exposure to the mine’s expansion.
We find a positive effect of the mine’s activities on real income in the city and 
surrounding areas. The effect decreases monotonically with distance and becomes 
insignificant beyond 100 km from the city. Our estimates suggest that a 10 percent 
increase in the mine’s local purchases and wage bill is associated with an increase in 
real income of 1.7 percent. We also observe increments on the relative price of local 
food crops, such as potatoes and maize. This is consistent with the effect on real 
income being driven by a market mechanism and explains how the rural population 
benefitted from the demand shock in the city markets.
Nonetheless, in the presence of locational externalities associated to the mine (such 
as pollution or crime), increments on real income do not imply an increase in welfare. 
Similarly, the average increase in income may hide negative re-distributional effects, 
for example if poor households are unable to benefit from the mine expansion. To 
explore these questions, we first follow Roback (1982) who suggests using house prices 
as a measure of welfare.3 We find evidence of increments on house rental prices, in 
line with the observed increase in real income, which we interpret as evidence of net 
welfare gains due to the mine expansion. Second, we test for changes in self-reported 
measures of health and crime, but we do not find evidence that they have worsened 
with the expansion of the mine. Thirdly, we analyze the re-distributional impacts of 
the mine expansion. Using quantile regressions, we find that the average household 
income at the bottom of the income distribution has experienced an increase of real 
income similar to that observed for richer households. We also find evidence of poverty 
reduction associated to the mine expansion.
Finally, we investigate whether the observed phenomena is driven by the revenue 
windfall to local governments or by the mine’s backward linkages. This is a relevant 
question because of the importance attached to the increment on public expenditure as 
one of the main benefits from natural resource exploitation. We show that local public 
spending increases due to the expansion of the mine. However, we find no evidence 
that this expansion of the public sector contributes to the observed increase in real 
income or welfare.4 Instead, the observed phenomena seems to be driven entirely 
by the expansion of the mine’s local purchases and employment. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is not previous empirical work contrasting the relative importance 
of these two mechanisms.
In sum, our empirical results suggest that the expansion of the mine increased 
real income and welfare of the local population. The effect seems to be driven by the 
demand shock and its multiplier effect, associated to the mine’s backward linkages
3For an example of an empirical application, see Greenstone and Moretti (2003).
4Using the case of Brazil, Caselli and Michaels (2009) also find evidence suggesting that the oil 
revenue windfall to municipalities did not translate to increases in local income.
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not to the fiscal revenue windfall. The gains are transmitted to residents in the rural 
area, not directly selling inputs to the mine, due to the existence of trade within the 
economic region. The increase in the relative price of locally produced food crops is 
evidence of this transmission channel.
A main policy implication of our findings is that, even in the presence of weak 
governments, natural resources can benefit local populations if backward linkages be­
tween the extractive industry and the rest of the economy are strong enough. This 
recommendation, however, hinges on the existence of economic integration in the re­
gional economy (labor mobility and trade) as well as the existence of goods and labor 
markets able to supply local inputs to the extractive industry.
The lessons to be drawn from this case study are not exclusive to extractive indus­
tries: they could apply to any business venture that creates a strong demand shock in 
a relatively poor area. There are, however, at least two features that make large-scale 
mining a different and interesting case to study. First, mining is a relevant industry for 
developing countries.5 According to the World Bank, around 60 countries in the world 
have a mining sector large enough, in terms of GDP or exports, to be a main driver 
of economic growth and poverty reduction (World Bank, 2002a). Nonetheless, under­
standing how to transform mining wealth into better living standards still remains 
an unsolved policy question. Second, there are well-documented negative local effects 
associated to mining. These negative side effects increase the need to assess both di­
rect and indirect benefits on local communities to inform industrial and development 
policies.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 briefly reviews the 
relevant literature. Section 1.2 develops the analytical framework we use to explore the 
effect of the mine on a regional economy. Section 1.3 presents background information 
about Yanacocha and the relevant geographic area. Section 1.4 describes the data 
and identification strategy. Section 1.5 presents the main empirical results related to 
the model predictions. Section 1.6 explores alternative explanations of the observed 
phenomena. Section 1.7 presents robustness checks and section 1.8 concludes.
1.1 R elated  L iterature
The findings in this chapter contribute to the literature studying the effect of natu­
ral resources on economic development and to the literature examining how regional 
markets respond to demand shocks.
There is not conclusive evidence of the effect of natural resources on development. 
Earlier studies use cross country data and find negative effects (Sachs and Warner, 
1995; Sachs and Warner, 2001). Other papers, however, use alternative measures of
5 Developing countries play an important role in global mining. They are the largest producers of 
key minerals like iron, copper and aluminium, and have almost three quarters of the world mineral 
resources. They account for most of the recent growth on mining production and attract an even 
increasing proportion of exploration spending (Humphreys, 2009).
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resource abundance and fail to find a negative relation (Lederman and Maloney, 2003; 
Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004). Using a microeconomic approach, Michaels (2006) finds 
that oil abundance in U.S. counties increased specialization in primary industries, but 
that these costs were offset by population growth and better education. In balance, oil- 
rich counties enjoyed higher income per capita without increments in inequality. Black 
et al. (2005) explore the effect of a coal boom in U.S. counties and find modest positive 
spillover effects on employment. More recently, Caselli and Michaels (2009) find no 
evidence of positive effect of oil extraction on income in Brazilian municipalities.
In contrast, the literature on the impact of demand shocks (such as large industrial 
plants, construction works, casinos or military bases) find some evidence of positive 
regional effects on wage bill and employment (Carrington, 1996; Hooker and Knetter, 
2001; Evans and Topoleski, 2002), and resident’s welfare (Greenstone and Moretti, 
2003).
Three features distinguish our research from previous work. First, we use a mi­
croeconomic approach where the household is the unit of observation, as opposed to 
counties or districts. The comprehensiveness of the data allows us to explore in more 
detail the mechanisms generating the spillover effects and to assess the net impact on 
resident’s welfare. Second, we show the importance of backward linkages as a channel 
to improve local conditions. The mechanism we uncover hints at an alternative expla­
nation for the failure of natural resources to promote development: few linkages with 
local markets. This explanation relates to a technological feature of extractive indus­
tries and complements the political economy argument used to explain the natural 
resource curse. Finally, we embed the study of natural resources (and local demand 
shocks) in the analytical framework of a new economic geography model. This allows 
us to explicitly explore general equilibrium effects and to introduce transportation 
costs, agglomeration economies and migration which are relevant factors when study­
ing a regional economy.
1.2 A nalytica l framework
In this section we present a stylized model to shed fight on the general equilibrium 
effects of the expansion of a mine on a regional economy. We use the mono-centric 
city model developed by Fujita and Krugman (1995) and extend it by including an 
export sector and interregional trade. In this framework, the mine is a foreign-owned 
net exporter that uses local labor as a production factor but sells all its output in 
international markets.6
We treat the expansion of the mine as a shock in the demand for local labor and 
explore the effect on factor and good prices, and ultimately on real income. The model 
allows us to analyze the spatial distribution of the effects as well as the interaction of 
different economic sectors.
6This setup resembles the characteristics of the mining activities of Yanacocha and other large 
modern mines.
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The model stresses the role of backward linkages, rather than alternative channels 
such as forward linkages, agglomeration economies, public spending or technology 
spillovers.
1.2.1 Environment
We consider a mono-centric spatial structure a la von Thiinen, as depicted in Figure 
1.1. In this spatial configuration, the regional economy is a long narrow line with a 
single city surrounded by a rural hinterland that extends from — /  to / ,  where /  rep­
resents the endogenously determined agricultural frontier. The land is of homogenous 
quality with one unit of land per unit of distance. Each location along the line is 
denoted by r. For simplicity, we drop it when referring to the city (r =  0).
The economy has three productive sectors: manufacturing, agriculture and an ex­
port sector. The manufacturing sector produces a large number of varieties with an 
increasing returns to scale technology and has a monopolistic competition structure. 
In contrast, the agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and produces a single ho­
mogeneous good, namely food. The export sector produces two goods: a manufactured 
commodity and the natural resource, which are not consumed locally. Consumers in 
the region can import consumption goods from other regions. Import and export 
goods are homogenous and their prices axe set in external markets.
All manufacturing, production of the export goods and import activity takes place 
in the city, while the rural hinterland specializes in food production. We take this 
spatial system as given.7 There are (potentially) different factor and good prices in 
each location r, since we assume trade within the region is costly. We use an iceberg 
transportation cost such that if 1 unit is transported over a distance d, only e~Td 
units arrive. The parameter r  represents the transportation cost and is the same for 
all types of goods.8
The region has a given population of N  workers who supply inelastically one 
unit of labor.9 Intra-regional migration is costless and workers can freely move among 
locations. They live where they work, so we rule out the possibility of commuting. The 
free mobility assumption implies that the population allocation within the region is 
endogenous. In particular, the size of the city L  will depend on the spatial distribution 
of real wages.
7Fujita and Krugman (1995) show that this configuration can be an equilibrium outcome, if some 
conditions are met. In particular, if the population is relatively small, if manufacturing goods repre­
sent a large enough proportion of consumers’ expenditure or if consumers have a sufficiently strong 
preference for varieties.
8The model predictions are similar if we assume different transportation costs for agricultural, 
manufactured and import goods.
9This assumption is very important since it precludes the possibility of inter-regional migration. 
However, the assumption is not a very strong one, if we take into account evidence in the next section 
that shows very low levels of inter-regional migration flows in Cajamarca over the analyzed period.
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Figure 1.1: The monocentric economy
C onsum ers All consumers share the same homothetic preferences U = X fJ,AaM 1~a~^ 
where X  is a composite index of the domestically produced manufactured goods, A  is 
the agricultural good or food and M  is the import good. The quantity index X  is a 
CES function of the consumption of each available variety:
X = {^JQ ^id^ j P > 0 < p <  1,
where c* is the consumption of each individual variety and v is the range of vari­
eties. The parameter p denotes the taste for variety and a = the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties.
The representative consumer’s budget constraint in location r is given by
y M  =  Pa{r)A{r) +  pm(r)M (r) +  [  Pi(r)ci(r)di,
Jo
where Y  is the consumer’s income, pa is the price of food, pm is the price of the import 
good and pi is the price of variety i. Note that, due to transport costs, prices and 
quantities are location-specific.
Consumers maximize their utility given the budget constraint. We can solve 
the problem in two steps.10 First, we minimize the cost of attaining X  and ob­
tain the compensated demands for each variety Ci(r) =  X  where G(r) —
[Jq Pi{r)1~crdi \ 1~<7 is the price index for the manufacturing composite. Then, we
allocate the available budget between A , M  and X  using the utility function param-
Y (r )eters a  and a. The demand for the agricultural and import goods axe a —7-7 and
P a(r)
Y  (r) Y  (r)
(1 — a  — u) — —  respectively, while the demand of the composite X  is u-~ ~ . Com- 
P m {r)  G(r)
bining this expression with the compensated demand we obtain the uncompensated
demand for each variety:
ci(r) =  MV ( r ) ^ L =If. (1.1)
Furthermore, from the indirect utility function we can obtain the cost of living in 
a specific location r:
P (r) =  G(r)/ipa(r)Qpm(r)1-a-/i. (1.2)
5For a detailed exposition see Fujita et al. (1999, pp. 46-48).
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M anufacture producers The local manufacturing industry uses an increasing re­
turns to scale technology with labor as the only production factor. In particular, a 
firm requires k = F  +  (3x{ units of labor to produce Xi units of a variety of the manu­
facturing good. The presence of increasing returns to scale implies that each variety 
is produced by a single firm. There is free entry and exit to the industry, hence in 
equilibrium manufacturing firms make zero profits.
A firm’s profit is equal to piXi — wk, where Xi = c* as in equation (1.1) and w is 
the wage in the city.11 The resulting profit-maximization price is
Pi =  ~^—r(3w. (1.3)
<7 —  1
Note that this result implies pi =  p, i.e. all varieties have the same price, since 
they all share the same marginal cost (5. It follows that the manufacturing price index 
becomes G = p v " ^  and the location-specific individual demand for each variety (1.1) 
as
From the zero-profit condition we obtain a firm’s individual supply x =  —~
and its labor demand I = Fa.
A gricultural p roduction  and ru ra l h in terland  Farming uses a fixed proportion 
technology. It requires one unit of land and ca units of labor to produce one unit of 
food. Food is consumed locally and the surplus, a proportion 1—a, is sold to the city.12 
Landlords live in their landholdings, hence all the agricultural income is consumed 
locally. For a given frontier / ,  the total demand of labor from the agricultural sector 
is 2caf  and total food supply to the city is 2 (1 — a) Jq e~Trd.
Food is traded in the city at a price pa. However, due to transportation costs, the 
price of food received by farmers decreases with distance to the city, i.e. a farmer in 
location r receives pa(r) =  pa e-Tlrl where |r| measures the distance to the city. This 
means that the opportunity cost of consuming food is lower the greater the distance 
to the city.
In contrast, since the manufactured goods and import need to be shipped from 
the city to rural areas for their consumption, the corresponding prices increase with 
distance. In particular, in location r the price of the manufacture composite is G(r) = 
GeT\r\ and the price of imports, pm(r) = pmeT^ .  Taken together, these results imply 
that the price index in location r is
P (r) =  P e(1_2a)T|r|. (1.5)
n In the city, given the manufacturing sector zero-profit condition, the wage w  is also the average 
income.
12This follows from the representative consumer’s maximizing food consumption.
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Since landlords use ca units of labor to produce one unit of food, their rents are 
R(r) = pa e-Tlr l — caw(r), where w(r) is the wage rate in location r. The hinterland
extends around the city up to the point where rents are zero, or w (f) =   .
ca
Costless migration implies that in equilibrium the real wage is the same in all locations. 
In particular, we compare the real wage in the city and in the agricultural frontier to 
obtain the following wage equalization condition:13
pae_2(1_a)T/ Mw = ------   . (1.6)
°
Finally, we derive total demand for manufactures and import goods from the 
rural hinterland. Note that a proportion p of the local income is consumed in the 
manufactured good while the remaining 1 — a  — p  is spent on imports. In the rural 
hinterland, the total income -distributed between landlord and workers- corresponds 
to the price of the agricultural output pa(r) • Since landlords and agricultural workers 
share the same homothetic preferences, we can treat their demand as the one of a 
representative consumer. Replacing the values of local prices and income, we obtain 
the total demand of each manufactured good variety and import goods from the rural 
hinterland:
Manufactured goods: 2p —  [  e~2rrdr (1-7)
pv Jo
Imported goods: 2(1 — a — p)—  [  e~2rrdr. (1.8)
Pm Jo
E xport sector There are two types of firms in the export sector: producers of a 
tradeable commodity and a mine that extracts the natural resource. Both use labor 
as their input and sell their output in perfectly competitive external markets.
In contrast to the manufacturers supplying the domestic market, the commodity 
producers face decreasing returns to scale. In particular, their production function is 
E  (Le) =  Lg, where E  is the amount produced of the commodity, Le is the size of the 
workforce employed in the industry and e < 1. The industry profit is peE  (Le) — wLe, 
where pe is the price of the commodity. Solving for the profit maximization problem 
we obtain the unconditional labor demand function:
Labor demand: Le (w) = 1-6 . (1.9)
Note that epeE  is paid, as wages, to local workers; while the industry profits 7re =  
(1 — e)peE  are distributed among the firms’ shareholders. For simplicity we assume 
that all shareholders reside in the city and have similar preferences than workers.
The mine uses a fixed proportion of local labor in its production process. The
13Real wage equalization and the price index defined in (1.5), give us a nominal wage in location r 
equal to w(r) =  w e^~2a T^^ .
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demand of local labor is OS, where S  is the mine’s production and 0 < 1 is exogenously 
determined. Note that 0 captures the extent of backward linkages between the mine 
and the local economy. The mine is foreign-owned and there are no taxes, hence all 
the profits are remitted abroad.
1.2.2 Equilibrium
The instantaneous equilibrium is given by the solution of the following system of 
non-linear equations:
n < r -  1)
P
= ^  ^Lw  +  2pa J  e 2TTdr +
(1 — a) f  e TTdr =  (Lw +  7re )
Jo Pa
L =  vFcr +  Le (w) +  OS 
p0e_2(1_a)r/w =
peE(w) +  wOS = (1 — a — p) ^Lw  +  2pa J  e~2TTdr +  7re^
V =  Pw-^—r<7 —  1
N  = L -f- 2 caf .
1.10)
1.11)
1.12)
1.13)
1.14)
1.15)
1.16)
Equation (1.10) represents the market equilibrium of each variety of the local 
manufacture. The total demand on the right hand side is proportional to the regional 
income which is composed by the wages paid to city workers, agricultural income and 
the profits from the commodity export firms. Equation (1.11) is the food market 
equilibrium condition while equation (1.12) represents the equilibrium in the city’s 
labor market. Note that the labor demand in the city comes from local manufacturers, 
commodity export firms and the mine.
Equation (1.13) is the wage equalization condition (1.6) obtained from the assump­
tion of costless migration. Equation (1.14) represents the current account’s balance: in 
equilibrium the value of exports minus the net factor payments should be the same as 
the value of total imports.14 Equation (1.15) is the manufacturers’ profit maximiza­
tion condition (1.3). Finally, equation (1.16) represents the population constraint, 
where the size of the regional population equals the number of workers in the city and 
in the agricultural sector.
We solve the system analytically. First note that, using (1.12) and (1.16), we can 
write the number of manufacturing firms, v, as:
N  — 2 caf  -  Le (w) -O S  ^v{w, f )  = ------------- — ------------- . (1.17)
We assume a fixed exchange rate equal to one.
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Using this result, replacing (1.14) into (1.10) and re-arranging, we obtain:
, T (1 —  a —  a) e + a r  x 1 —  a  _  „  . .  . .N  -  2Caf-----7Z------------7 Le(w) -  ------------ 0S = 0. (AA)(1 — a — n)£  1 — a — n
Note that expression (AA) defines an upward sloping curve in the space (f ,w ). 
This curve has a positive intercept and also an upper bound /  on the values that /  
can adopt.15
Second, using (1.9), (1.13) and (1.16), solving for the integral over /  and rearrang­
ing, we can rewrite the equilibrium condition in the food market (1.11) as:
2c°[(1 + f ] ~ N ~  {1^ L e(W) =  0. (BB)
This expression defines a downward sloping curve in the space (f ,w ), with a lower 
bound /  on the values of / . 16
Intuitively, the curve AA is upward sloping because with a larger rural hinterland 
(higher / ) ,  the city has a smaller population and hence the labor supply is smaller. 
This translates into higher wages in the city. In contrast, curve BB is downward 
sloping because higher wages in the city increase agricultural wages (due to costless 
intra-regional migration). In turn, this means that the marginal farmer makes losses 
and hence the agricultural frontier shrinks (smaller /) .
To solve the model we plot curves AA and BB (see Figure 1.2). The intersection 
of both curves at point Q provides the unique pair (/*, w*) that solves the system and 
defines the equilibrium.17
1.2.3 The Effects of the M ine’s Expansion
We are now ready to use the model to perform a thought experiment and analyze the 
effect of the mine’s expansion on the regional economy. We simulate the expansion 
of the mine as an increase in S, the amount of natural resources extracted by the 
mine. The immediate effect of this shock is to increase demand of labor and shift the 
curve AA upwards as depicted in Figure 1.3. To understand this shift, note that /  
defines the distribution of people between city and rural countryside, and thus the 
labor supply in each area. Hence, keeping the labor supply fixed, increments on the 
demand for labor in the city due to the mine expansion would increase local wages.
As we see in Figure 1.3, the equilibrium moves from point Q to Qf with a higher 
wage in the city but smaller / .  The reduction on /  implies a smaller extension of 
agricultural frontier and a larger city population. Since N  is assumed to be fixed,
15To see this, note that /  =  lim f  =  ( n  — , 1-0 A#) and that limit; =
10— 00 2ca V 1 - a - n  J  / _ 0
L^1 ^2caf  )  ’ w^ere 1 is the inverse function of L e(w).
16Note that / =  lim /  =  g~1 (N),  where g~x (•) is the inverse function of g( f )  =  2ca [ ^  ~ _ 2?i -  a w /  ^+— XU—>00 ae
/]•
17See Appendix A .l for a formal proof.
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Figure 1.2: Model equilibrium
the grow of the city requires migration of agricultural workers to the city.18 In this 
model, the increase in wages -triggered by the mine expansion- is partially offset by 
migration to the city.
BB
Figure 1.3: The expansion of the mine
Crowding out The expansion of the mine, and the subsequent wage increment, 
displaces other economic activities. First, the reduction on the agricultural frontier
18 The assumption of a fixed N  is im portant to obtain the model predictions. If we assume instead 
costless inter-regional migration, the effect of the mine expansion on real income would be zero.
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implies a smaller agricultural production. Second, the higher wage reduces the employ­
ment, output and profits of the export sector which uses labor as its only production 
factor. This result is similar in flavor to the “Dutch disease”, commonly found in 
macroeconomic models of resource boom (Corden and Neary, 1982). In this case, the 
crowding out is driven by increase in the relative price of a production factor.
Nonetheless, the effect on the local manufacturing industry could be either positive 
or negative. On the one hand, the growth of the city population favors the increase in 
the number of firms, v , due to the increasing returns to scale. On the other hand, this 
positive effect is offset by the expansion of the mine’s labor demand, which reduces 
the labor available for manufacturing firms. The net effect depends on the extent 
of the mine’s backward linkages, 9. In particular, if it is sufficiently high, v would 
increase, because the multiplier effect would make the city population grow enough to 
satisfy the additional labor demand from the mine without harming the manufacturing 
industry.19
Effect on real wages From (1.2), we can obtain an expression for the real wage in 
the city:
where G = pv1^  and a > 1.
Note that the wage relative to the price of food and import goods and ^ )  
increases as a consequence of the expansion of the mine.20 These results highlights 
two sources for real wages to increase: the increase in the payments to labor relative to 
land rents, due to the additional demand; and the access to relatively cheaper import 
goods. However, the effect on real wages is ambiguous, because these gains may be 
offset by higher price of manufactured goods (G), if the number of firms reduces.21
1.2.4 Testable Predictions
The previous results provide the basis for the two testable predictions of the model 
regarding the effect of the mine expansion on real income and relative prices.
Effect on real income The income of households located in the city and rural hin­
terland comes from different sources. In the city, the households’ income is composed 
by wages and the dividends from export firms. In contrast, in the rural hinterland the 
income is proportional to the value of the agricultural output pa(r)- Taking that into
19See Appendix A .2 for a formal derivation of the condition.
20To see this note, from (1.13), that is decreasing on /  and hence increases with S. Additionally, 
given that the price of imports pm is exogenously determined and w  increases, ^  also increases.
21 We can, however, identify two plausible cases in which the real wage increases: when v  increases, 
and when v  decreases but local manufactures represent a small proportion of the budget (small p). 
See Appendix A.3 for a formal derivation of these conditions.
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account, we can write the average real income in location r as:
(1.19)
where y(r) is the average real income, P  is the general price index in the city, and k
The effect of the mine expansion on the income of city residents is, a priori, unclear 
and remains an empirical question. On the one hand, it increases due to higher wages. 
On the other hand, it decreases due to reduction on the profit of export firms, crowded 
out by the mining sector, and the (potential) increase in the price of the manufactured 
good due to the smaller number of firms.
We focus on the case in which the real income in the city increases with the mine 
expansion. In this case, the model provides clear testable predictions regarding the 
relation between income in the city and rural hinterland and relative prices.
P roposition  1 I f  the real income of city residents increases, then the real income of 
rural inhabitants must also increase.
Intuitively, the growth of urban income combined with the larger city population 
increases the demand for food. This shift of demand, combined with the reduction on 
food supply due to the smaller agricultural frontier, necessarily results on an increase 
in the price of food and on higher income in rural locations.
To explore the effects on welfare, note that the indirect utility of a household in 
location r is V(r) = /j,^aa(l — p — a)l~^~ay{r). Hence, the real income becomes 
a sufficient statistic for welfare. This result, however, does not hold in presence of 
externalities from the mine. For that reason, in the empirical section we explore 
different measures of welfare in addition to real income.
In this model, the shock of demand created by the mine expansion directly affects 
the city’s labor and goods markets. The effect is transmitted to the surrounding rural 
areas due to the trade links between the city and its rural hinterland. Since intra- 
regional trade is limited by the existence of transportation costs, a relevant question is 
how the effects of the mine expansion are distributed spatially in the economic region.
Proposition  2 When the mine expansion increases real income, the effect decreases 
monotonically with distance to the city.
The model predicts heterogeneous effects by distance, because transportation costs 
reduce the land rents for farmers in farther locations and absorb part of the gains on 
real income. In the extreme, beyond the agricultural frontier, the effect is nil since 
there is no trade with the city. In the empirical section, we use this insight as a key
22 Recall that in each farm there are ca workers and a landlord, but the total population is not 1 +  ca 
since a landlord can also be a worker.
is the unknown, but constant, population size in each rural locality.22
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element of the identification strategy. In particular, we obtain the distance from a 
locality to the city, and use it as a measure of different exposure of households to the 
mine expansion.
Effect on relative prices The increase of real income, and its transmission to 
agents not directly employed by the mine, are driven by changes in the relative prices 
of labor and food. To explore this mechanism further, we use the model to obtain 
predictions regarding the effect of the mine expansion on relative prices within the 
economic region. We focus on two types of goods that are possible to identify in the 
data: the agricultural good and the import good.
P roposition  3 I f  the real income of city residents increases due to the mine expan­
sion, then also increases. The effect on Pp $  is ambiguous.
The relative price of food in the region increases because it is proportional to the 
real agricultural income. In contrast, the effect on the relative price of the import 
good is ambiguous since G, one of the components of the price index may increase 
or decrease. However, if local manufactures represent a small proportion of the con­
sumption basket, then the relative price of imports would actually decrease due to the 
increase in price of food. A corollary of this result is:
P roposition  4 if the real income of city residents increases due to the mine expan­
sion, then the increase in y(r) is greater than the increase in where Y(r) is the 
nominal income in location r.
Note that — Pa(r$p(r) • ^  *s straightforward to see that the change on is 
smaller than the change on y(r) since also increases due to the mine expansion.
This result sheds light on the transmission channel of the effect from the city to 
the rural hinterland. Since rural income increments are driven for higher food prices, 
the income relative to the price of food should not vary as consequence of the mine 
expansion. In the city, the increment may be positive, but still smaller than the 
increase in y.
1.3 T he Case o f Yanacocha G old M ine
Peru has a long tradition as a mining country and ranks among the top producers of 
minerals in the world.23 In the late 1990s it experienced a mining boom and the sector 
expanded significantly. In the relevant period for our analysis, from 1997 to 2006, the 
mining product grew at an average annual rate of 7.4 percent while the economy’s 
growth rate was around 3.5 percent. As a consequence, the share of the mining sector 
in GDP went from 3.8 to 5.2 percent (Banco Central de Reserva del Peru, 2009). The
23In 2006 it was the first producer of gold, zinc, silver, lead and tin in Latin America and among 
the top five producers of those minerals in the world (Ministerio de Energia y Minas, 2006).
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mining growth has been mostly driven by the opening and expansion of large mining 
operations in gold, copper and silver.24
One of the largest new mines is Yanacocha. The mine is privately owped and none 
of the investors resides in the locality.25 Yanacocha is the second largest gold mine in 
the world, representing around 45 percent of the total Peruvian gold production, and 
the most profitable. The mine extracts gold from open pits and uses a very capital 
intensive technology. All production is exported as gold bars, with no other processing 
or added value. This feature precludes the creation of forward linkages.
The mine is located in the department of Cajamarca in the North Highlands of 
Peru. The department of Cajamarca is mostly rural and relatively poor. In 2006, 
Cajamarca was the eighth department (among 24) in terms of incidence of poverty, 
with 63.8 percent of the population living below the poverty line (INEI, 2007). The 
mine is located less than 50 km away from Cajamarca city, the department’s capital 
and largest urban settlement (see Figure 1.4 for a map of the spatial configuration). 
Due to the proximity to the city, most workers and local suppliers live there. This 
feature facilitates our analysis, because the city becomes the geographical market 
where the mine purchases local goods and services.26 There are other three major 
cities in the surrounding regions (Trujillo, Chiclayo and Chachapoyas) and some small 
and medium mines in the south of Cajamarca.27
Local procurem ent Yanacocha started operations in 1993, and its production in­
creased steadily over time. In 2001, it expanded its production due to the opening 
of new gold deposits Figure 1.5 shows the expansion of the mine production since 
1997 and the change of trend since 2001 associated to the expansion of the production 
capacity.
The growth on the mine size has required a steady increase in the purchase of 
production inputs such as explosives, machinery, oil, laboratory services, limestone, 
etc. As we will see below, the mine expansion coupled with a shift in procurement 
policies has increased Yanacocha’s local purchases and employment.
Yanacocha procures its inputs in three ways: purchasing goods to suppliers, di­
rectly hiring workers and contracting out services. In terms of origin, Yanacocha 
classifies the supplying firms as local and non-local depending of where they are regis­
tered for tax purposes and the origin of their shareholders.28 In particular, for a firm 
to be considered local it has to pay taxes in Cajamarca and have at least 50 percent
24Some of the new mines are Yanacocha (gold), Pierina (gold) and Antamina (silver and copper).
25The mine shareholders are: Newmont Mining Co., with more than 50 percent of the shares, 
Compania de Minas Buenaventura (more than 40 percent of the shares) and the World Bank (around 
5 percent of the shares). Newmont Mining Co. is a U.S. based company, while Compania de Minas 
Buenaventura has its headquarters in Lima, Peru’s capital city.
26Yanacocha classifies its purchases by origin as local (sourced in Cajamarca), national (bought 
from the rest of the country, mostly Lima) and foreign.
27These mines use more traditional technologies, have smaller scale and are more labor intensive 
than Yanacocha.
28The non-local category includes Lima, rest of Peru, and other countries.
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Figure 1.4: Location of mine and main cities
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of Cajamaxquinos among their shareholders. For individuals, the requirement is to be 
born in Cajamarca or to demonstrate continuous residence for at least five years in 
Cajamarca.29
In the first years of operation, Yanacocha had little economic interaction with the 
city of Cajamarca and its surroundings, with only a very small proportion of inputs 
bought locally (Kuramoto, 1999). For example, in 1998 the value of purchases from 
Cajamarca represented 3 percent of total good purchases and 15.5 percent of services. 
In contrast, purchases from Lima were 77.5 percent and 72.6 percent of goods and 
services respectively. The rest was bought abroad or in the rest of the country. There 
were also very few local firms among the top mine suppliers.30
A shift in procurem ent policy Since late 1990s, the mine started a shift in its 
procurement and employment policies aimed to increase the participation of local 
firms and workers. The policy change was promoted by the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), one of Yanacocha’s shareholders and Newmont’s main lender, as 
a way to increase the economic impact of the mine in the region and minimize the 
risk of conflict with the local population (Jenkins et al., 2007).31
The most important feature of the mine procurement policy was to give priority 
to local suppliers and workers in competitive bids and recruitment.32 For example, a 
2006 policy memorandum by the mine aiming at outsourcing services such as cleaning, 
waste management or transport, establishes that “in competitive bids with non-local 
companies, the Company has to prioritize the hiring of local small and medium en- 
terprizes”. Similarly, the memorandum specifies that the mine should ensure that at 
least 60 percent of personnel of the mine contractors reside in Cajamarca. This shift 
in policy becomes apparent in the evolution of local purchases and wage bill (including 
bonuses) that show a significant increase since 2000 (see Figure 1.5).
W h at does th e  m ine buy locally? The local purchases consist of relatively simple 
services and goods, with low quality requirements and not considered vital to the mine 
operations. The expenditure on services is larger that the expenditure on goods.33 
The main local services contracted locally include demolition, haulage and transport 
of material to leach pads, and cleaning and reforestation activities. More specialized 
services such as transport of dangerous materials, consulting, engineering, laboratory
29 This information was obtained from internal memorandums and interviews with Yanacocha rep­
resentatives.
30 Among the top 20 suppliers, there was only one local firm. In the case of service providers, there 
were four local firms among the top contractors.
31 The IFC is promoting policies to increase supply chain linkages in other mining, oil and gas 
projects. For example, a similar approach is being development in a new mine operated by Newmont 
in Ghana.
32 Yanacocha has also promoted quality certification among its suppliers, but it has not engaged in 
direct transfer of technology or training.
33For example, in 2004 the expenditure on services was around nine times greater than the expen­
diture on goods.
1 NATURAL RESOURCES AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT 30
200
180
3.0
160
2.5140
120
2.0
100
1.5
1.0
0.5
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
'W age bill and local purchases — —* Q uantity {in m illion ounces)
Figure 1.5: Evolution of Yanacocha’s local procurement and production
analysis, etc., are supplied by firms located in Lima or abroad. In the case of goods, 
local purchases consists mostly of construction materials, basic hardware, cleaning 
materials, vehicles spare parts, chemical products, office furniture, etc.
Even though local purchases and wages would imply different channels through 
which the activity of the mine affects household incomes (e.g. direct effect of wages 
or development of backward linkages), the distinction is not as clear-cut as it seems. 
The mine hires some workers directly; however, most workers located in the mine site 
are employed by contractors who provide services to the mine.
Figure 1.6 shows the evolution of the number of workers in the mine, directly 
employed by Yanacocha or indirectly through contractors. In the period 1997-2006 the 
number of total workers increases from 4,000 to 14,000, a substantial proportion of the 
active population of Cajamarca. To put this numbers in context, the mine’s workforce 
represented around 12 percent of the active population of the city of Cajamarca in 2001 
and 20 percent in 2005. Consistent with the mine policies, 60 percent of the workers 
are locals and almost all of them live in Cajamarca (Minera Yanacocha, 2006)
The increase of mine employment occurred in 2000 and was driven mainly by 
workers indirectly hired through contractors. Contractor workers represent a signifi­
cant proportion of the mine’s workforce. In average they represent 78.5 percent of the 
total mine workers. Workers that are hired directly by Yanacocha, tend to be skilled 
(engineers, accountants, technicians, secretaries, assistants, supervisors) as opposed
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Figure 1.6: Direct and indirect employment
1.4 D ata  and Identification S trategy
Household d a ta  The empirical analysis uses data from repeated cross sections of 
the Peruvian Living Standards Survey, an annual household survey collected by the 
the National Statistics Office (INEI).34
The survey consists of a stratified household sample representative at regional 
level. The regions are defined for statistical purposes and consider both environmental 
conditions (coast, highlands and forest) and geographical location (north, center and 
south).35 We focus on the North Highlands statistical region, where the mine is 
located. The data set covers 10 years, between 1997 and 2006, and includes more 
than 7700 households.36
Figure 1.7 shows the area of study and the spatial distribution of the sample. 
The area covers a surface of almost 40,000 square kilometers and had an estimated 
population of 1.2 million inhabitants in 2005.37 The darker shaded areas correspond
34The name of the survey is Encuesta Nacional de Hogares or ENAHO.
35In general, these statistical regions are larger than departments and do not necessarily share the 
same boundaries.
36 In line with the model, we restrict attention only to  household with an employed household head. 
This filter reduces the sample by just 46 observations and does not affect the results.
37The population estimates are obtained from the ENAHO survey.
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to districts sampled at least one year, while lighter shaded ones are districts for which 
there are not available observations. We can see that the sample is evenly distributed 
over the area of study.
The main purpose of the survey is to measure poverty and living standards. 
The survey contains detailed information on income, expenditure, socio-demographics 
(such as gender, age and educational attainment), composition of the household, hous­
ing characteristics like access to public utilities and construction materials, and self- 
reported incidence of health problems and exposure to crime. The data set also has 
extensive information on prices and agricultural activity at household level.
Additionally, we obtain the distance from the household’s location to the city. We 
measure distance as the length of the shortest path between the main town of the 
household’s district and Cajamarca city using the existing road network. We per­
formed the calculation using the ArcGIS software and maps produced by the Ministry 
of Transport of Peru. The road map corresponds to the network available in 2001 
and includes only tracks usable by motorized vehicles. In terms of the model, this 
variable is the empirical counterpart of r and relates to the total transportation cost 
from one location to the city markets. As suggested by the model, the effect of the 
mine expansion should decrease with distance to the mine’s supplying market. As 
described below, we exploit this heterogenous effects by distance to identify the effect 
of the mine on the regional economy.
Table 3.2 shows the estimated mean of the main variables at household level. Since 
we are using an stratified sample, the means are estimated using sampling weights. 
In the second column we report the standard errors of the mean estimates, which are 
calculated using sampling weights and clustering by primary sampling unit.
Poverty  line as a  price deflator The survey provides estimates at household level 
of nominal income and prices. However, the model provides predictions of the effect 
of the mine on y(r) and pa(r)/P(r),  the real income and relative price of food in a 
given location. To construct these variables we need a measure of P(r), the general 
price index in location r.
We use the value of the poverty line as a proxy for P(r). The poverty line is 
estimated by the National Statistics Office as the value of the minimum consumption 
basket that guarantees an adequate living standard. It is calculated using local prices 
and varies within region and over time.38
A concern with using poverty fine as a price index is that it may not be represen­
tative of the average consumption basket. Two reasons suggest that this may not be 
a relevant concern. First, the proportion of households with a consumption below the 
poverty line is 65 percent. This implies that the median household is poor and hence 
the consumption basket used to calculate the the poverty line may not be too different
38Ideally we would like to construct a price index for each locality; however, we are limited by the 
lack of representativeness of the sample at more local level.
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Figure 1.7: Area of study and spatial distribution of sample
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics of household data
Variables Mean
N=7738
Standard
error
Household head
Years of education 4.1 0.2
Age 48.4 0.7
% female 0.129 0.021
All individuals
% health problems 0.208 0.012
Household
Income per capita 143.7 10.8
Expenditure per capita 149.0 8.8
Poverty line 155.9 1.6
% poor 0.651 0.048
% extreme poor 0.374 0.040
% access to electricity 0.163 0.031
% access to water 0.616 0.054
% victim of crime 0.014 0.005
Nr. Household members 4.8 0.2
Nr. Income earners 2.0 0.1
Distance to Cajamarca city (km) 108.2 7.9
Note: The mean and its standard error are calculated using sample 
weights and clustering by primary sampling unit.
from its actual consumption. Second, we compare the evolution of the poverty line in 
Cajamarca city with an index of consumer prices calculated by the National Statistics 
Office. This price index is only available at city level and it is used to calculate city 
inflation. Figure 1.8 depicts both variables, normalized to be equal to 100 in year 
1997. Note that the poverty line has a similar trend until 2000 and then grows faster 
than the consumer price index.39 Thus, if anything, the use of the poverty line as 
a deflator may lead to an underestimation of the actual increase in real income or 
relative prices.
F irm  d a ta  To measure the expansion of the mine activities, we collect data from 
the Yanacocha reports on the mine wage bill, value of local purchases and quantity of 
gold produced (Minera Yanacocha, 2006). The frequency of this data is annual and 
covers the period 1993 to 2006.
Local purchases include goods and services bought to local suppliers and contrac­
tors. The wages of workers indirectly employed in the mine, through contractors, are 
also included in this variable. A supplier or contractor is classified as local if it is reg-
39This pattern is consistent with the model predictions. In particular, recall that the relative price 
of locally produced food may increase with mine expansion. Then if the poverty consumption basket 
has a larger proportion of local food than the basket used to calculate the consumer price index, we 
could expect the value of the poverty line to increase faster.
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Figure 1.8: Consumer price index and poverty line for Cajamarca city
istered for tax purposes in the department of Cajamarca and the main shareholders 
are also locals or with permanent residence in the department. The wage bill includes 
net wages and bonuses paid to workers directly employed by Yanacocha. The data on 
wages do not separate workers by location; however, almost all the mine’s workforce 
lives in Cajamarca city.
Panel A in Table 1.2 presents summary statistics for the firm level data over the 
period 1997 to 2006. The value of wage bill and local purchases is measured in million 
of U.S. dollars while the quantity produced is measured in million of ounces.
M unicipality da ta  We complement the household and firm data with data at mu­
nicipality level.40 Municipalities are the lowest tier of autonomous local government 
with jurisdiction over districts. We use this administrative unit to calculate the dis­
tance from the city to the households.
We obtain annual data about revenues and expenditures for each municipality in 
the North Highlands region and within 400 km from Cajamarca city. This geographical 
scope corresponds to the distance range observed in the household data. The dataset 
includes information on 179 municipalities over the period 1998 to 2006.
Our dataset contains detailed information about the sources of revenue, including 
the amount of mining transfers received. This information provides a reliable mea­
sure of the magnitude of the revenue windfall experienced by each local government. 
The expenditure is also divided between capital and current expenditures. This is a
40 We use this data in Section 1.6.1 to evaluate the role of the fiscal revenue windfall as an alternative 
explanation of the observed phenomena.
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relevant distinction since the mining transfers are earmarked to capital expenditures, 
and hence we can expect a relative increase of this category of expenditure.41
Panel B in Table 1.2 displays some summary statistics. The average municipality 
has an annual budget of 3.5 million of Nuevos Soles, but a slightly smaller expenditure. 
The difference is kept by the local government and rolled forward to next periods. In 
the period of analysis, capital expenditures represented around 40 percent of total 
expenditures, while mining transfers were around 12 percent of total revenue.
Table 1.2: Summary statistics of firm and municipality data
Variables Mean Standard
deviation
A. Firm data
Wage bill 55.5 33.9
Local purchases 42.3 27.7
Gold production 2.18 0.76
local purchases /  total 0.12 0.05
purchases
B. Municipality data
Total revenue 3.53 8.20
Mining transfer 0.41 2.08
Total expenditure 2.96 6.52
Capital expenditure 1.26 2.42
Note: The value of wage bill and local purchases is mea­
sured in million of US$ while the quantity produced is mea­
sured in million of ounces. The municipal data is measured 
in million of Nuevos Soles.
Identification s tra teg y  The aim of the empirical exercise is to evaluate the effect 
of the mine expansion on real income, relative prices and measures of welfare.42 To 
do that, we exploit two sources of variation. First, we use the significant increase in 
Yanacocha’s wage bill and local purchases started in 2000. As previously mentioned, 
this growth was driven by the increment on gold extraction and implementation of 
mine’s policies directed at increasing local procurement and employment.
Second, we use distance to the city as a measure of heterogeneous exposure to 
the mine expansion. As predicted by the model, we expect the effect on real income, 
if positive, to decrease with distance to the city due to transportation costs. At 
a large enough distance, the effect should become insignificant because there is no 
economic interaction between those locations and the city. This prediction suggests 
that we could use households living in areas farther from the city as a control group 
of households living in areas closer to it. In the sample, the distance ranges from 0 to
41 Capital expenditures include mainly the investment on infrastructure projects.
42We provide more details about the measures of welfare and the rationale for using them in the 
next section.
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400 km with an average value of around 100 km. We use this threshold to divide the 
districts in two categories: far and closer to the city.43
Our identification strategy is basically a difference in difference, with the expansion 
of the mine being the treatment and the distance to the city defining treated and 
control groups. The underlying identification assumption is that the evolution of the 
outcome variables in areas close and far from the city would have been similar in the 
absence of the mine expansion.
Figure 1.9 illustrates the basic idea behind the identification strategy. It plots the 
conditional mean of real income per capita for households located in districts within 
100 km from the city and farther away.44 Note that until 2001 the real income follows 
similar trends in both locations. After that, it diverges and increases in areas located 
closer to the city relative to areas located farther away.
The similarity of trends in both areas before the expansion of the mine is a nec­
essary condition for the validity of our difference in difference strategy. There may 
be, however, other unobserved time-varying factors correlated with the expansion of 
the mine and affecting differently areas closer and farther from the city, which would 
invalidate our identification assumption.
In Section 1.7, we explore the possibility of confounding factors by including het­
erogenous non-parametric trends based on observable characteristics (such as urban­
ization, density, type of economic activity or proximity to a city) and by performing a 
falsification test using other cities in the north of Peru that do not have a nearby mine. 
In all cases, the results are similar to the baseline regressions and provide suggestive 
evidence that our estimates capture the effect of the mine expansion.
To formally evaluate the effect of the mine expansion on real income, relative prices 
and measures of welfare, we estimate the following regression:
In yhdt = otd + rjt + /3(In Mt x Dd) +  X hdtj  + ehdt, (1.20)
where yhdt is the outcome variable of household h in district d in year t. The outcome 
variables could be real income, relative price or a measure of welfare. Mt is a measure 
of the mine activity, lagged two periods to allow adjustments in market prices.45 In 
the baseline specification we use the value of the mine’s wage bill and local purchases, 
but we also check the robustness of the results using alternative measures such as the 
value of local purchases or quantity of gold produced. Dd is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
district where the household lives is within 100 km of Cajamarca city, and 0 otherwise. 
This dummy identifies households living close and far to the city and thus defines the 
treated and control group (see Figure 1.10 for a map of the spatial distribution of
43 In Section 1.7.3 we check the robustness of the results using alternative definitions of proximity 
and distance.
44The mean is conditional on schooling, age and gender of the household head, access to water and 
electricity, number of household members and number of income earners.
45 The results are similar using other time lags.
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Figure 1.9: Conditional mean of real income
both groups). X/lc& is a vector of time-varying control variables. In this specification, 
the parameter of interest is (3 which captures the effect of the mine expansion.
All regressions include year (r)t ) and district (ay) fixed effects to account for com­
mon regional shocks and unobserved time-invariant district characteristics. The re­
gressions are estimated using sample weights and clustering the standard errors at the 
level of the primary sampling unit. The primary sampling unit is a geographical unit 
smaller than districts and defined for sampling purposes. The estimation procedure 
takes into account that the sample is not a random draw of the region’s population 
but an stratified sample.46 The reason for clustering is to account for spatial cor­
relation of households exposed to similar shocks and market conditions, or surveyed 
simultaneously.
1.5 M ain R esults
The model highlights a market channel for the extractive industry to affect a regional 
economy. In this story, the mine expansion increases the demand for local labor. This 
demand shock increases wages in the city, but it is partially offset by migration of rural 
workers. The net effect on city income is ambiguous due to the crowding out of other 
sectors, that may reduce alternative sources of income such as dividends from export 
firms. However, if city income increases, the price of local food crops also increase 
due to the lower supply. In turn, this translates into higher income in rural locations,
46See Magee et al. (1998) for a discussion on the use of sample weights with complex survey data.
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but the effect decreases with distance due to transportation costs. In the absence of 
externalities, the increase in real income also represents increase in welfare.
This mechanism resembles the multiplier effect with growth in the mining industry 
creating ripple effects in other sectors of the economy. The magnitude of the effect 
depends on the extent of backward linkages connecting the extractive industry to the 
rest of the economy.47 The benefits accrue to all residents of the regional economy -not 
only to the ones directly employed in the mine or living in the city- due to mobility 
of goods and labor, but do not reach households living outside the city hinterland.
In this section we first evaluate the model predictions regarding the effect on real 
income and relative price of local food crops. Then, we explore the effect on welfare 
and the re-distributional effects of the mine expansion.
1.5.1 Effect on Real Income
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.3 show the estimates of (3 using the baseline specifica­
tion (1.20) with different measures of the mine activity. Panel A uses the value of the 
mine wage bill and local purchases as a measure of mine activity while panels B and 
C use the value of the mine local purchases and the quantity of gold produced, respec­
tively. All regressions include year and district fixed effects and a vector of control 
variables. In column (1) we use the full set of control variables including character­
istics of the household head such as education, age, gender and dummies indicating 
the occupation industry and type of job (e.g. independent worker, employee, wage 
worker, etc.). It also includes household characteristics like access to water, electric­
ity and number of household members and income earners. In column (2) we use a 
more parsimonious specification with only the household head’s schooling, age and 
occupation industry dummies.
In all the cases, the estimates of (3 -the change on real income associated to the 
mine expansion- are positive and significant. The similarity of results shows that the 
results are not sensitive to different measures of the mine activity or alternative set 
of control variables.48 In what follows, we use the mine wage bill and local purchases 
as our preferred measure of the mine activity because it relates, more closely, to the 
mine’s demand of local inputs.49
The positive relation between the mine expansion and real income suggests that 
the crowding out of local firms (and the subsequent reduction of their profits) does not 
affect the income of the average household. This is not surprising since most people
47 The model suggests that if the mine does not buy local inputs, its expansion would not have any 
effect on the regional economy.
48We also use real expenditure per capita as a dependent vaxiable. The results, not reported, are 
similar.
49Note that the quantity of gold produced can be used as an instrument for the mine wage bill and 
local purchases. In that case, the results in Panel C would correspond to the reduced form estimates. 
We run a 2SLS regression using the quantity of gold as an instrument for the mine’s wage bill and 
local purchases, and find an estimate for /? =  0.306, significant at five percent.
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in the sample are wage workers or farmers, and hence less likely to be affected by 
reduction on firm profits.50
Under the assumption that the evolution of income in locations far and closer to 
the city would have been similar in the absence of Yanacocha, we can interpret these 
results as the evidence of a positive effect of the mine on real income. The magnitude of 
the effect is economically significant: the smallest estimate using the full specification 
suggests that a 10 percent increase in the mine’s activity is associated to an increase 
of 1.7 percent in the real income of households located closer to the city. Note that 
the evolution of Yanacocha implies large changes in household incomes since, by any 
measure, the activity of the mine has multiplied by at least a factor of two.
The model predicts that the effect of the mine expansion on real income decreases 
with distance. This heterogenous response justifies the use of households far from the 
city as controls for households closer to the city. To explore this hypothesis further 
we present two additional specifications. First, we use a flexible specification for the 
measure of distance. In particular, we divide the households in six groups according 
to the distance to the city and create dummies corresponding to each category. The 
categories start with households living in Cajamarca city and then group them in 
blocks of up to 50 km, with the last category containing all households located at 
least 200 km from the city. Then we estimate the baseline regression (1.20) with the 
full set of controls, using the mine wage bill and local purchases as measure of the 
mine activity interacted with each of the distance dummies. The omitted category is 
the group of households living farther than 200 km.
Figure 1.11 shows the estimates of j3 for households located at each of the distance 
brackets, as well as the 95 percent confidence interval. The estimates are positive 
and significant for households located within 100 km of Cajamarca city, but become 
insignificant for households located in farther locations. These results provide the 
basis for using a dummy variable of distance and reduces concerns about the observed 
average effect being driven exclusively by city residents.51
Second, we run a regression on the interaction of the measure of the mine’s activity 
and the continuous measure of distance, expressed in hundreds of kilometers. The 
results are displayed in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.3. Note that in almost all 
the cases, the estimated parameter is negative and significant. Taken together, these 
results are consistent with the prediction of the model that the effects decrease with 
distance.52
50In the sample, 95 percent of individuals work as independent workers, laborers, employees or 
family workers.
51 For example if the distribution of household income improvements was only concentrated in 
Cajamarca city, the reduced form estimates would be just averaging out large positive effects in the 
city and negative or zero effects in the vicinity.
52In section 1.7.3 we evaluate the robustness of the results to the use of alternative measures of 
distance and non-linear functional forms.
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Table 1.3: Effect of Yanacocha’s expansion on real income per capita
Ln(real income per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Measure of mine activity =  mine’s wage bill and local purchases
Mine activity 0.174** 0.161*
x distance < 100 km (0.078) (0.088)
Mine activity -0.128** -0.102
x continuous distance (0.062) (0.064)
R-squared 0.521 0.349 0.521 0.348
B. Measure of mine activity =  mine’s local purchases
Mine activity 0.215** 0.188*
x distance < 100 km (0.091) (0.101)
Mine activity -0.151** -0.119*
x continuous distance (0.060) (0.064)
R-squared 0.523 0.35 0.522 0.349
C. Measure of mine activity =  mine’s gold production
Mine activity 0.313** 0.316**
x distance < 100 km (0.131) (0.154)
Mine activity -0.207** -0.185*
x continuous distance (0.100) (0.106)
R-squared 0.523 0.35 0.522 0.349
Observations 7738 7738 7738 7738
Full set of controls yes no yes no
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and 
*** significant at 1%. All regressions include year and district fixed effects. The full 
set of control variables includes: household head’s education, age, gender and dummies 
indicating her industry of occupation and type of job, plus household access to water, 
electricity and number of household members and income earners. Columns (2) and (4) 
use a smaller set of controls: household heads’ schooling, age and dummies of her industry 
of occupation. Columns (3) and (4) use a measure of continuous distance, expressed in 
hundreds of kilometers.
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Figure 1.11: Effect of Yanacocha’s wage bill and local purchases on household 
income, by distance to Cajamarca city
1.5.2 Effect on Relative Prices
The model predicts an increase in the relative price of locally produced goods -such 
as foodstuff- as a consequence of the demand shock initiated by the mine activities. 
This price increment is responsible for transmitting the effect among rural agricultural 
producers, who do not participate directly in the city’s labor market. In contrast, the 
model is mute regarding the effect on the relative price of imported goods. Their 
relative price may increase or decrease (see Proposition 3).
To test these predictions, we start by identifying the main crops in the area of 
study. We use information from the household survey about agricultural production 
and rank the crops according to its contribution to the regional agricultural gross 
product.53 In our sample, the two most important crops are potatoes and maize. 
Together they account for almost half of the agricultural gross product.54 These 
results are consistent with the data from the 1994 Agricultural Census. According 
to the census, potatoes and maize were the most widespread crops in the highlands 
of Cajamarca representing more than 50 percent of the land cultivated with annual 
crops.
For each crop we obtain the farm gate price received by the producer based on
53The survey has detailed information about the production and value of individual crops at pro­
ducer level.
54In the period 1997 to  2006, they represented 30 percent and 16 percent of the value of agricultural 
production, respectively. Their contribution remained relatively constant over the period of analysis.
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reported quantity and value of production. In addition, we calculate the unit value 
paid by consumers using information about total expenditure and quantity purchased. 
These variables do not correspond exactly to market prices because they are also 
affected by the household’s quality choice. The producer prices and unit values are 
then divided by the value of the poverty line to obtain measures of relative prices.
To explore the effect of the mine expansion, we estimate the baseline regression
(1.20) using as dependent variable the logarithm of the measure of relative prices. 
When using unit values, we include as an additional control variable the logarithm 
of the household real income to account for quality choices (Deaton, 1997).55 In the 
case of prices at producer level, we do not include any additional control. The reason 
is that the inclusion of income or expenditure as controls would bias the results since 
the income of agricultural producers also depends on crop prices.
Table 1.4 presents the estimates using the measures of prices at producer and 
consumer level. In most cases, the estimates suggest that the relative prices of local 
crops in areas closer to the city increase relative to prices in markets located in farther 
locations. The use of year fixed effects reduce concerns that this relation is driven by 
an underlying common trend. There is no significant change of the price of price 
received by producers (Column 2), though there is a positive and significant effect 
on the price paid by consumers. The lack of effect in the case of the farm gate price 
of maize may be due to the poor development of the maize market. According to 
the survey, only 40 percent of the maize production was sold, while the proportion of 
potatoes sold was 63 percent. In contrast, around of 63 percent of the potatoes were 
sold.
Table 1.4: Effect of mine expansion on price of local goods
Ln relative price of:
Potatoes Maize
(1) (2) (3)_____________ (4)
Mine’s wage bill and 0.128* 0.084* -0.026 0.110***
local purchases x 
distance <100 km
(0.074) (0.050) (0.082) (0.038)
Prices reported by: producer consumer producer consumer
Real income per capita no yes no yes
Observations 3407 4072 4253 4000
R-squared 0.417 0.524 0.374 0.19
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** 
significant at 1%. All regressions include year and district fixed effects. Columns (1) and (3) 
do not include any additional control variable. Columns (2) and (4) include ln(real income 
per capita) as control variable.
55The underlying assumption is that quality is correlated with income.
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As a second step, we replicate the same empirical exercise using unit values of 
commodities consumed by a large number of households and less likely to be locally 
produced such as rice, sugar, cooking oil and canned fish.56 In the model, these 
goods correspond to the import good. Similar to the previous regressions, we use 
the baseline specification (1.20) and include the log of real income per capita as an 
additional control variable. The results are shown in Table 1.5. In contrast to the case 
of local crops, the effect of the mine on relative prices is negative or insignificant. This 
result reduces concerns that the observed increase in relative price of locally produced 
food is driven by a general increase of food stuff.
Table 1.5: Effect of mine expansion on price of non-local goods
Ln relative price of:
Rice Sugar Cooking Canned
oil fish
______________ (1) (2) (3)_____________(4)
Mine’s wage bill and 0.021 0.037 0.020 -0.111*
local purchases x (0.033) (0.029) (0.028) (0.064)
distance < 100 km
Prices reported by: consumer consumer consumer consumer
Real income per capita yes yes yes yes
Observations 5174 5520 2349 925
R-squared 0.416 0.349 0.591 0.486
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** 
significant at 1%. All regressions include year and district fixed effects, and ln(real income 
per capita) as control variable.
We can go further and explore the changes on income relative to the price of local 
food. As predicted by the model, we expect the increase in income deflated using 
the price of local crops to be smaller than the increase in income deflated by a more 
general price index (Proposition 4). The main reason is that the increase in rural 
income is mostly driven by higher food prices, hence the effect of the mine expansion 
on income deflated by food price should be negligible.
To test this prediction we re-estimate the baseline regression (1.20), using alter­
native measures of prices to deflate the nominal income. In particular, we use the 
unit value of potatoes and maize. In both cases, we take the average value by pri­
mary sampling unit to reduce measurement errors and obtain better proxies of the 
underlying prices.
Table 1.6 displays the results. Columns (1) and (2) use as explained variable the 
log of the income divided by the unit value of potatoes or maize. Column (3) displays
56For example, rice represents only 1.6 percent of the agricultural product in the sample, while sugar 
and cooking oil axe processed food stuff traded at national level. Of particular interest is canned fished 
(sardine), because the region is landlocked and thus the production is certainly not local.
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the baseline result using the poverty line as deflator. Note that the estimated effect 
of the mine expansion is positive but insignificant when using the unit values of local 
crops as deflators. The point estimates axe also smaller than the ones obtained using 
poverty line as a deflator.
Table 1.6: Effect of mine expansion on real income, using alternative price deflators
Ln(relative income per capita) 
(1) __ ... (?)___________ (3)
Mine’s wage bill and 0.137 0.115 0.174**
local purchases x (0.091) (0.091) (0.078)
distance <100 km
Deflator of unit value unit value poverty
nominal income of potatoes of maize line
Observations 7132 7089 7738
R-squaxed 0.562 0.525 0.521
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are ad­
justed for clustering at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant 
at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions 
include year and district fixed effects, and control variables.
1.5.3 Effect on W elfare
We have shown that the mine has had a positive effect on real income. In the context 
of the model, this increase of real income translates into higher household utility. 
However, in the presence of negative externalities this is not necessarily the case. The 
negative effects of the mine may offset the benefits of having a higher income and 
leave households neither better or worse off. In that case, higher wages would just 
compensate for the mine negative externalities.
For example, the mine may have increased the actual, or expected, levels of pol­
lution or environmental degradation with negative effects on health. Similarly, the 
influx of new population and growth of the city may be linked to increase in criminal 
activity or anti-social behavior. There is anecdotal evidence of concerns among the 
population about the risk of water pollution due to the use of highly toxic chemicals 
in the mine, and discomfort associated to the perceived increase in prostitution and 
crime (Pasco-Font et al., 2001, p. 156).
To evaluate the effect on welfare, we proceed in the following way. We first treat 
the mine as an “amenity” and apply the analytical framework developed by Roback 
(1982) that suggests using changes on housing prices as a measure of net welfare effects. 
Then, we evaluate changes on indicators of negative spillovers -such as incidence of 
health problems and crime.
1 NATURAL RESOURCES AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT 47
1.5.4 The Mine as an Amenity
Using the simplest version of the model in Roback (1982), the mine can be studied 
as an amenity that generates locational externalities (positive or negative) in a region 
with perfect labor mobility and a fixed supply of housing. If the mine generates neg­
ative externalities to workers (e.g. pollution), there is an outflow of people from that 
particular location. This emigration increases wages but decreases property prices. 
Alternatively, if the mine creates positive externalities to producers (e.g. due to ag­
glomeration economies) there is an increase in labor demand and wages.57 The higher 
wages attract immigrant workers and increase the price of housing. If both forces are 
at play, wage unequivocally increases but the effect on rent is ambiguous and depends 
of the relative magnitude of both externalities.
A particularly useful implication of this model is that changes on property values 
reflect the net effects on welfare (for an empirical application see Greenstone and 
Moretti (2003)). In particular, lower property prices would suggest that the increase 
in real income is just compensating workers for negative externalities. In contrast, an 
increase in house prices would provide evidence of a net positive effect.
To evaluate this hypothesis, we use data from the household survey on self-reported 
house rents. This variable was obtained asking home owners about the minimum price 
they would require for renting their property.58 We calculate a proxy for relative price 
of property dividing the reported house rents by the value of the poverty line.
Then, we estimate the baseline regression (1.20) with the logarithm of the relative 
house rent as dependant variable. In addition to year and fixed effects, the regression 
includes controls for observable house characteristics that may affect the property 
value such as type of urban settlement, construction materials (walls and floor), num­
ber of rooms and access to utilities (water, sewage, electricity and phone landline). In 
addition, we also include household socioeconomic variables -like schooling, age and 
gender of the household head and number of members and income earners- to ac­
count for systematic biases in the report of rental price. This empirical specification 
corresponds to the hedonic regression, a widely used method to assess the value of 
environmental amenities.59
Table 1.7 displays the results using different sets of control variables. Column (1) 
includes only house characteristics while column (2) runs the complete specification 
with socio-economic controls. In both cases, we find evidence of a positive relation 
between the mine activity and house rents. The magnitude of the effect is significant, 
with an estimated elasticity of 0.24. This evidence is consistent with the mine activities 
having a positive net effect on household’s welfare.
57This effect is similar to the one emphasized in our model in Section 1.2
58We did no use actual rent prices due to the small number of observations. In the sample, only 6 
percent of households live in rented accommodation.
59See Black (1999) and Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) for examples of empirical applications.
1 NATURAL RESOURCES AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT
Table 1.7: Effect of mine expansion on house rents
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Ln (relative value of house rent) 
(1) (2)
Mine’s wage bill and 0.250** 0.238**
local purchases x (0.095) (0.092)
distance < 100 km
House characteristics yes yes .
Socio-economic controls no yes
Observations 7699 7696
R-squared 0.635 0.650
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant at 10%,
** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include 
year and district fixed effects. Column (1) include as additional controls 
only house characteristics such as type of urban settlement, construction 
materials (walls and floor), number of rooms and access to utilities (water, 
sewage, electricity and phone landline). Column (2) adds socio-economic 
characteristics of the household such as schooling, age and gender of the 
household head and number of household members and income earners.
1.5.5 H ealth  and  Crim e
A main limitation of the previous analysis is that the self-reported rental prices may 
fail to fully capture the net effect on household welfare. This may happen, for exam­
ple, if housing markets are incomplete, if self-reported rental prices are biased or if 
individuals lack information regarding the negative effects associated to the mine.
To address this issue, we test directly for the presence of some negative effects 
associated to the expansion of the mine. In particular, we use data from the household 
survey to construct dummy variables to indicate whether an individual had a health 
problem, and whether a household member was victim of a criminal activity.60 Then, 
we use these dummies as the dependent variables in the baseline regression (1.20) and 
estimate it using a linear probability model. As control variables we use an indicator 
of whether the household fives in a urban or rural area, access to water, sanitation 
and electricity, number of household members and income earners, and individual’s 
sex and age.61
Table 1.8 shows the results. Column (1) uses the whole sample of individuals, 
including children, while in column (2) we restrict the sample to children under the 
age of five, who may be more vulnerable to negative health spillovers. Note that in 
both cases the incidence of self-reported health problems has actually decreased with 
the expansion of the mine. Column (3) shows that there is no apparent increase in
60 The survey questions are “In the last four months, have you felt sick, suffered a chronic disease 
or an accident?” and “In the last 12 months, has any member of the household been affected by a 
criminal act?”.
61 The results are robust to the exclusion of the control variables.
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crime associated with the expansion of the mine.
Nonetheless, we need to interpret these results with caution. They only suggest 
that there is no evidence that individuals in the area of influence of the mine have 
suffered more occasional illnesses, that could result from a more polluted environment. 
But, we cannot say anything about long run effects, such as general deterioration in 
health or chronic afflictions that could result from exposure to the activities of the 
mine. Similarly, the measure of crime only informs us about the perceived level of 
crime but may fail to account for other forms of social disorder or crimes within the 
household. Moreover, it may reflect changing perceptions of crime.
Taken together, these results do not rule out the presence of negative externalities. 
They suggest, however, that their magnitude, at least as perceived by the residents, 
may not be too important. This finding is consistent with the observed net improve­
ments on household welfare discussed previously.
Table 1.8: Yanacocha’s expansion and measures of health and crime
Health problems Crime
(1)__________(2) (3)
Mine’s wage bill and -0.087*** -0.008 0.001
local purchases x (0.039) (0.057) (0.008)
distance <100 km
Sample All Children Households
individuals under 5 years
Observations 39674 4189 6663
R-squared 0.076 0.157 0.048
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** signifi­
cant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. Health problems is a self-reported measure 
of whether an individual was sick in the recent past, while Crime is a self-reported 
measure of anyone in the household being victim of a crime in the recent past. All 
regressions are estimated using a linear probability model. Columns (1) and (2) 
include as control variables an indicator of the house being in a urban area, ac­
cess to water, sanitation and electricity, number of household members and income 
earners, and individual’s sex and age. Column (3) use similar controls but exclude 
individuals’ age and sex.
1.5.6 D istribu tional Im pacts
The previous results are only informative of the effect of the mine expansion on the in­
come and welfare of the average household. They do not tell us, however, whether the 
operations of the mine have reduced poverty or whether the effects were distributed 
evenly across different income groups. The increase in average income may hide nega­
tive re-distributional effects with only the richer benefitting from the mine expansion. 
Even if equally distributed, the income increase may have been insufficient to close
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the poverty gap.
We address these questions in two steps. First, we evaluate the effect of the mine 
expansion on measures of poverty. To do so, we estimate the baseline regression
(1.20) using as dependent variables dummies indicating whether a household is poor 
or extreme poor. The difference between these two categories is the definition of 
the minimum consumption basket, which is more restrictive for the case of extreme 
poor.62 We estimate the regression using a linear probability model and interpret the 
coefficients as the change on the probability of being poor or extreme poor. Table 1.9 
displays the results. Note that the mine expansion is associated to reductions on the 
probability of being poor or extreme poor.
Table 1.9: Yanacocha’s expansion and poverty
Poor
(1)
Extreme
poor
(2)
Mine’s wage bill and -0.107*** -0.075**
local purchases x (0.036) (0.056)
distance <100 km
Observations 7738 7738
R-squared 0.406 0.3572
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are ad­
justed for clustering at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant 
at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions 
are estimated using a linear probability model.
Second, we explore the distributional impact of the mine expansion estimating the 
the effect of the mine on real income at different points of the conditional income 
distribution using quantile regressions s63 The model specification is the same as the 
baseline regression (1.20), but the estimator does not use the sampling weights nor 
cluster the errors by primary sampling unit.
Figure 1.12 plots the estimates of j3 -the effect of the mine expansion on real 
income- (on the vertical axis) and the confidence interval at 95 percent at different 
quantile values. The estimated parameter is positive and significant for all quantiles 
except for the top 20 percent. These results mean that households with income below 
the 80th percentile, conditional on the control variables, experienced an increase of 
real income associated to the mine expansion in areas within 100 km from Cajamarca 
city. We cannot conclude from this result that inequality has not increased, but we 
can claim that the positive effects were evenly distributed across income groups, even 
among the poorer households.
In this section we have provided evidence that the increase in income that followed
62 In the sample, 65.2 percent of households are poor, while 37.4 percent are classified as extreme 
poor.
63See Koenker and Hallock (2001) for a survey of the literature on quantile regressions.
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the expansion of local purchases by Yanacocha is also associated with a positive net 
welfare effect. There is no evidence of short run negative externalities, poverty has 
decreased and even the poorest of the poor in Cajamarca city and surroundings have 
obtained an increase in income relative to households in other surrounding areas.
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Figure 1.12: Effect of Yanacocha’s wage bill and local purchases on household
income, by quantile
1.6 A lternative E xplanations
In addition to local purchases and employment, there are at least two other channels 
through which Yanacocha’s activities might have affected the regional economy: a 
revenue windfall to local governments and direct transfers to local groups, through 
higher wages or local development projects.
1.6.1 Fiscal Revenue W indfall
Local governments receive a transfer from the central government, funded with the 
taxes paid by the mine. In particular, 50 percent of the corporate tax paid by the 
mine is distributed to local governments in the region.64 This mining transfer (called 
canon minero) is allocated according to a formula established by law, that takes into
64 Mining firms also pay fees for operational rights (derecho de vigencia) which is distributed to the 
local government where the mine pits are. The total fee is proportional to the extension of the mining 
operation, regardless of actual production. Its magnitude is much smaller than the canon minero.
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account location of the mine pits, population, density and poverty incidence.65
This source of local revenue grew in the last years following the expansion of the 
mine operations and represented a substantial revenue windfall for local governments. 
For example, between 1998 and 2006 the total amount of mining transfers in the area 
multiplied by a factor of 7 and its contribution to the municipal budget increased from 
8 percent to 25 percent.
This revenue windfall may explain the observed relation between the mine expan­
sion and real income. For example, the additional revenue could have increased public 
spending and demand of local inputs. Similarly, better public good provision could 
have enhanced household welfare, and contributed to the increase in housing rents.
In order to understand the mechanism driving the results, we evaluate whether 
the effects on real income and welfare are driven by a fiscal channel (additional public 
spending) or by a market channel (mine’s demand of local inputs). We address this 
question in two steps. First, we evaluate the effect of the revenue windfall on municipal 
total revenue and spending. Second, we evaluate the effect of real income and welfare 
using both the measure of the mine local demand and the revenue windfall received 
by the local government where the household resides.
Effect on m unicipal revenue and spending As a first step, we check whether 
the revenue windfall from the mining transfer translated into higher revenue and 
expenditure for local governments. To do that, we estimate the following regression:
Vit =  OLi+-nt +  f a it  +  €it, (1 .21 )
where yu is a revenue or expenditure outcome of municipality i in year t, such as the 
logarithm of total revenue or the share of capital expenditure while xa is the loga­
rithm of the amount of mining transfer received. This specification includes year and 
municipality fixed effects, and exploits within municipality variation. The standard 
errors are clustered at municipality level to address possible serial autocorrelation.
Table 1.10 displays the results using different dependent variables. All the vari­
ables, except the share of capital expenditures, are expressed as logarithms. In all 
the cases the estimates of (3 are positive and significant. This result supports the 
claim that the revenue windfall associated to the mining transfer increased both the 
available budget and actual spending. Capital expenditure increased even faster that 
other expenditures, as the increase of its share in total expenditure indicates. This 
result is expected since, by law, the revenues from the mining transfer should be used 
only for capital expenditures.
65 More specifically, 10 percent of the tax collected goes to the district where the mine is located,
25 percent goes to other districts in the province, 40 percent to the province government and the 
remaining 25 percent to the departmental government (Minera Yanacocha, 2006).
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Table 1.10: Effect of mining transfers on municipal revenue and expenditure
Total
revenue
(1)
Total
expenditure
(2)
Capital
expenditure
(3)
Share of 
capital 
expenditure
(4)
Mining transfer 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.047*** 0.007***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)
Observations 1414 1414 1414 1414
Nr. Municipalities 179 179 179 179
R-squared 0.738 0.733 0.476 0.156
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant 
at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include year and district fixed effects. All 
the variables, except the share of capital expenditure, are expressed as logarithms.
Effect on real income and welfare As a second step, we re-estimate the baseline 
results on the effect on real income and relative rental prices including, as an additional 
control, the logarithm of the municipal revenue or expenditure of the district where 
the household resides. To address possible heterogenous impact of public spending by 
location, we also estimate the baseline regressions including the measure of municipal 
revenue or expenditure interacted with our measure of proximity to the city (an in­
dicator of the household living less than 100 km to the city or not). If the effect was 
driven by the revenue windfall, and subsequent public spending, we could expect the 
parameter associated to the effect of the mine expansion to become insignificant.
Tables 1.11 and 1.12 report the results using the logarithms of real income and 
relative house rents as dependant variables, respectively. These regressions explore 
the effect of the mine expansion on real income and household welfare and use the 
same set of control variables as in the baseline results (see notes in Tables 1.3 and 1.7 
for further details). In both tables, the regressions in panel A include as additional 
control variable a measure of municipal revenue or expenditure, while Panel B includes 
this variable interacted with the dummy of proximity to the city. Columns (1) and (2) 
use two measures of municipal revenue: the amount received as mining transfer and 
the total revenue. Columns (3) and (4) uses instead measures of total expenditure 
and capital expenditures. The difference in the sample size respect to the baseline 
regressions is due to the lack of observations on municipal budgets for 1997.
Note that in all cases the effect of the mine expansion on real income and house 
rents remains positive and significant. The estimates are similar in magnitude to the 
results without municipality control variables. In contrast, the effect of municipality’s 
revenue or expenditure is insignificant or even negative.66 These results reduce con­
cerns that the observed effect is driven by the revenue windfall to local governments.
66 We also replicate this exercise dropping the measure of mine expansion interacted with distance 
and keeping only the municipal variables. The results, not reported, are similar.
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Moreover, they suggest that the market mechanism may have been more effective on 
enhancing household income and welfare than public spending.
The lack of a positive effect of public spending is surprising. A first explanation 
is the need of a longer period for public projects to mature. We replicate the results 
lagging the variables one and two periods, but the estimates remain insignificant.67 An 
alternative explanation is that public spending increased well being (through better 
public good provision) but did not affect income. The lack of positive effect on house 
rents, however, does not support this argument. Finally, it could be that the additional 
public spending had very small economic returns.68 A similar phenomenon is reported 
by Caselli and Michaels (2009) in the context of oil-rich Brazilian municipalities. They 
find that municipalities increased significantly their expenditure using the revenue 
windfall associated to the oil operations. But they find no evidence of a positive effect 
on local income. They interpret this result as suggestive that the additional revenue 
was wasted if not stolen.
1.6.2 Direct Beneficiaries
There are three groups of individuals that might have benefited directly from the mine 
expansion: residents of communities located around the mine pits, mine workers, and 
public sector workers.
In the first case, inhabitants of local communities may have benefited from the 
development projects started and financed by Yanacocha. These projects are aimed 
to rural communities adjacent to the mine pits and focus mostly on construction 
and staffing of schools and health centers, provision of electricity and sanitation, and 
maintenance of local transport infrastructure.69 Similar to the expansion of mining 
transfers, the expenditure on local development projects increased significantly in the 
period of analysis from around US$ 4 million in 1997 to US$ 34 million in 2006.
In the case of mine workers, the benefit may be explained by the higher wages 
paid by the mine. For example, in 1997 the average salary for a Yanacocha employee 
was almost three times the salary for a similar job in Cajamarca city (Pasco-Font et 
al., 2001, p.165).70 In the case of public workers, their income would have increased 
if the revenue windfall associated to mining transfers was redistributed in the form of 
higher wages or in-kind benefits.
A relevant concern is that the observed effect on the average real income may 
be just driven by the positive effect of local development projects or higher wages
67We cannot explore longer lags since we only have budgetary data from 1998. Additionally, the 
use of lags reduces the number of observations in the period before the mine expansion and may 
attenuate the results.
68 Anecdotal evidence suggests that some recipients of mining transfers embarked in unproductive 
projects such as refurbishing the town main square or erecting monuments.
69Yanacocha considers as potential beneficiaries the inhabitants of 65 villages adjacent to the mine 
pits with a population of around 28,000 inhabitants (Minera Yanacocha, 2002, p. 24).
70 The higher wages may be a compensation for the (potentially) more dangerous working environ­
ment or efficiency wages paid for roles deemed as vital for the mine’s normal operation.
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Table 1.11: Effect of the mine on real income, controlling for municipal revenue or
expenditure
Ln(real income per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Adding municipal revenue or expenditure
Mine’s wage bill and 0.175** 0.180* 0.164* 0.164*
local purchases x (0.083) (0.094) (0.089) (0.089)
distance <100 km
Municipal revenue -0.025 -0.142 0.045 0.045
or expenditure (0.209) (0.093) (0.126) (0.126)
Observations 7738 6305 6305 6305
R-squared 0.521 0.536 0.536 0.536
Panel B: Adding municipal revenue or expenditure x proximity to city
Mine’s wage bill and 0.250* 0.295* 0.361** 0.169
local purchases x (0.129) (0.172) (0.152) (0.123)
distance <100 km
Municipal revenue -0.081 -0.178 -0.346* -0.015
or expenditure x (0.056) (0.184) (0.185) (0.144)
distance <100 km
Observations 7138 6305 6305 6305
R-squared 0.524 0.536 0.536 0.536
Municipal revenue Mining Total Total Capital
or expenditure transfers revenue expenditure expenditure
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant 
at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include year and district fixed effects 
and the same control variables of the baseline regressions (see notes of Table 1.3). 
The measures of municipal expenditure or revenue and mine wage bill and local 
purchases are expressed as logarithms of the total amount.
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Table 1.12: Effect of the mine on house rents, controlling for municipal revenue or
expenditure
(1)
Ln (relative value of house rent)
(2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Adding municipal expenditure or revenue
Mine’s wage bill and 
local purchases x 
distance < 100 km
0.239**
(0.096)
0.360***
(0.102)
0.353***
(0.101)
0.353***
(0.101)
Municipal revenue 
or expenditure
-0.016
(0.242)
-0.230**
(0.097)
-0.194*
(0.106)
-0.194*
(0.106)
Observations
R-squared
7696
0.650
6365
0.667
6365
0.666
6365
0.666
Panel B: Adding municipal expenditure or revenue x proximity to city
Mine’s wage bill and 
local purchases x 
distance <100 km
0.286**
(0.131)
0.472**
(0.206)
0.447**
(0.176)
0.381**
(0.159)
Municipal revenue 
or expenditure x 
distance <100 km
-0.055
(0.056)
-0.182
(0.218)
-0.171
(0.191)
-0.059
(0.164)
Observations
R-squared
7696
0.650
6365
0.667
6365
0.667
6365
0.667
Municipal revenue 
or expenditure
Mining
transfers
Total
revenue
Total
expenditure
Capital
expenditure
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant 
at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include year and district fixed effects 
and the same control variables of the baseline regressions (see notes of Table 1.7). 
The measures of municipal expenditure or revenue and mine wage bill and local 
purchases are expressed as logarithms of the total amount.
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received by mine workers or public servants, not by the multiplier effect highlighted 
in the model.
To check for this possibility, we use data on the industry of occupation reported by 
employed individuals and identify workers in the mining industry and public service.71 
We classify education workers as part of the public sector given that most teachers 
are in the government payroll. Additionally, we identify households living in the same 
districts where the towns targeted by Yanacocha’s development projects are located. 
We consider these groups to be a broader definition of potential direct beneficiaries 
of the mine activities. In our sample, these households represent around 15 percent 
of total observations. Then we re-estimate the regressions of the effect on real income 
and welfare excluding these three groups of households.
Table 1.13 displays the results. Panel A uses real income as dependant variable, 
while panel B uses the relative house rental price,. Column (1) presents the baseline 
results with the whole sample. Columns (2) to (4) gradually reduce the sample ex­
cluding public sector workers, mining workers and households living adjacent to the 
mine. Note that in all the cases the results are similar to the obtained with the whole 
sample. This evidence suggests that the observed effects on income and welfare are 
not driven by groups that may receive direct benefits from the mine, and supports the 
claim that the main driver is the multiplier effect from the mine’s demand shock.72
1.7 A dditional Checks
In this section we present additional checks on the validity of the previous results. 
We are particularly interested on confounding factors that may violate the identifica­
tion assumption, compositional effects driven by migration within the region and the 
sensitivity of the results to alternative measures of distance.
We focus on the baseline regression exploring the effect of the mine on real income. 
We also perform similar checks on the set of results on local crop prices and house 
rents and reach similar conclusions. These additional checks are not reported, but are 
available from the authors upon request.
1.7.1 Confounding Factors
A main concern is that, in parallel to the expansion of the mine, there are other 
phenomena happening in the region that affected differently areas close and far from 
the city. This would violate our identification assumption and imply that the estimated 
effect on real income could not be attributed to the mine expansion.
We are particularly concerned with changes on the survey sampling framework in 
2001, heterogenous trends driven by different initial conditions or by proximity to a
71 The survey reports the two digit International Standard Industry Code of the main activity of 
working individuals.
72We are unable to evaluate in a reliable manner the effect among direct beneficiaries due to the 
small size of the sample.
1 NATURAL RESOURCES AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT 58
Table 1.13: Effect on households not directly employed by public sector, mining 
__________________industry or living adjacent to the mine_________________
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: dependent variable is Ln(real income per capita)
Mine’s wage bill and 0.174** 0.198** 0.186** 0.187**
local purchases x 
distance <100 km
(0.078) (0.085) (0.086) (0.087)
Observations 7738 6796 6668 6570
R-squared 0.521 0.484 0.478 0.479
Panel B: dependent variable is Ln(relative value of house rent)
Mine’s wage bill and 0.238*** 0.240** 0.255*** 0.256***
local purchases x 
distance <100 km
(0.092) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097)
Observations 7696 6829 6718 6613
R-squared 0.65 0.595 0.583 0.583
Public sector workers yes no no no
Mining workers yes yes no no
Live in district adjacent 
to mine pits
yes yes yes no
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and 
*** significant at 1%. All regressions include year and district fixed effects and the same 
control variables of the baseline regressions (see notes of Tables 1.3 and 1.7).
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city.
M ethodological change In 2001 some changes were introduced to the sampling 
framework of the household survey to include newly developed urban areas and im­
prove the estimates of the poverty line (INEI, 2006). Our concern is that the change 
in methodology may have affected differently areas close and far to the mine and that 
our results are simply reflecting the change on the survey methodology and not the 
effects of the mine.
To address this issue, we include in our baseline regression a dummy equal to 
one for all years from 2001interacted with our measure of distance, to capture any 
shift in the average income level after 2001 for households closer to Cajamarca due to 
the re-sampling. Column (1) in Table 1.14 shows that our main result is not affected, 
suggesting that the income of adjacent households does not just suffer a jump in levels 
(as a change only due to the methodology would suggest) but follows the variation in 
mine’s activity. If anything, accounting for this change in methodology increases the 
magnitude of our coefficient, suggesting that the bias was towards zero, rather than 
positive.
H eterogenous tren d s  There axe some systematic differences between areas close 
and far to Cajamarca. Areas closer to the city are relatively more urbanized, more 
densely populated and less agricultural. In the main specification, this is dealt with 
by using district fixed effects and controlling for household characteristics. However, 
these different initial conditions may also lead to different trends of income or prices 
which we may be mistakenly attributing to the mine expansion. For example, farmers’ 
income may be diverging from non-farmers, or there may be an overall decline of rural 
areas or possibly densely populated areas are growing faster.
To address this concern we include a non-paxametric trend interacted with dum­
mies related to observable characteristics. In particular we use an indicator of ur­
banization (a dummy equal to one if the household is located in an urban area), 
agricultural activity (one if the household reports any agricultural production), pop­
ulation density (one if the population density of the district where the household lives 
is above the median).
Columns (2) to (4) in Table 1.14 shows the results of this robustness check using 
real income as dependant variable.73 The estimates of the effect of the mine on real 
income are similar to those found in the baseline regression.
Proxim ity  to  a  city The previous checks suggest that our results axe not driven 
by different trends based on some observable characteristics. There may be, however, 
unobservable shocks contemporaneous to the mine expansion that affect differently 
areas close or far from the city. For example, there may be a general process of
73The results axe similar using other dependant variables studied in the main results.
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Table 1.14: Effect of the mine on real income, controlling by methodological 
___________________ change and heterogenous trends___________________
(1)
Ln (real 
(2)
income per capita)
(3) (4)
Mine’s wage bill and 0.238** 0.168** 0.177** 0.184**
local purchases x 
distance <100 km
(0.109) (0.079) (0.080) (0.075)
Post 2001 x distance < 100 km yes no no no
Year dummies x urban no yes yes yes
Year dummies x farmer no no yes yes
Year dummies x high density no no no yes
Observations 7738 7738 7738 7738
R-squared 0.522 0.526 0.532 0.537
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** 
significant at 1%. All regressions include year and district fixed effects and control variables. 
Post 2001 is a dummy equal to 1 if year is 2001 or later. Urban is a dummy equal to 1 if 
household resides in an urban area. Farmer is equal to 1 if household reports agricultural 
production. High density is equal to 1 if density of the district of residence is above the 
median in the sample.
divergence between cities and their rural hinterland due to agglomeration economies, 
different vulnerability to climatic shocks or targeting of public projects to main cities.
We address this concern in two steps. First, we include as additional control to 
the baseline regression the measure of mine activity interacted with distance to other 
cities, to rule out that proximity to other city centers is driving the results. Second, 
we perform a falsification test replicating the estimates of the effect of the mine on 
real income but using as reference points other cities instead of Cajamarca. Finding 
a similar effect of the mine expansion on other cities would suggest that the observed 
effect on real income observed in areas closer to Cajamarca city is just reflecting a 
broader city-rural phenomenon and would raise concerns about the validity of the 
identification assumption
We select the other main cities around the North Highlands region: Chachapoyas, 
Chiclayo and Trujillo (see Figure 1.4 for a localization map of the cities). All these 
cities are department’s capitals, as Cajamarca, and have a similar governmental status. 
Chachapoyas is located in the highlands and have a similar size as Cajamarca. In 
contrast, Chiclayo and Trujillo are much larger cities located on the coast. For each 
city, we calculate distance by road using the shortest path and construct a distance 
dummy variable equal to one if the distance is less than 100 km and zero otherwise. 
The algorithm is the same used to calculate distance to Cajamarca city.
Table 1.15 presents the estimates of the baseline regression with real income as the 
dependant variable and including the mine wage bill and local purchases interacted
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with distance to other cities. In all cases, the mine expansion only affects areas closer 
to Cajamarca city, not to other urban centers.
Table 1.15: Effect of the mine on real income, controlling by proximity to other
___________________________cities__________________________
Ln(real income per capita)
 (1) (2) 0 )
Mine’s wage bill and local purchases x
distance to Cajamarca 
< 100 km
0.160*
(0.083)
0.160*
(0.083)
0.144*
(0.082)
distance to Chachapoyas 
< 100 km
-0.088
(0.154)
-0.088
(0.155)
-0.103
(0.153)
distance to Chiclayo 
< 100 km
0.014
(0.179)
0.001
(0.179)
distance to Trujillo 
< 100 km
-0.042
(0.170)
Observations
R-squared
7738
0.520
7738
0.520
7738
0.520
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are ad­
justed for clustering at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant 
at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions 
include year and district fixed effects and control variables. Distance to 
all cities is calculated as the shortest path between the main town in the 
district where the household fives and the city.
Table 1.16 displays the results of the falsification test estimating the baseline re­
gression with distance to the alternative city instead of Cajamarca and using two 
alternative samples. Panel A uses the same sample as in the baseline results: house­
holds in the North Highland region. Panel B includes households within 200 km of 
the cities, regardless of the geographical region.74 In all cases the effect of the mine’s 
wage bill and local purchases becomes insignificant or even negative. The lack of effect 
on this falsification exercise weakens the case for some confounding factor driving the 
results.
1.7.2 M igration  and  Com positional Effects
The model predicts an increase in city size due to intra-regional migration. In the 
model, the increase in labor demand and wages in the city attracts agricultural work­
ers. To explore this model prediction, we use data from two most recent population
74The results are similar using larger areas of influence, e.g. 400 km
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Table 1.16: Falsification test using distance to other cities
Ln(real
(1)
income per capita) 
(2) (3)
Panel A: North Highlands sample
Mine’s wage bill and -0.188 -0.066 -0.136
local purchases x (0.142) (0.169) (0.157)
distance <100 km
Observations 7738 7738 7738
R-squared 0.521 0.521 0.521
Panel B: Households within 200 km
Mine’s wage bill and -0.058 0.000 -0.077*
local purchases x (0.063) (0.050) (0.044)
distance <100 km
Observations 6978 10801 12073
R-squared 0.552 0.536 0.604
City Chachapoyas Chiclayo Trujillo
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are ad­
justed for clustering at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant 
at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions 
include year and district fixed effects and control variables.
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censuses (1993 and 2007) and calculate the intercensal population growth rate in Ca­
jamarca city and surrounding areas, up to 400 km.75
Figure 1.13 plots the population growth rates for areas at different distance from 
the city. In the period between the two censuses, the region grew at an annual rate 
of 0.7 percent, below the national average of 2 percent. In contrast, Cajamarca city 
experienced a significant growth, with population increasing at a rate of 3.4 percent 
per year and became the second fastest growing city in Peru (INEI, 2008).76 In 
contrast, the surrounding areas grew at a much slower pace, below the regional average. 
Interestingly, the growth rate decreases with distance to the city.77
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
City 50 km 100 km 150 km 200 km -f 200 km
Figure 1.13: Intercensal annual population growth rate: Cajamarca city and
surroundings
Taken together, this evidence is suggestive of migration from the rural hinterland 
to the city, as predicted by the model.78 Empirically, a main concern with migration 
is that the observed increment on real income may be just reflecting compositional 
changes on the labor force. For example, if only the most productive agricultural 
workers migrate to the city, the increase in real income would be driven by higher 
productivity not by the demand shock from the mine.
We address this concern indirectly by evaluating whether the expansion of the mine
75 This extension corresponds to the range of distances observed in the data.
76 In the period between 1993 and 2007, Cajamarca city increased its population from 117,000 to 
almost 190,000.
77 A possible explanation consistent with this observation is th a t migration costs are increasing 
with distance.
78Nonetheless, we cannot interpret it as evidence of the mine expansion causing migration because, 
among other reasons, we do not know whether migration occurred before or after the expansion of 
the mine.
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has lead to changes on observable characteristics of the labor force in areas closer and 
farther from the city.79 In particular we focus on different measures of human capital 
such as: years of education, indicators of having completed primary school or attended 
a private school (a proxy for quality of education).80 We also consider demographics 
such as age, gender and number of household members to evaluate selective migration 
of young adult males. Finally, we explore characteristics of the agricultural unit such 
as proportion of production sold, number and concentration of crops, to account for 
changes on the type of farmers. In all cases, we estimate the baseline regression (1.20) 
with year and district fixed effect as the only control variables.
Table 1.17 shows the results. The parameter associated to the interaction term 
captures the changes on the measure of human capital, demographics or agricultural 
activity in areas closer to the city associated to the expansion of the mine. Note that 
all the measures of education (columns 1 to 3) worsen in areas closer to the city, while 
the rest of characteristics remain unchanged. If we take into account that educational 
attainment in areas far from the city was lower before the mine expansion, these results 
suggest a reduction on the gap between both areas due to the migration of relatively 
less educated workers from the rural hinterland to the city.81 Taken together, these 
results reduce concerns that the increase in real income is driven by migration of more 
productive workers to the city.
1.7.3 Alternative Measures of Distance
In this section we check that our results are not sensitive to our measure of distance. 
So far, we have used the shortest path by road and the average (i.e. 100 km) as the 
threshold. In column 1 of Table 1.18 we show that results hold when the threshold is 
defined by the median, i.e. 90 km.
Additionally, we obtain two alternative measures of distance: a topographic and 
a straight line. The topographic measure is calculated using the ArcGIS package by 
minimizing the sum of the normalized values of altitude and gradient, regardless of 
the existence of a road. It can be interpreted as a proxy for where a road may be 
located or alternative transportation routes in the absence of roads. The straight line 
measure is calculated as the Euclidian distance between the district capital town and 
the city of Cajamarca. In order to distinguish district closer and farther from the city, 
we use as a threshold the median value of the measure of distance. Columns 2 and 3 
show that the effects are similar, irrespective of the measure of distance used to tell 
apart districts that are far and close to Cajamarca.
79 Ideally we would like to identify migrants in the sample and check whether the results are driven 
by this sub-population. Unfortunately, that information is not available.
80In the baseline regressions we control for education. However, this control may be insufficient to 
account for compositional changes in the presence of human capital spillovers or complementarities.
81 In 1997 the average worker located more than 100 km from the city had 3 years of education 
while the average worker closer to the city had 3.6 years of education. In 2006, the years of education 
of both type of workers were 4.6 and 4.7, respectively
Table 1.17: Changes on characteristics of labor force and agricultural activity
Human capital 
Years of Complete 
education primary 
(1) (2)
Private
school
(3)
Demographics 
Age Is
female 
(4) (5)
% prod, 
sold 
(6)
Agricultural activity 
Number Crop 
of crops HH index
(7) (8)
Mine’s wage bill and -0.684** -0.059* --0.019*** -0.648 0.011 -0.094* -0.153 0.015
local purchases x 
distance <100 km
(0.322) (0.031) (0.007) (0.835) (0.017) (0.050) (0.287) (0.036)
Observations 31255 31255 25473 34507 34159 5582 5582 5582
R-squared 0.106 0.064 0.177 0.023 0.011 0.309 0.311 0.228
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at primary sampling unit level. * denotes 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include year and district fixed effects. Regressions in 
Columns 1 to 5 use the sample of individuals in working age, while columns 6 to 8 use the sample of households with some agricultural 
production. Complete primary is a dummy equal to 1 if individual completed primary school, private school is a dummy equal to 1 if 
individual assisted to private school. Is female is a dummy equal to 1 if individual is a female. Crop concentration is the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman concentration index calculated as the sum of squares of the contribution of a crop to total agricultural production.
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Table 1.18: Alternative measures of distance
• (1)
Ln(real income 
(2)
per capita)
(3)
Mine’s wage bill and 0.137* 0.150** 0.134*
local purchases x (0.077) (0.075) (0.074)
distance < median
Measure of distance Shortest path Topographic Straight
by road line
Median distance (km) 90 75 65
Observations 7738 7738 7738
R-squared 0.521 0.521 0.521
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
at primary sampling unit level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** 
significant at 1%. All regressions include year and district fixed effects and control variables. 
Topographic distance is calculated as the length of the shortest path that minimizes the 
normalized sum of altitude and gradient. Straight fine distance is the Euclidean distance 
between two points.
Finally, we explore in more detail the monotonic decline of the effect by distance, 
which is a crucial feature of our identification strategy. To do that we estimate the 
baseline regression including the interaction between the mine’s wage bill and local 
purchases and different functions of distance. Column 1 in Table 1.19 displays the 
results with the linear measure of distance as a benchmark. Columns 2 and 3 allow 
for non-linearities by including the logarithm and inverse of distance. In all cases, the 
results support the claim that the effect of the mine expansion on real income declines 
with distance to the city.
1.8 C onclusion
This chapter investigates the effect of a large mine on a regional economy using the 
analytical framework provided by a spatial general equilibrium model. We find ro­
bust evidence that the mine has generated positive income and net welfare gains for 
residents in the city and in the surrounding rural hinterland.
The main contribution of the paper is to improve the understanding of the mech­
anisms through which natural resource extraction can foster local development. In 
particular it shows that, in the presence of backward linkages, the expansion of ex­
tractive industries can generate a positive demand shock and increase the real return 
to local factors of production, such as land and labor. In turn, this translates into 
better living conditions for local residents.
A main limitation of the paper is that we only observe events occurring over the 
span of a decade during the mine operation. This means that we are unable to explore 
whether the welfare gains are a short-term effect or part of sustainable development
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Table 1.19: Exploring the decrease of the effect by distance
Ln(real income per capita) 
(1) (2) (3)
Mine’s wage bill and local purchases x
distance -0.128**
Ln(distance)
distance-1
(0.062)
-0.034**
(0.016)
0.002*
(0.001)
Observations 7738 7738 7738
R-squared 0.521 0.521 0.521
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering at primary sampling unit level. * 
denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** sig­
nificant at 1%. All regressions include year and district fixed 
effects. Distance is equal to the length of the shortest path by 
road from the main town of the district where the household 
lives to Cajamarca city, expressed in hundreds kilometers.
that would persist after the mine closure. For the same reason, we can say little about 
relevant long-run phenomena such as specialization, technological progress, or city 
formation (such as San Francisco after the Gold Rush). Though beyond the scope of 
this thesis, these phenomena warrants further research.
In the case we study, the positive effects come from a market channel rather than 
from the revenue windfall to local governments. This suggests that, in a context of 
weak governments, policies that promote local procurement and employment could be 
more beneficial to local residents than increased public spending, at least in the short 
run.
This policy implication, however, depends of the existence of goods and labor 
markets able to supply local inputs to the mine, and the extent of economic integration 
of the region where the mine is located. In the absence of inter-regional trade, the 
benefits would disappear since the increase in prices could offset the gains on nominal 
income. Similarly, lack of intra-regional trade or labor mobility would restrict the 
benefit to the place where the mine suppliers are located and might lead to negative 
re-distributional effects.
The availability of natural resources in the developing world is often seen as a 
hindrance to economic development. In most cases, institutional failure (e.g. conflict, 
mismanagement or corruption) is at the heart of this inability to transform natural 
wealth into better standards of living. However, as this paper suggests, in the presence 
of strong enough backward linkages natural resources can be more a blessing than a 
curse.
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A  A pp en dix
A .l Existence of equilibrium  
A ssum ption 5 N  >
This assumption means that the share of employment from the mine is small 
enough relative to the total population in the region. To check how reasonable this 
assumption is, note that we can re-write it as p < (1 — a) (l — , where a  is the
consumer’s budget share of locally produced food, (i is the budget share of local 
manufactures and ^  is the relative size of the mine’s workforce.
We calculate the budget share on food using the ENAHO survey and use it as 
a proxy for a.The estimated budget share is 0.6, however note that this measure 
may overestimate the true value of a  since some of the food is not locally produced. 
Regarding recall from Section 1.3 that Yanacocha’s direct and indirect employment 
in the analyzed period was between 12 percent and 20 percent of the active population 
of the city of Cajamarca. This proportion would be significantly lower if we include 
working population in the rest of the region. These figures imply that for Assumption 
1 to be violated p  should be, at least, greater than 0.32 or 0.35. In turn this implies a 
very small budget share of imported goods (1 — a  — p), with values at most between 
0.05-0.08.82
Proposition  6 Under Assumption 5, there is a unique and positive pair (f*]W*) that 
solves (AA) and (BB).
Proof. To see this, first note that we can re-write equilibrium condition (BB) as 
a function of Le(w) and plug it in equilibrium condition (A A). We then obtain an 
expression of /  only that can be expressed as
H( f )  = N - 2 c af -  1 - 0  eS  -  A( f )1 — a — p
,where A( f )  =  + Ca\ ^ ^ l + f ) - N } ,  A' ( f )  > 0 and H' ( f )  <
0. To find the equilibrium, we look for a value /* such that H(f*)  =  0.
First, recall that the values that /  can adopt in equation (AA) have an upper bound
_  / \  — N  —
f  =  2cl ~  0 < /  < - — under Assumption 5. Note that H ( f ) =
a \  /  _
—A (/), which is negative only if 2ca[  ^ A f] — N  > 0. From definition of
/ ,  (1.11) and (1.16), this condition can be re-written as
which is satisfied under Assumption 5, hence H { f ) < 0.
82Note that the overestimation of a  and ^  mean that the threshold that jj. should exceed to violate 
assumption 1 are understated. Hence, violation of assumption 1 requires an even higher p, and smaller 
budget share of imported goods.
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Second, recall that the values of /  in equation (BB) have a lower bound / =  
lim /  =  0_1 (AT), where g~l (•) is the inverse function of g( f ) =  2ca[  ^+ /]•w—>00 ae
from this definition follows that A( f )  = 0 . Combining this result with the previous
-  -  -  N
observations that A( f )  > 0 and A' ( f )  > 0, it follows that 0 < f_ < f  < -— and
therefore H( f )  = N  -  2caf_ -  OS > 0.
Finally, since H ( f ) monotonically decreases in / ,  H( f )  > 0 and H( f )  < 0  imply 
that there is a unique positive value /* € ( / , /) ,  such that H(f*)  = 0. From inspection 
of either (1.11) or (1.16), values of f* € ( / , / )  imply a value of Le(w) > 0 and thus
that the equilibrium wage, namely w*, is also unique and positive. ■
A .2 Effect on number of manufacturing firms
Proposition 7 the number of manufacturing firms, v increases with the expansion of
j 1 dLe dwthe mine, ^  > 0, if  and only if 0 > ------;--- —.a:> e dw dS
Proof. Taking total derivatives to (AA) we obtain that:
_ 2 c V  _  (l +  =  ( 1 .2 2 )
dS (1 — a  — p) e dw dS 1 — a  — p
Similarly taking total derivatives to (1.17) we obtain
dv _  df dLe dw
ds - '^ ds -d ^d s - 6 (123)
and thus > 0 if and only if:
_ df dLe dw n n i,
ad S ~ ~ d w l S > (1'24)
Using (1.22) and (1.9) we can re-write condition (1.24) as 6 > —1 dLP dwe dw dS 
A .3 Effect on real wage
P roposition  8 if the number of manufacturing firms increase with expansion of the 
mine, then jg  > 0- Otherwise, the effect is more likely to be positive for low values of 
p, 0 or high values of e.
Proof. Taking total derivatives to (1.18) and using (1.13) we obtain:
dw u ,w ... _■> dv . , uj d f .
=  d s  + 2{1~ a)aTW { m )+
(1 - a - ^ - ^ w - ^ ,  
Pa d o
(1.25)
. . . .  . . .r dvwhich is positive it —  > 0.do
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To study the conditions for ^  > 0 when < 0, we first re-write (1.25) replacingdo do
dv—  using expression (1.23): do
dw ^  dLe dw Q 
d S = ~ ~ d w d S ~  ’
where
_ . . w Nrvcr — 1 ,w ._ .. . df
C = - { 2 ( l - a ) a r ( - )  — (g) ^  +
(1
P(X P  (-7  r f w
Hence the condition for ^  > 0 when —  < 0 is:do do
dLe dw 
dw dS '
dv dLe dwNote, from Proposition 7, that —  < 0 implies — ; — > e9. That means thatdo dw do
dw dva sufficient condition for —  > 0 when —  < 0 is:do do
C > 9 { l - e ) .
This condition is more likely to be satisfied for high values of e or low values of /i 
and 6. u
A.4 Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Using the definition of real income from (1.19) and re-arranging, we can re-write the 
food market equilibrium condition (1.11) as:
i -
ccLy,
where y is the real income in the city. Note that > 0 implies dp£g- > 0, because 
^  < 0 and > 0. However if ^  > 0 the sign of dp^ P is ambiguous.
Recall that real income in the rural hinterland is:
y(r) =  ^ p e" 2<1" a)T|r|- 
It is immediate to see that > 0 and -^ Sdr <
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A .5 Proof o f Proposition 3
Using (1.2) and (1.5), we can write the relative prices of food and the import good as:
Pa{r) -  P±e~-
P(r) ~  P 6
Pm(r) Pm 2
P(r) P €
By proposition 1, we know that if ^ |  > 0, then ^ 2 s~ > ^ which also implies that 
>  o Since §  |  0 and % • =  0, it follows that §  0.
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2 Nomination Procedures and Po 
litical Selection
Political parties are considered one of the key political actors in modern democra­
cies. They create a link between voters and politicians and provide the organiza­
tional infrastructure needed to enter and participate in political life (Hazan and Ra- 
hat, 2006; White, 2006). Nonetheless, despite their role as gatekeepers of the political 
arena, little is known about the effect of party institutions on political selection and 
the implications for economic and policy outcomes (Besley, 2005).
This chapter explores empirically the relationship between internal party nom­
ination procedures and the quality of politicians. It uses a new data set of Latin 
American political parties containing detailed information on the procedures used to 
select presidential candidates, electoral outcomes and politicians’ characteristics. This 
data is complemented with several measures of quality of government at country level.
The main empirical challenge in addressing the research question is the presence 
of omitted variables which might drive both policy outcomes and parties’ institutional 
decisions. In most countries, parties axe free to choose a nomination procedure and 
hence it may be endogenous to the political process (Katz, 2001; Serra, 2007). To 
address this concern, I first develop a model to understand a party’s decision to adopt 
a particular nomination procedure. Then I test the model predictions on the data and 
use the suggested institutional determinants as instruments for the observed candidate 
nomination procedure.
In the model, more democratic nomination procedures -such as party primaries- 
provide party members with the option of replacing the incumbent candidate with a 
better politician and enhance the party’s electoral performance. They can do it be­
cause they have inside information and observe the quality of the politicians. The cost 
of adopting primaries comes from the possibility of replacing the incumbent leader, to 
whom party members may have a loyalty attachment.83
The model predicts that primary-nominated candidates will obtain higher vote 
shares and have a better expected quality than candidates selected in less contested 
procedures, like nomination by a party leader. Regarding primary determinants, the 
model predicts that inter-party political competition increases the likelihood of adopt­
ing primaries. The effect of political competition, however, is attenuated by the incum­
bency advantage, which in the model comes from the loyalty bias of party members.
83The model stresses the role of primaries as selection devices in presence of perfect information 
within the party. Complementary explanations focus on the signalling or screening role of primaries. 
For example Meirowitz (2005) develops a model in which primaries offer voters an early opportunity 
to signal their preferences to candidates. Serra (2007) proposes a model of endogenous primary 
adoption in which parties use primaries as devices to obtain information about the campaigning skills 
of candidates.
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I test the model predictions in three steps. First, I exploit within-party variation 
to evaluate the determinants of primary adoption. I find a positive and significant 
relationship between measures of political competition and the likelihood of primary 
adoption. This effect becomes insignificant when the candidate is also the party 
founder. I interpret this finding as evidence of the incumbency advantage offsetting 
the incentives created by political competition.
Second, I investigate the relationship between selection methods and quality of 
government using a sample of appointed presidents. The empirical strategy exploits 
between-party variation and uses the primary determinants identified in the first step 
as instruments. In particular, I use political competition, the status of a candidate 
as party founder and the interaction term as instruments for the nomination pro­
cedure used by the president’s party. This approach reduces relevant identification 
concerns due to the endogeneity of primary adoption. I find that during the mandate 
of primary-nominated presidents there is an improvement of more than one standard 
deviation in the measures of government efficiency (such as corruption and bureau­
cracy quality) as well as an increase of government size and real income per capita.
Finally, I explore the relationship between nomination procedures and electoral 
performance. This allow us to explore the mechanism through which primaries affect 
quality of government: improvements of the political process or the type of politician. 
Exploiting within party variation, I find evidence that primary-nominated candidates 
obtain a larger vote share. On average, the increase in vote share is 6 percent -a 
sizeable gain considering that the average vote share is 33 percent. This result is 
similar to previous studies in Latin America (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich, 2006). 
More interestingly, the vote premium is decreasing in the size of the party -measured 
as the seat share obtained in legislative elections. I interpret these findings as evidence 
of primaries improving the candidate’s quality and attracting non-partisan voters.
Taken together, these results support the claim that parties -through the choice of 
more democratic nomination procedures- can improve political selection. The quality 
differences do not only translate into better electoral performance, but seem also to 
affect government efficiency and economic outcomes.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 places the findings of this 
chapter in the context of the relevant literature. Section 2.2 presents some background 
on Latin America primaries and the data used in the empirical exercise. Section 2.3 
develops the analytical framework. Section 2.5 explores the determinants of primary 
adoption. Section 2.6 uses the insights from the previous section to evaluate the effect 
of candidate selection methods on the quality of politicians. Section 2.7 provides some 
concluding remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 NOMINATION PROCEDURES AND POLITICAL SELECTION 74
2.1 R elated  Literature
The research in this chapter contributes to the literature on political selection. This 
literature stresses the role of formal compensation as a factor to attract good politi­
cians. For example, Caselli and Morelli (2004) argue that low rewards from office 
attract low-quality citizens and deteriorate the quality of the pool of available politi­
cians. Ferraz and Finan (2009) exploit a quasi-experiment in Brazil and find evidence 
that increase in wages improves the observable quality of legislators and measures of 
performance. Besley et al. (forthcoming) find evidence in U.S. consistent with the 
argument that parties respond to political competition by improving the quality of 
their candidates. Nonetheless, to the best of my knowledge, there are not empirical 
studies relating party nomination procedures to the quality of politicians.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on primary adoption. Similar to the 
argument proposed in this chapter, this literature emphasizes the trade-off between 
the cost of increasing internal competition and the benefits of improving electoral 
performance. There are, however, very few empirical studies of primary determinants. 
For example, Castanheira et al. (forthcoming) develop a model in which the quality of 
the party platform depends on a candidate’s effort. In their view, primaries provide 
a better signal to voters and enhance the pool of candidates the party can choose 
from, but they reduce candidates’ incentives to improve the policy platform. The cost 
of adopting primaries is augmented by inter-party political competition and internal 
ideological polarization. Serra (2007) proposes a model in which primaries help party 
leaders to assess the candidates’ campaigning skills but may be costly since they 
may induce candidates to adopt extreme ideological views. Lundell (2004) evaluates 
empirically the determinants of candidate selection methods using a cross section of 
political parties in developed countries. He finds that smaller parties -measured by 
the vote share in the previous election- tend to adopt more decentralized selection 
methods. This result is consistent with my empirical findings.
2.2 Prim aries in Latin A m erica
In recent democratic elections, Latin American political parties have used different 
methods to nominate presidential candidates. The nomination procedures range from 
nomination by the party leader to more democratic procedures such as party primaries 
(Alcantara Saez, 2002). This institutional heterogeneity makes Latin America an 
interesting testing ground to study the effect of party institutions on political selection.
The use of primaries varies both between and within parties: there are several 
cases of parties switching nomination procedures between elections. For example, the 
Argentinean Union Cwica Radical used primaries in the presidential elections of 1989, 
1995 and 2003, but not in 1999. The Mexican Partido Revolutionaries Institutional 
started using primaries in 2000 after decades of nominations controlled by the in­
cumbent president. As a rough measure of this heterogeneity I calculate the standard
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deviation of the use of primaries between and within parties. The values are 0.268 and
0.277 respectively. This suggests that within party variation is an important source 
of heterogeneity in the use of primaries.
Primaries in Latin America are not as widespread as in American politics. In the 
period 1978-2004, only 11 percent of presidential candidates was nominated in a party 
primary. The use of primaries, however, has increased over time specially during the 
second half of the 1990s (see Figure 2.1).
The use of primaries remains a party decision. In most countries there is no legal 
requirement to use primaries or any specific nomination procedure (Alcantara Saez, 
2002; Freidenberg, 2003). Only recently some countries like Uruguay, Paraguay and 
Panama included a legal obligation to use primaries in their electoral legislation. In 
practice, however, this requirement has not been fully enforced (see Table 2.1). More­
over, the adoption of primaries has been partial: not all parties in a given election 
used them (see Table 2.1). This suggests that the decision to use primaries is not 
entirely driven the by the electoral environment but also may be affected by party 
specific factors.
The endogeneity of primary adoption confounds the evaluation of the relation­
ship between parties’ nomination procedures and economic and electoral outcomes. 
In the next sections, I propose and test a simple model to understand some of the 
determinants of primary adoption. Then I use the suggested primary determinants as 
instruments of the nomination procedure and explore the effect of primaries on quality 
of government.
2.3 A  M odel o f E ndogenous Prim aries
The aim of this section is to develop an simple analytical framework to understand 
some of the determinants of primary adoption and guide the empirical exercise. The 
model treats the candidate nomination procedure as endogenous and links its adoption 
to political competition and candidate characteristics.
The model stresses the following trade off of adopting primaries: increasing inter­
nal competition allows the party to choose a better candidate and may improve the 
party electoral performance. Primaries are costly, however, because they may replace 
the incumbent candidate, for whom some party members have a strong ideological 
attachment.
Consider a political party whose only role is to nominate a candidate to run in 
a presidential election. The party is composed of a rank and file and professional 
politicians, one of them acting as the party leader. In the status quo, the party 
leader is by default the party candidate.84 The final decision, however, depends on 
the nomination procedure chosen by the party members.
84 This status quo is equivalent to a situation with an office-seeking leader in charge of party 
nomination.
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Figure 2.1: % primary-nominated candidates, by quinquennium
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 2001-04
Q rnnque mum
Table 2.1: Use of presidential primaries in Latin America
Country Legal obligation Use of primaries in practice
Argentina No Partial (1989, 1995, 1999, 2003)
Bolivia Yes, since 1999 No
Brazil No Partial (2002)
Chile No Partial (1993, 1999)
Colombia No Partial (1978, 1986, 1990, 1994)
Costa Rica Yes Partial (1978, 1982, 1986, 1998, 2002)
Dominican Rep. No Partial (1982, 1986)
Ecuador No No
El Salvador No Partial (2004)
Guatemala No Partial (2003)
Honduras Yes Partial (2001)
Mexico No Partial (2000)
Nicaragua No Partial (1996, 2001)
Panama Yes, since 1997 Partial (1999)
Paraguay Yes, since 1996 Partial (1993, 1998, 2003)
Peru No No
Uruguay Yes, since 1996 All parties (1999, 2004), partial (1989)
Venezuela No Partial (1978, 1993)
Notes: ’Partial’ means that only some parties used primaries. The year of the presidential elec­
tion in which primaries were used appears in parentheses. The sample considers presidential 
elections in Latin America during the period 1978-2004.
Sources: Alcantara Saez (2002), Freidenberg (2003) and Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2006).
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The party members have two institutional choices: adopting a primary or main­
taining the status quo. The main distinction between the two alternatives is the degree 
of internal competition. In the status quo the party leader runs uncontested and is 
ratified as party candidate. In a primary, in contrast, a random party politician chal­
lenges the leader’s nomination and then the rank and file selects the party candidate 
from both contestants. In this context, primaries provide the option to the rank and 
file to challenge the status quo and to replace the incumbent candidate.85
Politicians behave as office seekers maximizing only their probability of holding 
office. This happens, for instance, if the benefits of holding office are sufficiently high. 
I abstract from enforceability concerns by assuming that all the politicians affiliated 
with a party can credibly commit to implementing the party’s preferred ideology.86
Politicians are heterogenous and differ in terms of their quality qi which is uni­
formly distributed on the support [0,1]. The quality of the party leader qi is exoge­
nously determined. Following Caselli and Morelli (2004) and Besley (2005), I interpret 
quality as honesty or competence, but it can reflect any characteristic valued by all 
voters regardless of their political ideology.87
The rank and file is composed of heterogenous risk-neutral individuals. They have 
a common interest in maximizing the party candidate’s vote share but differ on their 
degree of loyalty or attachment to the party leader. In particular, their utility is 
increasing in:
v +  <7j +  5, (2-1)
where v is the party vote share, cr* is a party member’s i individual attachment toward 
the leader and 8 is a common popularity shock. I assume that both parameters are 
non-negative and a i ~  U j^ 0, ^ j while 5 ~  U [o, ^ j . In this model, the party leader 
enjoys an incumbency advantage since the rank and file has some degree of loyalty 
toward her. In turn, this feature makes it more difficult to replace her as party 
candidate.
Like Besley et al. (forthcoming), I introduce inter-party political competition by 
considering two types of voters: partisan and non-partisan. Partisan voters have a 
preference bias towards the party’s ideological stance, although they do not participate 
in party decisions. For simplicity, I assume that the ideological bias is strong enough 
for partisan voter always to prefer voting for the party candidate. In contrast, non­
partisan voters care only about the president’s quality. The proportion of partisan 
voters is A € (0,1) and I define the political competition faced by the party as (1 — A).
Politician’s types are perfectly observed inside the party, but only imperfectly 
observed by voters. The underlying assumption is that party members have inside in­
85 These institutions resemble the procedures used in most Latin America cases. In particular, 
prim ary refers to closed primaries in which only party members can vote, while the status quo refers 
to the less inclusive methods in which the party leader (or group of leaders) decides the nomination.
86A possible motivation for this assumption is that politicians choose to join a party that shares 
their preferred ideology, as in Snyder Jr. and Ting (2002).
87In the political science literature, this concept of quality corresponds to valence.
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formation due to more frequent social interaction or more personal contact with party 
politicians. During the electoral campaign voters observe the candidates’ types with 
probability p. With complementary probability they remain completely uninformed 
about politicians’ types and the party’s selection method.
There are neither re-elections nor inter-temporal decisions in this model and all 
individuals live for one period. These assumptions diverge from previous models where 
parties are long-lived organizations (Alesina and Spear, 1988; Harrington, 1992), but 
they allow us to focus on the role of political competition and nomination procedures 
rather than reputation, re-election incentives or commitment devices.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. (Party constitution) Both a and 5 are realized, the rank and file observe qi and 
vote between adopting a primary or a caucus.
2. (Candidate selection) The party nominates its candidate using the chosen selec­
tion method. Simultaneously, the opposition party nominates a random politi­
cian to run in general elections.
3. (General election) Voters observe the types of both candidates with probability 
p and cast their votes.
The equilibrium concept is sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium and I solve the 
game using backward induction.
G eneral election Let us denote the quality of the candidate from the party as qp, 
and the quality of the opposition party’ candidate as q°. Due to the strong ideological 
bias, partisan voters will always vote in favor of the party, but non-partisan voters 
will only vote for the party if qp > qp. The tie-breaking rule is tossing a coin.
Given these responses, the expected vote share the party candidate can obtain 
conditional on qp before the election is
v {%) = P [Qp +  (i -  Qp) A] +  (1 — p) (2-2)
where I use the property that Pr (qp < qp) = qp. Note that the candidate’s vote 
share is increasing in both qp and A, reflecting the two sources of votes: non-partisan 
voters attracted by a high quality candidate and the support of ideologically motivated 
voters.
C andidate  selection When the party opts to maintain the status quo, the incum­
bent leader is the default candidate and thus qp = qi- In contrast, in a primary the 
incumbent leader faces a randomly drawn challenger with quality qc and the nomina­
tion is decided by the rank and file.
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From equation (2.1) we obtain the condition for a party member to prefer the 
challenger:
v (Qc) > v (qi) +  cn 4- 6 (2.3)
where <Ji +  5 > 0. Since v (•) is increasing in qp, condition (2.3) implies that qp > qi.
Thus a party member will only vote to replace the leader as the party candidate if
the quality of the challenger is sufficiently high.
In order to avoid a corner solution I assume that:
Assumption 1 ^  ^ < p (1 -  A) (1 -  ©)
This assumption states that the loyalty of party members towards the party leader 
is not too large. It guarantees that there is always a value of qc such that even a leader 
with a maximum popularity shock can be replaced if a challenger of sufficiently high 
quality appears.
Let Aq = Eqp — qi represent the expected quality gains from using a primary. 
Then under assumption 1, we can prove that:
Proposition 2 Primaries improve the expected quality of the party candidate (Aq > 
0). The expected gains in quality are decreasing in qi.
Proposition 3 A primary-nominated candidate has a higher eocpected vote share. The 
expected vote premium is p (1 — A) Aq which is decreasing in the size of partisan voters
A.
These findings highlight the role of primaries as an option for party members to 
improve the quality of incumbent candidates. In this setup, the desire of the rank- 
and-file to appeal to non-partisan voters and increase the party’s vote share creates 
incentives to enhance candidate selection. The expected electoral benefit from using 
primaries increases when the partisan support (A) is smaller, since attracting non­
partisan voters becomes more important for the party’s success. The gains from 
political selection, however, are smaller when the incumbent leader is already of high 
quality.
Party constitution At the first stage, the rank and file vote between adopting a 
primary or maintain the status quo. A party member prefers a primary if:
v (Eqp) > v (qi) +  <7* + 5. (2.4)
Note that party members with a strong attachment to the party leader prefer not to 
adopt a primary because of the possibility that the leader will be replaced.
Replacing (3) in equation (2.4) we can identify the party member indifferent be­
tween a primary and the status quo:
a = p (1 — A) Aq — 5 > Oi.
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Given the distributional assumption about and 5, the proportion of party members 
preferring a primary is:
7tp  =  ip a ,
while the probability of primary adoption p is:
1 1 (2-5)p = Pr ( 7TP > i  ) =  (p p U - A ) A ? - i
Expression (2.5) reflects the cost and benefits of using a primary. On the one hand, 
the leader may be replaced by a better candidate. This is costly for party members 
who have an attachment or loyalty towards her. For that reason, the probability of 
primary adoption is decreasing in the average loyalty towards the leader.
On the other hand, primaries provide the option of improving the quality of the 
party candidate and attracting non-partisan voters. In that case, the party obtains an 
electoral benefit p (1 — A) Aq, which increases with political competition but decreases 
with the quality of the party leader. Thus, primaries are more likely when the party 
faces high political competition or when the quality of the party leader is relatively 
low.
Both benefit and cost are scaled up by (p, the density of the popularity shock 5. We 
can interpret this parameter as an inverse measure of the incumbency advantage. To 
see this, note that the expected bias of the median party member towards the leader 
before the popularity shock is ^  Thus everything else equal, the higher the
values of (p, the smaller the leader’s incumbency advantage.
Calculating comparative statics from (2.5), we can summarize the effect of political 
competition on primary adoption:
Proposition  4 Political competition increases the probability of primary adoption. 
The effect of political competition is decreasing in the leader’s incumbency advantage.
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 summarize the model’s main empirical predictions. They 
formalize the argument that political competition increases the need to attract non­
partisan voters and also creates incentives to adopt quality-enhancing procedures such 
as contestable internal elections. A direct implication of this model is that primary- 
nominated candidates obtain larger vote shares and are of better quality. The incen­
tives from political competition, however, are attenuated by the incumbency advan­
tage, which in the model comes from the loyalty of party members towards the party 
leader.
2.4 D a ta  a n d  M ain  V ariab les
2.4.1 D a ta
I use a data set of presidential candidates from 17 Latin American countries. The data 
include all candidates from major parties running in presidential elections during the
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period 1978 to 2004. I restrict the universe of candidates only to candidates that 
obtained a vote share higher that five percent and who were among the four runners 
up .88 I also exclude cases of presidents seeking immediate re-election because they 
may be abnormally popular or influential politicians.89
Based on the universe of candidates, I define two data sets: a data set of candidates 
and a data set of presidents. The first dataset includes candidates of parties that I 
observe for two or more elections. For each candidate I observe the procedure used 
to nominate her and the electoral outcome of her party in presidential and legislative 
elections. I complement this data with information about the candidate and party’s 
characteristics. This dataset allows me to exploit within party variation on nomination 
procedures to explore both the determinants of primary adoption and the effect of 
primaries on electoral outcomes.
The second data set includes only candidate appointed as presidents. In addition 
to the information about the nomination procedure and electoral outcomes, I collect 
information about the quality of government during the mandate of the president.90 
I use this dataset to study the effect of nomination procedures on quality of govern­
ment. The data on nomination procedures comes from Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 
(2006) while the electoral data is from the Political Database of the Americas and 
party websites. I obtain the data on quality of government from several sources: the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), World Development Indicators database 
and Penn World Table.91
In total, the dataset of candidates comprises 176 candidates from 47 political 
1 parties, while the dataset of presidents includes 82 elected candidates. Table 2.2 
presents some summary statistics for the dataset of candidates and presidents.
2.4.2 M ain Variables
N om ination procedures I use an indicator variable primary equal to one if the 
candidate was nominated in a close or open primary.92 The complementary category 
includes less democratic methods such as party conventions and nominations by party 
leaders. These two categories correspond to the primary and status quo institutions
88 The rationale for this exclusion is to avoid very small parties that may not have an office-seeking 
motivation but may pursue other political objectives. The results including candidates from this 
parties, not reported, are qualitatively similar
89In Latin America presidential re-election is very rare and requires constitutional changes. In the 
period of analysis, there are four cases of incumbent presidents seeking re-election: Alberto Fujimori 
(Peru), Hugo Chavez (Venezuela), Carlos Mente (Argentina) and Henries Cardoso (Brazil). All four 
presidents were re-elected.
90 The measures of quality of government have annual frequency. To link these variables to each 
president, I first identify the president ruling a country in any given year. In the case of two presidents 
in a year (i.e. transition years) I match the year to the president who held office for most of the time. 
Then I aggregate the measures of quality of government taking the average value during a given 
president’s mandate.
91 See Appendix B.4 for further details on data sources and variables’ definitions.
92 The main distinction between open and close primaries is than in open primaries the whole 
electorate can vote while in close primaries only registered party members can participate.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Variable
A. Dataset of candidates 
Primary
Primary in previous election
Primary any other
Seat share
Vote share
Political competition
Founder
Number of candidates
B. Dataset of presidents
Primary
Primary in previous election 
Primary any other 
Political competition 
Founder 
Corruption 
Bureaucracy quality 
Government expense 
Government revenue 
Ln(GDP per capita)
Annual GDP growth
Standard 
Obi. Mean deviation
179 0.168 0.375
174 0.115 0.320
179 0.223 0.418
179 0.335 0.152
179 0.340 0.139
179 -0.032 0.131
179 0.291 0.455
179 9.587 4.835
82 0.390 0.491
82 0.122 0.329
82 0.220 0.416
82 -0.095 0.120
82 0.293 0.458
77 2.8 0.9
77 1.7 0.8
43 18.1 6.3
43 18.8 5.7
76 8.6 0.4
76 0.8 2.2
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described in the model.
In addition, I construct indicator variables of whether the party used a primary 
in the previous presidential election (primary in previous election) and whether other 
parties used primaries in the same electoral process (primary any other).
Political com petition  As a measure of political competition faced by a party, I 
use the difference between a party’s seat share and the second largest seat share. I 
calculate the seat share as the proportion of seats obtained by the candidate’s party 
in the legislative election held simultaneously or immediately before the presidential 
election.93
Recall that in the model, the political competition faced by a party is (1 — A), 
where A is the size of the partisan support or electoral advantage. Intuitively, a party 
with a relatively large partisan support faces less political competition because it can 
win the election relying only on the vote of partisan supporters.
The measure of political competition I use captures the same intuition and uses 
the party seat share as a proxy for partisan support.94 The reason for comparing this 
partisan support to the second largest seat share is that under majority rule, a can­
didate needs at least as many votes as the second runner up to win the election. This 
measure can be easily derived from the model’s definition of political competition.95
Incum bency advantage The model predicts that the effect of political competition 
of primary adoption decreases with the incumbent candidate’s advantage. To measure 
the incumbency advantage, I use an indicator of the candidate also being a party 
founder (founder).
The rationale for using this variable is that party founders may have a particular 
charisma, popularity or reputation which facilitated the creation of a new party. These 
same characteristics may give them a political advantage inside the party.96 In terms
93 In the countries studied, the legislative and presidential elections are separated electoral events, 
even though both elections may occur simultaneously. The vote share obtained by the presidential 
candidate and the proportion of parliamentary seats obtained by a party (seat share) are highly 
correlated, but not identical. In the case of bi-cameral parliaments, I use the proportion of seats in 
the lower chamber (Camara de Diputados)
94The proposed measure resembles the Ranney Index, a widely used index of political competition 
(King, 1989). In the empirical section I check the robustness of the results to alternative measures of 
political competition.
95For a formal derivation of the index of political competition, see Appendix C.
96There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that party founders enjoy a greater ability to influence 
party constitutions. For example, in the Dominican Republic, Joaquin Balaguer created the Partido 
Reformista Social Cristiano and controlled it throughout his lifetime, resisting internal pressures to 
democratized the party. In Peru, Alberto Fujimori changed his party’s name several times and was 
able to control it even during his exile in Japan. In a more extreme case, a politician can create a 
party to support his own candidacy and accommodate party institutions to that purpose. That is the 
case of Hugo Chavez, who founded the party Movimiento V Republica in 1997 to back his presidential 
campaign. A similar case is the one of Alvaro Uribe, Colombia’s current president, who first ran 
for president in 2002 with the Colombia Democratica, a party he created after separating from the 
Partido Liberal.
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of the model, being a party founder would correspond to having a small (j> and hence 
a higher cost of adopting primaries.
Q uality of G overnm ent Following La Porta et al. (1999), I use several variables 
of government efficiency and size of the public sector as proxies of quality of govern­
ment. As measures of government efficiency I use political risk assessments from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) related to corruption in government and 
the quality of a country’s bureaucracy.97 To measure the size of public sector, I use 
the value of government expense and revenues (excluding grants) as a proportion of 
GDP from the World Development Indicators database. In addition, I use indicators 
of economic performance such as real income per capita and economic growth rate 
from the Penn World Table.
2.5 F irst Stage: Prim ary D eterm inants
In this section, I explore empirically the determinants of adopting a particular nomina­
tion procedure using a data set of Latin American presidential candidates. Following 
the model’s insights, I focus on the role of political competition and incumbency ad­
vantage as the main explanatory variables. In the next section I use these primary 
determinants as instruments to identify the effect of nomination procedures on the 
quality of politicians.
The model suggests that the likelihood of using a primary increases with political 
competition. Additionally, the model predicts a heterogenous effect with the effect 
of political competition decreasing in the leader’s incumbency advantage (Proposition
4).
To test these hypotheses, I estimate the following model:
primaryij =  a \X ij +  ol<i(X ij x founderij)4- ^
as founderij +  0:4 W j -1-r]i + £ij,
where primaryij is the selection method used by the party i in the presidential election 
j ,  is the measure of political competition, founderij is the proxy for the leader’s 
incumbency advantage, W j is a set of control variables and % is the party fixed effect. 
Note that the hypotheses stated in proposition 4 imply a i > 0 and <*2 < 0.
This specification exploits within-party variation and controls for time-invariant 
party characteristics. The identification of the effect of political competition on pri­
mary adoption comes from the comparison of the same party in different elections.
Table 2.3 presents the estimates of the baseline specification using a linear proba­
bility model. It includes as additional control variables a post-1990 dummy to capture
97 These variables were previously used by Hall and Jones (1999) to construct an index of govern­
ment anti-diversion policies. They find a relationship between this indicator and improvements in 
productivity. I replicate the empirical exercise of this section using this alternative index and obtain 
similar results.
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the increased use of primaries and an indicator of other parties using primaries (pri­
mary any other). I cluster the standard errors by political party to correct for any 
serial correlation in the party use of a nomination procedure.
Column (1) shows the results without the interaction term. Consistent with the 
model predictions, there is a positive and significant correlation between political 
competition and primary adoption. This result highlights the importance of electoral 
incentives in the adoption of a candidate selection method. Column (2) explores the 
heterogenous effects of political competition by including the interaction term with 
founder. In this case, the estimate of at2 is negative and significant, but the correlation 
with political competition alone (ai ) becomes insignificant. The differences on the 
effect of political competition by founder are relevant. In particular, the effect of 
political competition is positive only when the candidate is not the party founder. This 
finding sheds light on the internal mechanism for adopting primaries and suggests that 
the incumbency advantage may attenuate the electoral incentives created by political 
competition.
Column (3) estimates the baseline model restricting the sample to parties older 
than 10 years. The results are similar to the ones using the full sample and reduce 
concerns that founder is picking up other characteristics associated with young parties 
that may hinder their ability to implement primaries, such as lack of organizational 
infrastructure, knowledge or financial resources. In all the cases, the probability of 
using a primary is larger if other parties are also using it. This result may indicate 
some strategic complementarities between parties or the existence of common factors 
driving the party decisions.
A first identification concern is the presence of omitted variables. In particular, 
the model suggests that the quality of the leader (qi) is positively correlated with 
primary adoption; however, qi is unobserved and omitted in the regression.98 This 
omission confounds the identification of the causal effect of political competition on 
primary adoption to the extent that qi is correlated with the explanatory variables. To 
address this concern, the empirical specification includes party fixed effects. Under the 
assumption that any relevant omitted variable is time-invariant, the estimates would 
capture a causal relationship between political competition and primary adoption.
A second concern is reverse causality between primary adoption and the measure 
of political competition. For example, a party adopting a primary may increase its 
partisan support and obtain a larger seat share, in turn reducing the index of political 
competition. In this case, however, we could expect a downward bias on the estimates 
of Qi, which would make the results even more conservative.
Table 2.4 presents the estimates of the baseline regression using alternative mea­
sures of political competition. In columns (1) and (2), I use the value one as a threshold 
t instead of the second highest seat share. The resulting index resembles more closely
98 Other possible omitted variables stressed in the literature of primary determinants include party 
ideology and organization.
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Table 2.3: Determinants of primary adoption
(i)
Primary
(2)
Primary
(3)
Primary
Political competition 0.453 0.714 0.901
(0.261)* (0.324) (0.356)
Political competition -0.888 -1.008
x founder (0.344)** (0.420)**
Founder 0.009 0.034 0.055
(0.033) (0.028) (0.051)
Primary any other 0.237 0.249 0.232
(0.099)** (0.099)** (0.103)**
Sample Full Full Age>10 years
Observations 179 179 147
Number of parties 47 47 40
R-squared 0.09 0.11 0.12
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at party level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 
5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include a post-1990 dummy.
The measure of political competition is the second highest seat share in 
an election minus the party seat share. Column (3) uses a sub-sample of 
parties older than 10 years.
the Ranney Index. In columns (3) and (4), in addition to changing the threshold, I 
replace the contemporaneous value of seat share with the value associated with the 
previous presidential election. In all the cases, the results axe similar to the baseline 
regressions.
Table 2.5 presents the results of a falsification test. I use specification (2.6), replac­
ing the dependant variable by its lagged value (primary in previous election). This 
variable adopts the value one if the party used a primary in the previous election, and 
zero otherwise. In contrast to the baseline results, the effect of political competition 
becomes insignificant.
2.6 Q uality o f P oliticians
In this section, I explore the relationship between candidate nomination procedures 
and political selection in two steps. First, I explore the relationship between primary 
nomination and the quality of government using the dataset of presidents. A simple 
OLS regression would not be informative of this relationship due to the endogeneity 
of nomination procedures. To address this concern, I use the determinants of pri­
mary adoption identified in the previous section as instruments for the nomination 
procedure.
Second, I evaluate the effect of primaries on candidate’s electoral performance. 
This allow us to explore the mechanism through which primaries affect quality of gov­
ernment: improvements of the political process or the type of politician. If primaries
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Table 2.4: Alternative measures of political competition
(i)
Primary
(2)
Primary
(3)
Primary
(4)
Primary
Political competition 0.481 0.754 0.358 0.607
(0.253)* (0.304)** -0.221 (0.297)**
Political competition -0.860 -0.688
x founder (0.332)** (0.323)**
Founder 0.016 0.636 -0.002 0.529
(0.032) (0.250)** (0.046) (0.251)**
Primary any other 0.242 0.250 0.275 0.284
(0.099)** (0.099)** (0.111)** (0.109)**
Measure of political 1 - party seat share 1 -■ party seat share
competition in previous election
Observations 179 179 158 158
Number of parties 47 47 47 47
R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.14
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 
party level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All 
regressions include a post-1990 dummy.
Table 2.5: Determinants of primary adoption - falsification test
(i)
Primary in 
previous election
(2)
Primary in 
previous election
Political competition 0.075 0.102
(0.218) (0.305)
Political competition -0.091
x founder (0.309)
Founder 0.026 0.029
(0.030) (0.033)
Primary any other -0.021 -0.019
(0.067) (0.068)
Observations 174 174
Number of parties 47 47
R-squared 0.01 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at party level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 
5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include a post-1990 dummy.
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improve political selection we expect primary-nominated candidates to attract voters 
and obtain a higher vote share.
2.6.1 Quality of Government
The analytical framework predicts that primaries may improve political selection 
(Proposition 2). If the role of the president is relevant enough to shape government 
policies, a corollary of this prediction is that a country will have a better government 
under a primary-nominated president.
To test this hypothesis, I estimate the following model:
Ucm ~  'hprimary president cm */2 ^^m  d- £cmj (2.7)
where yem is a measure of the quality of government of country c during the mandate 
of president m, primary cm is the method by which the ruling president was selected 
by his party and W m is a vector of control variables including a post-1990 dummy 
and an annual trend. In all regressions, I use the values of y normalized to have mean 
zero and a standard deviation equal to one to facilitate comparison of results. In this 
specification, the parameter of interest is 7 ^
A simple inspection of equation (2.7) suggests that an OLS regression would lead 
to inconsistent estimates of 7 X. The main identification challenge is the presence of 
omitted variables that may drive both the quality of government and the nomination 
procedure used by the president’s party. For example, the model suggests that parties 
with already good incumbent candidates will be less likely to adopt primaries. Since 
quality is unobservable and may positively affect the outcome variable, its omission 
may lead to a downward bias of the OLS estimates.
To address this identification concern, I use an instrumental variable approach 
based on the insights about the drivers of primary adoption identified in the ana­
lytical framework and tested in the previous empirical analysis (see Section 2.5). In 
particular, I instrument primary with the measure of political competition faced by 
the president’s party, the variable founder and the interaction term. The underly­
ing identification assumption is that at least one of the instruments, including the 
interaction term, is uncorrelated to the error term.
Table 2.6 displays the estimates of equation (2.7) using different measures of gov­
ernment quality. As a benchmark, column (1) shows the estimates of an OLS re­
gression. There is a positive correlation between primary-nominated presidents and 
all measures of government quality. However, with the exception of real income per 
capita, the correlation is not statistically significant.
Column (2) estimates the baseline regression using 2SLS. The estimates are larger 
than with OLS, which is consistent with the attenuation bias due to the omission of 
politician’s quality in the regression. The results suggest that there are significant 
differences in the quality of government during the mandate of primary-nominated
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presidents. I find that having a primary-nominated president is associated with incre­
ments of more than one standard deviation in the perceptions of corruption, bureau­
cracy quality and size of government revenues. Countries with primary-nominated 
presidents also enjoyed higher levels of income, although I find no evidence of differ­
ences in the growth rate of the economy. Taken together, these results are consistent 
with the argument that parties enhance the quality of politicians by adopting more 
democratic selection methods.
Table 2.7 displays the first stage and reduced-form regressions. I only report the 
first stage of the model with corruption as the dependent variable. The results are sim­
ilar when using other outcome variables, although the sample size varies. The results 
from the first stage (column 1) resemble the findings about primary determinants ob­
tained using the sample of presidential candidates in section 2.5. The likelihood that 
a president was primary-nominated increases with political competition, but only for 
politicians who were not also party founders." Columns (2) to (7) report the reduced 
form regressions. In all cases, the estimates are consistent with the 2SLS findings: the 
factors that increase the likelihood of primary adoption are also positively correlated 
with the measures of government quality. This evidence highlights the link between 
political competition, party institutions and political selection.
Discussion and m ain lim itations There are at least to relevant concerns regard­
ing the 2SLS estimates: the presence of weak instruments and the violation of the 
exclusion restriction. These issues need to be taken into account when interpreting 
the results. In particular, they could bias the results towards OLS or yield inconsistent 
estimates. In that case, we could not interpret the previous results as the effect of the 
president’s nomination procedure on quality of government.
Regarding the first issue, note that the sample size used in the 2SLS regressions 
ranges from 43 to 77 observations, and the F-statistic of the excluded instruments is 
6.87 (see Table 2.7). These evidence suggests that the instruments are weak. The 
presence of weak instruments may bias both the point estimates and the standard 
errors.100
To address this concern, I replicate the baseline regression using the Limited- 
Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator which is partially robust to weak 
instruments (Stock et al., 2002). In addition, I test significance using the Conditional 
Likelihood Ratio (CLR) test proposed by Moreira (2003). The CLR test provides 
a more reliable confidence interval and improves hypothesis testing in the presence 
of weak instruments (Andrews and Stock, 2005). Column (3) in Table 2.6 presents 
the estimates of using the LIML estimator, while column (4) displays the p-values 
of the significance tests using the CLR. The pattern of results is consistent with
"T he parameter associated to founder is negative and statistically significant as predicted by the 
model.
100A F-statistic above 10 is usually required to rule out weak instruments (Stock et al., 2002).
Table 2.6: Primaries and quality of government
Dependent variable Nr.
obi.
(1)
OLS
(2)
2SLS
(3)
LIML
(4)
CLR test 
p-value
(5)
Overid. test 
p-value
Government efficiency
Corruption 77 0.119 1.223 1.427 0.036 0.291
(0.239) (0.624)* (0.732)*
Bureaucracy quality 77 0.416 1.296 1.3 0.058 0.936
(0.209)* (0.730)* (0.714)*
Size of public sector
Government expense 43 0.215 1.655 1.999 0.023 0.447
(0.332) (1.084) (1.338)
Government revenue 43 0.436 1.83 1.991 0.019 0.638
(0.344) (0.933)* (1.016)*
Economic outcomes
Ln(GDP per capita) 76 0.508 1.037 1.046 0.118 0.858
(0.243)** (0.498)** (0.491)**
GDP growth 76 0.036 -0.01 -0.013 0.982 0.663
(0.230) (0.670) (0.683)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** 
significant at 1%. The estimates correspond to the parameter associated to variable primary. All regressions 
include a post-1990 dummy and a time trend. 2SLS and LIML regressions use political competition, no 
founder, and the interaction term as excluded instruments. 2SLS standard errors are corrected by small 
sample. Column (3) reports results using the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML). Column 
(4) shows the p-value of the LIML estimates using the Conditional Likelihood Ratio test. Column (5) shows 
the p-value of the Sargan-Hansen over-identification test.
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Table 2.7: First stage and reduced-form regressions
Excluded
instruments
a )
First stage
(2)
Corruption
(3) (4)
Reduced-form 
Bureaucracy Gov. 
quality expense
(5)
regressions
Gov.
revenue
(6)
Ln(GDP
per capita)
(7)
GDP
growth
Political competition 0.757 2.128 1.053 1.402 2.063 0.981 0.635
(0.427)* (0.783)*** (1.260) (1.800) (1.634) (0.825) (1.309)
Political competition -2.188 -4.723 -3.269 -2.406 -3.366 -2.108 0.446
x founder (0.938)** (1.531)*** (1.943)* (2.626) (2.677) (1.732) (1.874)
Founder -0.479 -0.556 -0.615 -0.961 -0.947 -0.536 0.052
(0.107)*** (0.248)** (0.312)* (0.406)** (0.363)** (0.266)** (0.302)
Observations 77 77 77 43 43 76 76
F-statistic 6.87
R-squared 0.149
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. 
All regressions include a post-1990 dummy and year trend as included instruments. Column (1) reports the first stage of 
the 2SLS regression with corruption as the outcome variable and the F-statistic and R-squared of the excluded instruments.
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the 2SLS findings, and suggests that weak instruments are not a serious concern in 
this application. Moreover, as shown by Stock et al. (2002), weak instruments may 
produce a small sample bias toward OLS. Since in this case most OLS estimates are 
not significantly different from zero, a weak instrument problem would mean that the 
2SLS estimates are too conservative.
A second concern is that the instruments may affect the outcome variable through 
other channels than through the adoption of a particular nomination procedure. This 
violation of the exclusion restriction may occur for example if a party’s seat share 
(the measure of political competition) also affects the president’s ability to influence 
policy. In that case, the estimates could not be interpreted as the effect of primary 
adoption on quality of government, but only as a simple correlation.
I explore this issue in two steps. First, I test the validity of the set of instruments 
using the Sargan-Hansen over-identification test. The null hypothesis of this test is 
that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and thus correctly excluded 
from the main regression. The results are displayed in Column (5) in Table 2.6. In 
all the cases, the null hypothesis is not rejected. These results support the case for a 
consistent estimation of ry1.
As a second step, I explore the presence of omitted variables that may confound 
the effect of primary adoption. To do that, I estimate the baseline regression using two 
alternative explanatory variables: primary any other which indicates whether other 
party uses a primary in the same election, and primary in previous election which 
indicates whether the president’s party used a primary before.
Finding a similar result on quality of government when other party, but the presi­
dent’s, use a primary would shed doubts on the results being driven by the nomination 
procedure of the president. Instead, it would suggest that there are broader omitted 
factors driving primary adoption in a country and also affecting quality of govern­
ment. Similarly, if the results are driven by the party previous use of primary, it 
would suggest that what matters is not the selection of a given candidate but the 
party characteristics driving primary adoption.
Columns (1) to (4) in Table 2.8 show the results. In contrast to the regressions 
using the president’s selection method, the LIML estimates are all insignificant. To­
gether, this evidence reduces concerns that common factors affecting parties’ insti­
tutional decisions -such as a more democratic political environment- are driving the 
main results.
Taken together, these additional tests provide some support to the validity of the 
identification strategy. There are, however, several remaining issues that limit the 
interpretation of the results.
First, the over-identification test rely on the assumption that at least one of the 
instruments is uncorrelated to the error term. If this is not the case, the test will not be 
informative about the validity of the set of instruments. There may be several reasons 
for all the instruments to be invalid. For example, the party size and the candidate
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characteristic may interact an affect the ability of a president to affect policy, other 
than by adopting a particular nomination procedure.
Second, in addition to common unobserved factors, there may be party-specific 
unobserved variables -like ideology or internal structure- that are omitted from the 
baseline specification and confound the estimates of the effect of primaries. In presence 
of these omitted variables, the falsification tests would also produce a similar result 
and hence would not be informative of the validity of the identification strategy.
In any of these cases, the results would need to be interpreted as evidence of a 
positive correlation between primaries and quality of government.
Table 2.8: Primaries and quality of government - falsification tests
Dependent variable (1)
OLS
(2)
LIML
(1)
OLS
(2)
LIML
Government efficiency 
Corruption 0.446 2.497 -0.111 -4.688
(0.261)* (2.598) (0.25) (9.496)
Bureaucracy quality 0.129 1.916 0.617 -0.989
(0.217) (1.479) (0.291)** (4.862)
Size of public sector 
Government expense 0.577 4.221 0.5 -28.835
(0.296)* (3.048) (0.467) (429.161)
Government revenue 0.879 4.317 0.271 -11.13
(0.275)*** (3.25) (0.500) (36.806)
Economic outcomes 
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.791 1.493 0.911 -1.052
(0.296)*** (0.993) (0.312)*** (7.629)
GDP growth -0.055 0.383 -0.402 -0.877
(0.339) (1.195) (0.376) (1.466)
Explanatory variable Primary any other Primary in previous
election
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. The estimates correspond to the 
parameter associated with the explanatory variable. All regressions include a 
post-1990 dummy and a year trend. LIML regressions use political competition, 
founder, and the interaction term as excluded instruments.
2.6.2 E lectoral Perform ance
The model predicts that primary-nominated candidates will obtain higher vote shares 
because they have a quality or attribute that attracts voters. Moreover, the gains 
of vote share are smaller for already large parties, since primaries broaden the party 
appeal among non-partisan voters.
To test these hypotheses, I estimate the following regression:
vote shareij — fiiprimaryij +  /32seat shareij+ 
(I^prim ary^ x seat shareij) -1- /?4W ^ +7^-1- £ij,
(2.8)
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where vote shareij is the proportion of votes obtained by the candidate of party i in 
presidential elections j , seat shareij is the proportion of legislative seats obtained by 
the party in the contemporaneous or more recent legislative election and primaryij 
is the selection method. W j is a vector of control variables and 77^ is the party fixed 
effect.
This specification uses seat share as a measure of partisan support A and it is 
derived from the vote share equation (2.2).101 Similar to (2.6), this specification 
exploits within-party variation and controls for time-invariant party characteristics. 
The parameters of interest are and /?3, which capture the vote share premium for 
primary-nominated candidates and the heterogenous effect by size of partisan support, 
respectively. The model predicts that 0 1 > 0 and (32 < 0.
Table 2.9 shows the estimates of equation (2.8) using as additional control vari­
ables the log of the number of candidates in the electoral process and primary any 
other. I cluster the errors by political party to correct for any serial correlation in 
the presidential vote share. Column (1) estimates the baseline regression without the 
interaction term to obtain the average vote premium. The evidence suggests that 
primary-nominated candidates have a better electoral performance. In particular, the 
average candidate obtains a vote share six percentage points above her partisan sup­
port when she is primary-nominated. To put this number in context, note that the 
average vote share of non-primary nominated candidates is 33 percent. Columns (2) 
and (3) estimate the full specification using the entire sample and restricting it to 
parties older than 10 years, respectively. In both cases, I find that primary-nominated 
candidates obtain larger vote shares and that the vote premium decreases with parti­
san support.
These results are similar to the estimates of Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2006). 
Using a larger data set and a different empirical specification, they find that primary- 
nominated presidential candidates in Latin America obtained between four percent 
and six percent of additional vote share. The main difference of this thesis with their 
work is the inclusion of party fixed effects and the use of seat share as a proxy for 
partisan support.
Table 2.10 shows the results of a falsification test. The specification is similar 
to the baseline regression (2.8) but uses primary in the previous election instead of 
primary as an explanatory variable. In both regressions, the estimates of (31 and (S2 
are not statistically significant. This evidence reduces concerns that primaries play a 
reputational role. If that was the case, the use of primaries would increase vote share, 
not only in the contemporaneous presidential election but also in future ones.
Taken together, these results provide supportive evidence of the electoral benefits 
of adopting primaries. The existence of these benefits is consistent with the electoral 
incentives to adopt primaries and the role of political competition. The benefit of 
adopting primaries increases with political competition, since attracting non-partisan
101See Appendix B.6 for a formal derivation.
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voters becomes more important for the party’s success.
These results also suggest that nomination procedures play a relevant role in po­
litical selection. In particular, the results show that primary-nominated candidates 
have attributes which broaden party appeal among non-partisan voters.
Table 2.9: Primaries and electoral performance
(i) (2) (3)
Vote share Vote share Vote share
Primary 0.057 0.204 0.213
(0.031)* (0.078)** (0.079)***
Seat share 0.638 0.731 0.726
(0.121)*** (0.082)*** (0.106)***
Primary x -0.398 -0.439
seat share (0.164)** (0.172)**
Sample Full Full Age > 10 years
Observations 179 179 147
Number of parties 47 47 40
R-squared 0.45 0.49 0.46
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at party level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 
5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include party fixed effects 
and as control variables: prim ary any other and Ln(num ber of candidates. 
Column (3) uses a sub-sample of parties older than 10 years.
Table 2.10: Primaries and electoral performance - robustness checks
a )
Vote share
(2)
Vote share
Primary in previous -0.033 0.097
election (0.037) (0.145)
Seat share 0.604 0.657
(0.128)*** (0.093)***
Primary in previous -0.319
election x seat share (0.340)
Observations 174 174
Number of parties 47 47
R-squared 0.43 0.44
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at party level. * denotes significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions 
include as control variables: prim ary any other and Ln(num ber  
of candidates).
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2.7 C onclusion
Motivated by a simple model, this paper has provided empirical evidence linking par­
ties’ nomination procedures to political selection. The evidence supports the argument 
that party institutions play an important role in political selection and can affect the 
electoral outcomes and ultimately the quality of government. Moreover, the results 
highlight another channel for inter-party political competition to improve political 
selection by creating incentives to adopt more democratic nomination procedures.
By explicitly modeling party decisions, the model provides additional testable 
insights regarding the interaction of party characteristics and political competition. 
In particular, the evidence suggests that the incentives of political competition can 
be attenuated by the incumbency advantage of a politician. This bias makes it more 
difficult to adopt institutions that may challenge the status quo.
This paper shows how treating parties as organizations can enrich our understand­
ing of the political process and its relationship to economic outcomes. However, I focus 
only on the candidate nomination process, assuming an office seeking party. In re­
ality, parties have richer institutional setups and also have other motivations beyond 
just holding office. These features may be also relevant for understanding political 
selection and how electoral incentives shape policy making.
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B  A pp en dix
B .l  Proof of Proposition 2
Under assumption 1, there is a positive probability that a challenger with sufficiently 
high quality will replace the leader as party candidate. To see this, recall that a party 
member votes for the challenger if:
v (qc) > v (qi) +  +  5
where 6 is the realization of 5. Thus, the swing party member - indifferent between 
the party leader and challenger - is represented by:
Using expression (2.2), we can rewrite (2.9) as a =  p (l  — A) {qc — qi) — 6. Then,
which is positive for any S under assumption 1.
Hence, we can write the expected quality gains before the primary election as:
A q = 7TC (qc -  qi)
which is positive because the challenger is nominated only when qc > qi. In addition, 
note that for similar reasons, Aq is decreasing in qi.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that qp = qi if a party uses a caucus, and Eqp > qi in the case of a primary. 
Using equation (2.2), we can write the difference in expected vote share between a 
primary- and a caucus-nominated candidate as:
a - v { q c) - v  (qi) -  5 (2.9)
the proportion of party members voting for the challenger is ijm and the probability 
that the challenger is nominated can be written as:
v(Eqp) -  v(q{) = p (1 -  A) Aq
which is strictly positive, increasing in Aq and decreasing in A since Aq > 0 and 
A €(0 ,1 ).
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B.3 P ro o f of P roposition  4
Recall from equation (2.5) that:
p (1 — A) Aq -
2
thus = which is positive by proposition 2. Similarly, =  P^q >
0.
B.4 Variables and  D ata  Sources
P rim ary  1 if presidential candidate was nominated by primary (open or closed), 0 
otherwise. Source: Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2006)
P rim ary  in previous election 1 if party used primary to select presidential can­
didate in the previous election, 0 otherwise. Source: Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 
(2006)
P rim ary  any o th er 1 if other party used primary in the same electoral process, 0 
otherwise. Source: Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2006)
Seat share Proportion of seats obtained by candidate’s party in lower chamber 
in the legislative election held simultaneously or immediately before the presidential 
election. Source: Center on Democratic Performance and Political Database of the 
Americas
Vote share Proportion of votes obtained by a presidential candidate. Source: Carey 
and Polga-Hecimovich (2006)
Founder 1 if candidate was one of the party founders, 0 otherwise. Source: Parties’ 
websites and Political Database of the Americas
N um ber of parties Number of presidential candidates in a given election. Source: 
Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2006)
C orrup tion  Assessment of corruption within the political systems including: pa­
tronage, nepotism, secret party funding and close ties between government and busi­
ness. Score ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating lower corruption. Source: 
International Country Risk Guide
B ureaucracy quality  Assessment of the strength and quality of the bureaucracy. 
Score ranges from 0 to 4, with higher values indicting a more autonomous and expert 
bureaucracy. Source: International Country Risk Guide
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G overnm ent expense Government expense as % of the GDP. Source: World De­
velopment Indicators
G overnm ent revenue Government revenue excluding grants as % of GDP. Source: 
World Development Indicators
G D P p e r cap ita  Real income per capita using Laspeyres index. Source: Penn 
World Table 6.1
G D P grow th Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Source: Penn World 
Table 6.1
B.5 D erivation of th e  Index of Political C om petition
Consider n parties competing in a presidential election. All of them have a candidate of 
similar quality, and thus they rely on their partisan supporters to decide the election. 
Each party has a proportion of partisan supporters A s u c h  that < 1. Ai is a
i € n
random variable with a cumulative distribution function Fi (Ai). I assume that all Fi 
have an identical shape but different means.
Denote the realizations of A* as Ai and rank them by size such that Ai > A2 > 
... >  An . Thus, we can write the ex ante probability that party i wins the election as 
Gi ^ 2  ^ =  1 — Fi ^ 2  ^ . Since parties are competing for one position, they need to 
surpass the votes obtained by the second highest candidate to win the election. In 
that case, the party becomes the one with the largest partisan support.
Gi (^ 2)  measures the ability of the party to win the election based purely on its 
partisan support. This measure corresponds to the concept of political competition 
used in the analytical framework.
Taking a first order Taylor approximation of Gi (^ 2)  around E  (Ai) and using Ai 
as the best estimator of E  (Ai), we obtain:
Gi ^ 2 ^  ~  cq  -1-  c i  ^ 2  — A i^
where co =  Gi(E (Ai)) and c\ = G[{E (Ai)) are positive constants.
Note that because of the assumption that all Ai have distribution functions with 
identical shapes, both co and c\ are identical for all parties. Thus, to construct an 
empirical counterpart of Gi ^ 2^, we can focus only on the component ^ 2  — Ai^, 
since cq,ci can be pinned down during the econometric estimation.
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B.6 Empirical Specification of the Vote Share Regression
Recall from equation (2.2) that the expected vote share a party can obtain is:
Vi = 5 [qp +  (1 -  qp) A] +  (1 -  6)
and that qp = Aq +  qi if the party uses a primary, and qpi = qu otherwise.
Under the assumption that Aq are qi are party-specific but time-invariant and 
using the definition of qp, we can re-write the expected vote share of the candidate 
from party i in electoral process j  as:
Vi j  =  S A q i p r i m a r y i j  +  ( ^
1 - 6  (210)-5A q  (Aij x primaryij) -|-------   1- Squz
Note that in expression (2.10), both the partisan support A and the selection 
method can vary between elections.
Equation (2.10) resembles a random coefficient model. Assuming that A qi = 
Aq+vJu and qu = qi+W2i with v ju ,v j2i independent from primary and A, expression 
(2.10) becomes:
where
vij =  Pi primaryij +  P2\ j  +  /^(A ij * primaryij) +V + £ij (2-ll)
Pi -  ~Pz =  6 A  q 
P2i =
1 - 6  
i  =  2  ^ qi
£ij =  zju [5primaryij (1 — Ajj)] +  w 2i [6 (1 -  A»j)]
Expression (2.11) provides the motivation for the proposed empirical specification 
(2 .8).
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3 The Flypaper Effect and Costly  
Tax Collection
One of the most documented empirical regularities in the fiscal federalism literature 
is the so-called flypaper effect (Hines and Thaler, 1995; Gamkhar and Shah, 2007). 
This effect refers to the observed greater responsiveness of local government’s spending 
to increases in grants than to increases in the local tax base. However, in the tradi­
tional grants-in-aid theoretical framework, these findings axe puzzling (Oates, 1999). If 
money is fungible, a local government representing the interests of the citizens should 
have the same propensity to spend out of individual income or out of lump-sum grants 
(Bradford and Oates, 1971).102
Some explanations of this paradox focus on flaws in the empirical strategy such 
as functional mis-specification (Becker, 1996), omitted variables (Hamilton, 1983), 
reverse causality (Knight, 2002) or measurement error (Moffitt, 1984). Other ex­
planations rely on some sort of political bias due imperfect information (Courant et 
al., 1979; Oates, 1979), uncertainty (Turnbull, 1998) or the action of agenda setting 
budget-maximizing bureaucrats (Filimon et al., 1982).103
An alternative explanation, first proposed by Hamilton (1986), suggests instead 
that the flypaper effect is partly due to costly taxation. In Hamilton’s original model, 
the cost of taxation comes from deadweight losses of local taxes. This explanation, 
however, has been criticized since the magnitude of the distortionary costs of local 
taxes may be insufficient to account for the observed flypaper effect (Hines and Thaler, 
1995, p. 221).
In this paper I evaluate empirically Hamilton’s hypothesis. First I develop a model 
of local public spending with costly tax collection. Then, I test the model predictions 
using data from Peruvian local governments.
The model is based on Hamilton’s contribution and emphasizes the same mecha­
nism -costly taxation- to produce the flypaper effect. There are, however, two relevant 
differences that make it more suitable for empirical testing. First, the model motivates 
costly taxation by introducing tax collection costs, such as administrative or compli­
ance costs, instead of deadweight losses. These costs are easier to observe empirically 
and may be more relevant in the case of local taxes (Slemrod, 1990). Second, it pro­
vides a simpler and quantifiable expression of the magnitude of the flypaper effect as 
a function of tax collection costs and the tax rate. To the best of my knowledge, this 
result has not been obtained before and it is important since the flypaper paradox is 
mainly an empirical issue.
102 A similar argument of fungibility is found in the aid literature. See Van de Walle and Mu (2007) 
for a recent survey of the literature.
103 For a detailed survey of the literature see Hines and Thaler (1995), Bailey and Connolly (1998) 
or Gamkhar and Shah (2007)
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The model predicts that local spending will be more responsive to additional grants 
than to increase of the local tax base, a result contrary to the standard grants-in- 
aid approach and consistent with the observed flypaper effect. Moreover, there is a 
substitution effect: local governments will use the additional grants to reduce costly 
local taxation.
These effects vary with the tax collection costs and tax rate. In particular, the 
model predicts that the grant elasticity of spending will be smaller for local govern­
ments with lower tax collection costs and will decrease with the tax rate. Furthermore, 
the substitution effect of local revenue by grants will be greater for local governments 
with lower tax collectiop costs.
I test these predictions using data from Peruvian district municipalities. I exploit 
variation on the Foncomun, a large equalization grant allocated by formula and funded 
with a share of the national value added tax. I focus on a particular type of tax 
collection costs: administrative costs. As a proxy for these costs I use the tenure of 
administrative tools -such as automated tax systems or an updated cadaster.
I find evidence supporting the model predictions. The grant elasticity of spending 
for a high cost municipality is 0.756, while for a low cost it is 0.561, almost 25 percent 
smaller. In contrast, the estimated sensitivity of spending to the local tax base is 
0.089. These results suggest that the differences in administrative tax collection costs 
account for almost one third of the difference on the elasticities of spending. I also 
find evidence of the substitution effect. Municipalities with lower tax collection costs 
reduce their local revenue, and taxes, when receiving additional grants. The results 
axe robust to the inclusion of observable confounding factors driving both the tax 
collection costs and grant elasticity of spending.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 develops the analytical 
framework. Section 3.2 discusses the institutional background of Peruvian district 
municipalities. Section 3.3 presents the empirical strategy while Section 3.4 presents 
the main results and robustness checks. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.1 A  M odel o f Local Spending
In this section I develop a model of the spending decisions of a local government in 
the presence of costly taxation. The model provides testable predictions about the 
magnitude of the flypaper effect as a function of tax collection costs and the tax 
rate.104
The model emphasizes the role of costly taxation as a mechanism to explain the 
flypaper effect. This explanation is similar to the one proposed by Hamilton (1986).105
104The magnitude of the flypaper effect is the difference between the propensity to  spend out of 
grants and the propensity to spend out of local income (Becker, 1996).
105 In Ham ilton’s model, the local public good is financed by a combination of local income taxes 
and grants from the central government. Local taxation is distortionaxy and creates a deadweight 
loss that reduces citizens’ net income. This feature makes the propensity of spend out of transfers 
greater than out of local income, because grants allow the local government to reduce distortionary
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There axe, however, two relevant differences. First, the model uses tax collection costs 
instead of deadweight losses to introduce costly taxation. Tax collection costs -which 
include compliance and administrative costs- are easier to observe than distortionary 
costs. This feature facilitates the empirical evaluation of the model. Second, it pro­
vides a simpler and quantifiable expression of the magnitude of the flypaper effect as 
a function of tax collection costs and tax rate. To the best of my knowledge, this 
result has not been obtained before and it is important since the flypaper paradox is 
mainly an empirical issue.
Consider a community populated by a continuum of citizens of mass one. Citizens 
have heterogenous income denoted by yi. In order to abstract from the effect of income 
inequality, I restrict attention to symmetric distributions such that both the average 
and median income are equal.106
There a two tiers of government: central and local. Both provide public goods, 
collect taxes and have their representatives elected in general elections. In addition, 
the central government provides financial support as lump-sum grants to the local 
government. I focus on the policy decisions of the local government and take the 
central government’s policies as given.107
Citizens derive utility from private consumption c* and a homogenous public good 
g provided by the local government. Preferences axe defined by a quasi-linear utility 
function:
Ui = Ci + H(g), (3.1)
where the utility from the public good H (g) is an increasing and concave function.
The local government funds the provision of the public good from two revenue 
sources: a local income tax and a grant from the central government. Tax policy 
is not targeted and hence the local tax rate r  6 (0 , 1) is the same for all citizens. 
The local government sets the tax rate and collects the tax revenue. In contrast, the 
decisions on grant’s funding and allocation axe made by the central government.
Raising local revenue is costly. In particular, the local government faces a admin­
istrative cost of operating the tax system equal to TC(r)y  where T is a cost shifter 
and C(-) is an increasing and convex function. T C ( t )  adopts values strictly between 
0 and r  to avoid a corner solution with zero taxation. The administrative cost cov­
ers, among others, the cost of processing tax returns, monitoring tax evasion and the 
required legal proceeds. An alternative way to motivate costly tax collection is to 
include compliance costs. In the rest of the model I will focus on administrative costs 
because they axe more relevant for the empirical case I study; however, the results 
using compliance costs are similar (see Appendix C.2).
From (3.1) and the previous definitions, we can write the indirect utility of citizen
taxation and increase citizens’ consumption.
106The results are similar with asymmetric income distributions (see Appendix C .l)
107This is a plausible assumption if local governments are unable to, individually, affect central 
government’s policies.
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i as
Vi = yi[l -  t \  + H  (g), (3.2)
while the local government’s budget constraint is
g = y [ r -  TC(r)] +  a, (3.3)
where y is the tax base (an also the average income) and a is the lump-sum grant per 
capita. Note that expression R = y [r — rC'(r)] represents the net tax revenue.
Assumption 1 C' < 1
This assumption guarantees that the net tax revenue is an increasing and monotonic 
function of the tax rate.
The political process to define the local tax rate and public spending is one of 
Downsian electoral competition. There are two office-seeking politicians running for 
local office, electoral promises are enforceable and the winning candidate is defined 
by simple majority rule. Politicians axe office seekers and choose policy to maximize 
their vote share. The timing of events is as follows. Firstly, candidates simultaneously 
announce their policies r  and g. Secondly, local elections are held. Finally, the 
appointed politician implements her announced policy platform.108
This setup is relatively standard in the political economy literature and has been 
widely used by Persson and Tabellini (2000) in their analysis of public spending and 
redistributive politics. The only differences are the introduction of grants as an addi­
tional source of revenue and costly tax collection.
Equilibrium policy Rearranging the budget constraint (3.3), we can express r  as 
a function of g:
F(r) = r-rC (r) = ^ ,  (3.4)
where F' > 0, F" < 0 by assumption 1 and convexity of C(r). Since F  is a monotonic 
function, we can write the tax rate as
where f  (•) =  F _1 (•) and hence f  > 0, f"  > 0.
The citizen’s indirect utility (3.2) satisfies single-crossing property and allow us 
to use the median voter theorem.109 Thus, the politician’s program is equivalent to 
choose a level of public spending to maximize the median voter’s utility. In equilib­
108To make the model sensible in the case of unanticipated grants , we can assume one of the 
candidates is the incumbent mayor seeking reelection.
109To see this note that =  f " ^ r  > 0
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rium, the local public spending satisfies:
g* =  arg max y [1 -  r] +  H{g). (3.6)
Using (3.5) and solving (3.6) we obtain the equilibrium policy:
9* =  f t ( / ' ( ^ ) ) ,  (3.7)
where h(-) is the inverse function of H'(-). Note that hf < 0 because H  is concave.
3.1.1 Costless tax collection.
Let us first study as a benchmark the case of costless tax collection. In this case, 
expression (3.7) simplifies to g* = h (1) and it is easy to see that the effect of lump­
sum grants and local tax base on g* are both identical and equal to zero.110
When tax collection is costless, the model predicts that grants from the central 
government do not affect spending but instead are fully translated to citizens as tax 
rebates. Moreover, the mechanism to transfer resources becomes irrelevant because 
both grants and local income are equivalent in terms of their effect on local government 
spending and taxation.
This result replicates the veil hypothesis which has provided the theoretical basis 
for the flypaper paradox (Oates, 1999, p. 1129). According to this hypothesis, when 
the local authority is representative of the citizens both lump-sum grants and local 
income have similar effect on local spending. Thus, the local government acts only as 
a veil and does not distort the final allocation of resources.
3.1.2 Costly tax collection
Let us now relax the assumption of costless taxation. Taking total derivatives from 
expression (3.7) we can calculate the marginal propensities to spend out of local income 
and grants:
v  = (3.8)
dy y -  h 'f"  y K }
dg* h ' f
da y — h 'f" (3.9)
Since h' < 0, and f"  > 0, these propensities to spend axe positive. Thus, in 
contrast to the benchmark case, the model predicts a local spending increases both 
with tax base and central government grants. The reason is that grants reduce the 
tax rate required to fund a given level of spending. In turn, this lowers tax collection 
costs, reduces the marginal cost of the public good and promotes additional spending.
3This result is extreme due to the quasi-linearity assumption which eliminates the income effect.
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Expressions (3.8) and (3.9) provide a way to compare both marginal propensities 
to spend and evaluate the magnitude of the flypaper effect. Using both results and 
definition (3.4), we can obtain the following expression:
dg* dg* 1   (3.10)
da dy t* — TC(t*)
where r* is the equilibrium tax rate and rC(r*) is the administrative cost as a pro­
portion of the tax base.
Equation (3.10) provides two important observations. First, the ratio ^*_rc(r*) 1S 
a measure of the flypaper effect. In most cases, this ratio is quantifiable since both the 
tax rate and administrative costs are, potentially, observable. This insight suggests a 
simple way to calculate, ex ante, the propensity to spend out of grants and evaluate 
the stimulatory effects of intergovernmental transfers.
Second, since TC{r*) € (0,r*) and r* < 1, the marginal propensity to spend 
out of grants is greater than the marginal propensity to spend out of income (the 
local tax base).111 This prediction is consistent with the observed flypaper effect and, 
contrary to the veil hypothesis, suggests that local income and lump-sum grants are 
not equivalent.
A corollary of this non-equivalence result is that additional grants reduce local tax 
revenue < 0). Thus, in the presence of costly taxation, there is a substitution 
effect of local taxes by grants. To see this note that:
dR* dq*
= 1 -1 ( 3 -n )
Similar to Hamilton (1986), the non-equivalence result is driven by the differences 
on the cost of funds faced by the local government. In particular, a local government 
finds more costly to collect local taxes than to use central government’s grants. In 
the model, this cost difference arises from the inability of the local government to 
internalize the cost of funding the intergovernmental transfers. This result points out 
a potential source of inefficiency: local governments may overspend if they do not take 
into account the tax collection costs incurred by the central government.112
Testable predictions In the empirical section, I use a double logarithmic specifi­
cation which provides estimates of elasticities instead of propensities to spend.
In order to link the previous results to the empirical exercise, we can rewrite
111 Moreover, finding similar marginal propensities would be rare since it requires very high tax rates 
and negligible collection costs.
112 Alternatively, the difference in tax collection costs can be due to technological differences. In that 
case, there would be no inefficiency.
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equations (3.10) and (3.11) as
a 1 . _ _
£° = £yyr*-rC(r*) ( ^
£R,a =  '-a : (3.13)
where ea =  and ey = are the grant elasticity and the tax base elasticity of 
spending, respectively, and £r>cl = ^  is the grant elasticity of local tax revenue.
In addition, using (3.3) we can rewrite (3.12) as:
£ a  =  £ y  » (^’14)g - a
where is the ratio of grant to non-grant revenue.
From equations (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14) it is straightforward to obtain testable 
predictions about the relation between the elasticities of spending and tax revenue, 
tax collection costs and actual tax rate. In particular, the model predicts that :
1. > 0: the grant elasticity of spending increases with tax collection costs;
2. ^  < 0: the grant elasticity of spending decreases with the tax rate;
3. > 0: the grant elasticity of tax revenue increases with tax collection costs 
(smaller substitution effect).
4. d(affg_a^ = £y > 0: the grant elasticity of spending increases with the ratio of 
grant to non-grant revenue. This derivative also provides an estimate of ey, the 
tax base elasticity of spending.
In Section 3.4,1 test empirically these model predictions in the context of Peruvian 
district municipalities.
3.2 Institu tional Background
District municipalities are the lowest tier of autonomous sub-national government in 
Peru. Their main responsibilities are the provision of local services -such as waste 
collection, local police and civil register- and development and maintenance of local 
infrastructure. They do not participate in the provision of education or health services 
and cannot redistribute cash directly to citizens.
Municipalities finance their budget mostly from two sources: local revenue (such 
as local taxes, fees, fines and contributions) and transfers from the central government 
(see Table 3.1). In the period 1998 to 2001, these two sources represented around 84 
percent of the total budget. The remaining budget corresponds mostly to debt, sales 
of assets and the amount saved from previous years.113
113Any amount of local revenues or transfers not spent in a fiscal year is rolled forward to the next 
year.
3 THE FLYPAPER EFFECT AND COSTLY TAX COLLECTION 108
Table 3.1: Aggregate municipal budget 1998-2001, in millions of Nuevos Soles
Source Annual % total
Budget budget
A. Transfers 1032.5 43.9
Foncomun grant 691.2 29.4
Vaso de Leche 221.9 9.4
Other transfers 119.4 5.1
B. Local Revenue 932.4 39.7
Taxes 368.9 15.7
Service fees 493.5 21.0
Fines and contributions 70.0 3.0
C. Other Revenue 309.7 13.2
D. Previous year balance 76.2 3.2
Total revenue 2350.8
Source: Municipalities’ budget reports.
Note: Other transfers includes Canon, Renta de Aduanas and 
Vaso de Leche. Other Revenue includes credit and capital in­
come.
Local taxes The most important local tax is the property tax (impuesto predial). 
The property tax is levied on the estimated value of the real estate property. In 2001, 
this tax amounted to 80 percent of total local tax revenue.
Local governments have no control over the property tax rate or tax base. The 
tax rate is defined by national law while the property value is calculated using criteria 
defined by a national surveyor agency such as property size, quality and economic use. 
The amount actually collected, however, depends on the municipality’s monitoring and 
enforcement effort.
A common form of tax evasion consists on failing to report improvements to ex­
isting properties (which could increase the taxable base). To address this problem, 
local tax authorities usually maintain a register of properties or cadaster, with details 
about properties’ location, size and ownership.114 As I explain below, I use the tenure 
of an updated municipal cadaster as one of the proxies for having low tax collection 
costs.
Transfers District municipalities receive several transfers from the central govern­
ment (see Table 3.1). The most important are the Foncomun, an equalization grant, 
followed by the Vaso de Leche (Glass of Milk), a conditional grant earmarked to pro­
114The importance of the cadaster as a tool to implement and operate property tax systems is 
highlighted in international guidelines of land management. See for example United Nations (2005) 
and International Federation of Surveyors (2005).
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vide food support to children and elders.115 Other transfers include sharing schemes 
of taxes managed by the central government such as corporate tax of extractive in­
dustries and custom duties. These tax sharing schemes are earmarked to capital 
expenditures. I focus on the Foncomun because it is the largest transfer and the only 
one that resembles an unconditional grant.
The Foncomun is funded with a fixed proportion of the national value added tax .116 
This tax is managed and collected by the central government without any intervention 
of local governments.
The Foncomun is allocated by a formula that considers: urban and rural population 
of a district and children mortality at provincial level.117. The allocation weights were 
calculated by the Ministry of Economics using values from the 1993 Population Census 
and remained fixed during the period of analysis.118 There is also a lower bound on 
the amount of Foncomun a municipality receives. This lower bound is set annually and 
benefits municipalities with small populations.119 The amount of Foncomun received 
in a year does not depend on the spending performance of previous years.
Municipalities cannot directly affect the allocation formula or weights. This rule 
out a possible bargaining mechanism that may difficult the identification of the propen­
sity to spent out of grants, as suggested by Knight (2002).
During the period of analysis, the Foncomun was partially earmarked to capital 
expenditures. Municipalities should have spent at least 70 percent of the transfer on 
capital expenditures. In practice, however, compliance with this conditionality was 
very limited. In aggregate, the proportion of the Foncomun actually spent on capital 
expenditures decreased from 67 percent in 1998 to 54 percent in 2001. This evidence 
suggests that the Foncomun may have been treated in practice as an unconditional 
grant. In 2003, the spending conditionality was removed.
3.3 Em pirical Strategy
3.3.1 Data
I use a dataset of around 1350 Peruvian district municipalities with information about 
annual budgets, administrative resources and socio-demographic characteristics.120 
The budgetary information covers four years (1998 to 2001) while the data on ad­
ministrative resources and socio-demographics is a cross section with data observed 
in 1999 or 1993. Table 3.2 presents summary statistics of the main variables.
115Foncomun stands for Fondo de Compensation Municipal or Municipal Compensation Fund
116Over the period of analysis this proportion was 2/19.
117A province is the immediately superior geographical jurisdiction
118The allocation formula for municipalities in Lima -the country’s capital and largest city- includes 
more variables but follows the same general criteria.
119The value of the lower bound is indexed to a reference value used by the central government 
agencies to calculate income tax personal allowances, tax brackets and fines.
120The sample size is smaller than the universe of 1650 municipalities due to lack of budgetary 
information for some small municipalities.
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I use the value of expenditure and Foncomun per capita as measures of local 
spending (g) and grants (a) respectively. Then I use these variables to estimate the 
grant elasticity of spending. To evaluate the substitution effect of grants on local 
taxes, I use the value of local revenue per capita as a measure of local tax revenue 
(R). As previously mentioned, this revenue category includes local taxes, fees, fines 
and contributions. I also evaluate the results using only the value of local taxes per 
capita.
The budgetary information comes from annual reports prepared by the local gov­
ernments. These reports have official status and are used for national accounting and 
auditing by different government agencies.121 They include detailed information on 
municipalities revenues and expenditures as well as the amount received from differ­
ent transfers.122 I express the revenue and expenditure variables in per capita values 
using population estimates for the year 1999.
I also collect data on the administrative resources of a municipality such as hav­
ing an updated cadaster -a register with details about properties’ location, size and 
ownership- or automated administrative systems. The data comes from surveys con­
ducted in 1999 by the National Statistics Institute to assess the resources and ca­
pabilities of district municipalities.123 The results of the survey were not intended 
to affect the transfers’ allocation or the implementation of other governmental pro­
grams. Participation in the survey was compulsory for all district municipalities and 
the questionnaire was completed by the local authority or a representative.
I complement the dataset with socio-demographic variables from several sources. 
I obtain measures of population density and percentage of urban population from the 
1993 Population Census, as well as population estimates for 1999 from the National 
Statistics Office. Poverty head count and access to utilities are estimates for 1999 
from Foncodes -a public body in charge of several antipoverty programs- and used for 
the prioritization of public works and development projects.
M easures of ta x  collection costs The literature of the efficiency costs of taxation 
distinguishes four main costs: the deadweight loss, administrative costs, compliance 
costs and the risk bearing costs of tax evasion (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002, pp. 1447- 
1449). The first cost refers to the loss of efficiency associated to the change on behavior 
due to taxes and the subsequent change on relative prices. In contrast, administrative 
and compliance costs refer to the costs incurred to meet the requirements of the tax
121 The budget reports I use correspond to the copy sent to the Ministry of Economy.
122I compared the amount of transfers registered in the budget reports with the records from the 
Ministry of Economy -the office in charge of distributing the transfers. The values are similar for both 
data sources.
123The survey is called Registro Nacional de Municipalidades or the National Municipality Register. 
It covers areas such as human resources, equipment, municipality services, local infrastructure and 
current investment projects.
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system borne by the tax office and taxpayers, respectively.124
Administrative and compliance costs are not negligible and, in the context of local 
public finances, may be as relevant as the distortionary costs of taxation (Slemrod, 
1990, p. 169). For example, estimates of the compliance and administrative costs of 
the U.S. federal and state income tax are between 5-10 percent of total tax revenue 
(Slemrod and Sorum, 1984; Blumenthal and Slemrod, 1992; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 
2002). In the case of local governments, Wicks and Killwort (1967) estimate collection 
costs for real property taxes of around 9.5 percent of the tax revenue.125
I focus on a particular type of tax collection cost: the administrative cost. As a 
measure of the differences on this cost I use the tenure of tax administration tools 
such as an automated tax system or an updated cadaster. In particular, I construct a 
dummy named low cost equal to one if a municipality has an automated tax system 
or an updated cadaster.126 In terms of the model, low cost equal to one corresponds 
to having a lower T. In the sample, around 32 percent of municipalities are classified 
as low cost.
The rationale for using tenure of these administrative tools as indicators for lower 
tax collection costs is that they may facilitate gathering of information required to 
manage and monitor local taxes. The focus on the cadaster, in particular, is moti­
vated by the importance of property tax in the Peruvian local finances. For example, 
a municipality without a cadaster -a register of properties- may find more difficult 
to assess the size of the tax base of the property tax and hence the magnitude of 
tax evasion. In turn, lack of information about where the evaders are may difficult 
monitoring and enforcement of tax collection.
A comparison of the finances of municipalities with and without tax administration 
tools provides evidence consistent with this assumption. In particular, municipalities 
with low cost have an average tax per capita almost 70 percent higher than high cost 
municipalities and also collect a larger local revenue (see Table 3.2).
The model also provides ancillary predictions about the differences on elasticity 
of spending by the level of the tax rate (r) and the ratio of grant and non-grant 
revenue, As a proxy for the tax rate, I use the average tax per capita collected 
during the period 1998-2001, while as a proxy for I use the ratio of Foncomun to 
non-Foncomun revenue.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics of the measures of administrative costs and 
the tax rate, and compares municipalities with low and high cost. There are signifi­
cant differences in the finance and socio-demographics characteristics of low and high 
cost municipalities. Even though they spent a similar amount, low cost municipalities 
receive smaller amounts of Foncomun per capita. Moreover, they have larger popula­
124The risk bearing cost of tax evasion refers to the loss of utility associated to the increased exposure 
to risk undertook to avoid paying taxes.
125 For an empirical survey of compliance and administrative costs see Sandford (1995).
126The results are similar when I use the components of the dummy (having an automated tax 
system or an updated cadaster) separately.
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tions, axe more urban, more dense, less poor and have better access to basic utilities. 
These systematic differences raise relevant identification concerns that I discuss in 
Section 3.5.
3.3.2 Econometric Specification
The purpose of the empirical exercise is to estimate the grant elasticity of spending 
(Ea ) and the grant elasticity of local tax revenue (£R,a), and evaluate how they vary 
by the level of administrative costs and tax rate.
The model predicts that ea would be smaller for municipalities with low adminis­
trative costs and decrease with the tax rate. These results imply a smaller flypaper 
effect for low cost municipalities. A corollary of the model is that the substitution of 
local taxes by grants will be larger for low cost municipalities.
To test these predictions, I estimate the following regression:
Inyidt = Po Inait +  f t  (Inait x Xi) +  7S* +r)d + td + eit, (3.15)
where yu is either the expenditure per capita or the local revenue per capita of mu­
nicipality i, in department d in year t.127 The variable an is the amount of Foncomun 
per capita and Xi is a measure of the administrative costs or the tax rate. is a 
vector of municipality characteristics such as: population density, percentage of urban 
population, poverty head count and access to basic utilities. I also include a dummy 
that indicates whether the municipality receives the minimum amount of Foncomun.
All regressions include department fixed effects (r)d) and department-specific trends 
(td). I cluster the standard errors by municipality to account for possible serial au­
tocorrelation Following Becker (1996) I use a double logarithmic specification. This 
functional form reduces concern of mis-specification and produces measure of elastic­
ities instead of propensities to spend.
In specification (3.15), the estimate of the grant elasticity is f t  +  f t  x I j .  f t  
provides a way to evaluate how the grant elasticity changes with either administrative 
costs or the tax rate. In particular, the model predictions suggest that f t  < 0. When 
Xi is the ratio of grant to non-grant revenue, Pi has a useful interpretation because 
it equals to the sensitivity of local spending to changes on the tax base {ey) and we 
could expect this estimate to take positive values.
The main identification assumption is that the changes of Foncomun grant are un­
correlated to other unobserved variables that drive municipal spending. The features 
of the setup -a grant allocated by formula and financed by a national tax- reduce 
concerns about reverse causality. There are, however, relevant concerns regarding 
omitted variables. These concerns are partially addressed by including the vector of 
control variables; but they may be insufficient. I discuss these concerns in more detail
127A department is the largest sub-national administrative unit. Many central government spending 
projects are targeted at this level.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics and mean comparison
Variable Total Low cost 
Yes No
Difference
A. Revenue and expenses
Expenditure per capita 179.5 187.9 175.5 12.4
(321) (369.9) (294.6) (9.2)
Foncomun grant per capita 99.1 87.9 104.5 -16.6
(95.6) (84.6) (100.1) (2.7)**
% received min. Foncomun 58.7 51.9 61.9 -0.1
(49.2) (50.0) (48.6) (0.0)**
Vaso de Leche per capita 14.8 15.2 14.6 0.5
(16.3) (24.2) (10.7) 0.5)
Local revenue per capita 28.7 37.8 24.3 13.5
(217.6) (106.4) (254.2) (6.3)*
Foncomun/Non Foncomun 2.161 1.766 2.347 -0.581
revenue (a/(g — a)) (1.954) (1.671) (2.048) (0.052)**
B. Measures of collection cost and tax rate
% has automated tax 32.0
system or cadaster (46.6)
Average tax per capita 13.8 18.9 11.3 7.6
(100.3) (50.6) (116.6) (2.7)**
C. Socio-demographic characteristics
Population 10978.5 20280.8 6593.5 13687.3
(35790.5) (58525.6) (14514.8) (937.6)**
Population density 347.8 910.5 79.4 10.9
(2074) (3505.5) (520.9) (0.8)**
% urban population 40.3 47.7 36.8 831.1
(30.1) (33.2) (27.9) (54.6)**
Poverty head count 46.8 42.4 48.8 -6.3
(14.2) (15.5) (13.1) (0.4)**
% access electricity 61.9 60.4 62.7 -2.3
(33.1) (32.3) (33.5) (0.9)**
% access water 26.0 31.2 23.5 7.6
(31.1) (33.1) (29.8) (0.8)**
% access sewage 38.3 45.6 34.8 10.7
(34.8) (35.3) (34) (0.9)**
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Low cost 
is a dummy equal to one if a municipality has either an automated tax system or updated 
cadaster.
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in Section 3.5.
3.4 M ain R esults
Table 3.3 presents the main results. Columns (1) and (2) estimate the grant elasticity 
of spending (ea) for different levels of administrative costs and tax rate, respectively. 
Consistent with the model predictions, /?x is negative, which implies that ea is signifi­
cantly smaller for municipalities with low administrative costs and decreases with the 
tax rate. For example, the estimated ea for a high cost municipality is 0.756, while 
for a low cost it is 0.561, almost 25 percent smaller.
Column (3) uses the ratio of Foncomun to non-Foncomun revenue, a proxy for 
a/{g — a), as the interaction term. Consistent with the previous results, the value 
of (3l is positive. Furthermore, we can interpret this estimate as the sensitivity of 
spending to changes on the local tax base, ey.
The results support the existence of a flypaper effect in the Peruvian case. The 
estimate of ea ranges from 0.561 to 0.756 while the estimate of ey is around 0.089.128 
Moreover, we can do a back of the envelope calculation to evaluate how much of the 
flypaper effect is explained by administrative costs. Using the estimates of ea from 
column (1) and ey from column (3), I find that the difference on administrative costs 
accounts for almost one third of the difference on elasticities of spending.
Column (4) and (5) explore the model predictions about the role of administrative 
costs on the substitution of local taxes by grants. In column (4) I use the value of 
local revenue, which include taxes and other sources, while in column (5) I narrow 
down the definition to include only local taxes. In both columns, we observe that 
low cost municipalities exhibit a larger substitution effect (01 < 0).129 This result is 
consistent with the previous findings and the model predictions: municipalities with 
low tax collection costs use additional grants to cut taxes instead of increasing local 
spending.
Taken together, the results are consistent with the model predictions. Municipal­
ities facing higher tax collection costs spend a larger proportion of grants and reduce 
local revenue less. I interpret these findings as evidence that costly tax collection 
shapes the reaction of local government to grants and partly explains the observed 
flypaper effect
3.5 A dditional Checks
A main concern with the previous results is that municipalities with high and low 
administrative costs also differ on several dimensions. For example, municipalities 
with low administrative cost municipalities have larger populations, are more urban,
128 More formally, I test of the null hypothesis (30 =  /3X in column (3) Note that j30 provide a lower 
bound for the value of fa -  This test is easily rejected with a F-statistic of 100.
129The estim ate in column (5) is significant only at 10 percent.
Table 3.3: Main results
Ln (total Ln (tax
Ln (total expenditure) revenue) revenue)
(1) (2) (3) (4)___________ (5)
Ln (Foncomun) 0.756 0.717 0.64 0.063 0.121
(0.021)** (0.021)** (0.048)** (0.077) -0.091
Ln (Foncomun) x Xi -0.195 -0.001 0.089 -0.214 -0.217
(0.056)** (0.000)** (0.009)** (0.103)* (0.122)
Variable Xi is: Low cost Average tax 
per capita
Average
a
g-a
Low cost Low cost
Observations 5422 5427 5429 5321 4666
R-squared 0.716 0.785 0.754 0.551 0.515
Notes: Robust errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. * significant 
at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All regressions include a set of municipality socio-demographic char­
acteristics, department fixed effects and department-specific trends. a/(g-a) is equal to the ratio of 
Foncomun and non-Foncomun revenue. Low cost is a dummy equal to one if a municipality has 
either an automated tax system or updated cadaster. The expenditure, total revenue, tax revenue 
and Foncomun are expressed as per capita values.
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more dense, less poor and have better access to basic utilities. To the extent that 
these differences are observable and only affect the level of spending, their effect is 
controlled by the vector of control variables S*.130
These differences, however, may also affect the grant elasticity of spending. For 
example, poorer municipalities may have a greater propensity to spend (out of grants 
or local income) because they obtain a higher marginal benefit from public spending. 
Similarly, there may be unobserved characteristics that confound the results. For ex­
ample, high cost municipalities may have larger bureaucracies and be more willing 
to spend a larger proportion of grants. In both cases, the results obtained in Table
3.3 could not be attributed to heterogeneity on grant elasticities due to tax collec­
tion costs, but to other sources of observed, and unobserved, heterogeneity between 
municipalities.
I address these concerns in two steps. First, I include the interaction between 
ln {Foncomun) and all the variables in vector S*. If the variable low cost is just 
picking up these municipality features, the estimates of (31 should become insignificant. 
Second, I include flexible time trends interacted with low cost. If municipalities with 
different tax collection costs also follow different trends of revenue or spending, then 
the differences of the elasticity to spend associated to administrative costs should 
become smaller.131
Table 3.4 displays the results of these additional checks. In all cases, the results 
are similar to the baseline regressions: the grant elasticity of spending is smaller for 
low cost municipalities. The results in Column (2) also provide some insights about 
factors driving the spending of local governments. In particular, the grant elasticity of 
spending increases with the municipality’s poverty head count and decreases with the 
population density. This finding is consistent with poorer and less densely populated 
localities obtaining a larger marginal benefit from public spending, and hence having 
a larger propensity to spend out of grants.
Taken together, these results reduce concerns that the differences on grant elas­
ticities between low and high cost municipalities are driven by some observable char­
acteristics. They, however, do not provide any information about other sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity correlated with the municipality’s administrative costs.
I partially address this concern by running a falsification test. The test adds to 
the baseline regression another important transfer: the Vaso de Leche, and explores 
the differences on the elasticity of spending of this transfer between high and low cost 
municipalities. The Vaso de Leche is a conditional transfer, earmarked to provide 
food support to children and elders. Since this transfer cannot be used to fund other 
activities and cut taxes, we could expect tax collection costs to be less relevant to
130This vector includes socio-demographic variables and the components of the allocation formula of 
the Foncomun (namely percentage of urban population, a measure of poverty and whether it receives 
the minimum amount).
131 Municipalities may follow different spending trends, for example, if the increase of other revenue 
sources is correlated to  the administrative costs.
3 THE FLYPAPER EFFECT AND COSTLY TAX COLLECTION 117
decide how to spend this revenue. Finding differences on the elasticity of spending 
of this conditional transfer would suggest that the measure of administrative costs is 
picking up other sources of heterogeneity on the propensities to spend.
Column (3) of Table 3.4 displays the results. Note that the grant elasticity of 
spending of the Vaso de Leche (around 0.137) is smaller than the elasticity of spending 
of the Foncomun grant.132 More importantly, there is not a significant difference 
between high and low cost municipalities on the elasticity of spending of the Vaso de 
Leche.
3.6 C onclusion
This papers presents robust evidence consistent with costly tax collection being a de­
terminant of the flypaper effect -the observed greater responsiveness of local govern­
ment’s spending to increases in grants than to increases in local income. In particular, 
the spending of municipalities with lower tax collection costs -proxied by the tenure 
of administrative tools- exhibits a smaller sensitivity to additional grants. I also find 
evidence of substitution of local revenue by grant, which is stronger among low cost 
municipalities.
The analytical framework simplifies previous models and provides a quantifiable 
expression of the magnitude of the flypaper effect as a function of tax collection costs 
and the tax rate. Moreover, it makes explicit the role of heterogenous funding costs 
as an explanation for the lack of fungibility. Grant recipients are more responsive to 
increases in transfers because they axe marginally cheaper than other revenue sources. 
This phenomenon is not exclusive of local public finances but may also be relevant 
among aid agencies.
In the model, the cost difference between transfers and local taxes is driven by the 
local government’s failure to internalize the cost of funding the transfer scheme. This 
result points out a potential source of inefficiency in fiscal decentralization processes 
with overspending at local level.
132This is consistent with the additional conditionality, and less fungibility, of the Vaso de Leche 
transfer.
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Table 3.4: Additional checks
(1)
Ln (total expenditure)
(2) (3) (4)
Ln (Foncomun) 0.758*** 0.402*** 0.739*** 0.336***
(0.021) (0 .120) (0.018) (0.105)
Ln (Foncomun) -0.200*** -0.087** -0.158*** -0.069**
x low cost (0.058) (0.036) (0.041) (0.031)
Ln (Vaso de Leche) 0.137*** 0.180***
(0.048) (0.045)
Ln (Vaso de Leche) -0.178 -0.080
x low cost (0.115) (0.085)
Ln (Foncomun) x:
Poverty head count 0.005** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Population density -0.082*** -0.091***
(0 .021) -0.022
Received min. Foncomun 0.072 0.075*
(0.047) (0.045)
% without water 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
% without sewage 0.001* 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001)
% without electricity 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
% urban population -0.001 - 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Flexible trend x low cost yes no no no
Observations 5422 5422 5419 5419
R-squared 0.716 0.753 0.724 0.764
Notes: Robust errors in parentheses. Standard errors axe clustered by municipality. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All regressions include a set of municipality 
socio-demographic characteristics, department fixed effects and department-specific 
trends. Low cost is a dummy equal to one if a municipality has either an automated 
tax system or updated cadaster. The total expenditure, Foncomun and Vaso de 
Leche are expressed as per capita values.
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C  A p p e n d ix
C .l  A sym m etric income d istribu tion
In the baseline model I assume a symmetric income distribution, such that the income 
of the average and median voter are the same. Let us relax this assumption and 
consider a more general case. Denote the median income as ym and the average 
income as y , and define the ratio k = ^ . I assume that k can be affected by changes 
on average income and that 0 < k < 1. In this setup k captures the degree of income 
inequality between the average taxpayer and the median voter. The rest of the setup 
is the same.
With this modification, the government’s budget constraint remains the same, 
9 =  V [r  ~  rC(r)] + a, and the tax rate can still be written as r  =  / ( However 
the equilibrium policy becomes
g* = arg max ym [1 -  r] +  H(g)
because the politician maximizes the median voter’s indirect utility.
Solving the maximization problem we can rewrite the equilibrium policy as:
S* =  W ' ( — )) (3-16)
y
Recall that h' < 0 and thus the level of public spending decreases with income in­
equality k.
Taking total derivatives to (3.16) we obtain the propensities to spend out of local 
income and grants:
dg* _  y k 'h 'f  kh 'f"  g* — a
dy y — k h 'f" y — kh 'f"  y
dg* _  kh 'f"  
da y — kh 'f"
From these two expressions and definition (3.4) we can relate both propensities to 
spend to obtain the magnitude of the flypaper effect:
dg* dg* k' f  x
■55-= 4T(- I r tf + T- rc(T)) (3-17)
Note that, similar to the case of symmetric income distribution, the magnitude of 
the flypaper effect is increasing on the administrative costs shifter T. Moreover, in 
the particular case when the income distribution is unaffected by changes on average 
income, k' = 0, expression (3.17) becomes identical to (3.10).
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C.2 Compliance and administrative costs
Consider a more general case with both compliance and administrative costs. In 
particular, for citizen i the compliance cost is TcCc(r)yi while for the tax authority 
the administrative cost represents a proportion TaCa(r) of the tax base. Both TcCc(r) 
and roCa(r) are increasing and convex functions and adopt values strictly between 0 
and r.
Given the previous assumptions, we can re-write equations (3.2) and (3.3) as 
Vi =  yi[ 1 -  r  -  TcCc(r)\ +  H(g)
9 = y[r-TaC a(r)] + a 
Rearranging the budget constraint, we can express r  as a function of g:
F(r) = r -  raCa(r) = (3 .18)
where Ff > 0, F" < 0 by assumption 1 and convexity of C0(r). Since F  is a monotonic
function, we can write the tax rate as
where /  (•) =  F~l (•).
It follows that the median citizen’s indirect utility can be written as
y { l - f - r cCc(f)] + H(g) (3.19)
The maximization of equation 3.19 with respect to g provides the level of public
spending in equilibrium;
9* =  h((l +  r cC')/') (3.20)
where h(-) is the inverse function of H'(-).
Calculating comparative statics from (3.20), we obtain:
dg* _  b!A g* -  a 
dy y — hi A y
dg* _  h'A 
da y — h'A
where A = (1 +  TcC ')f"  +  f f T cC%
From visual inspection of (3.21) and (3.22), and using definition (3.18), we obtain 
the following relation between both propensities to spend:
(3.21)
(3.22)
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Note that the magnitude of the flypaper effect is similar to the obtain in the case 
without compliance costs. However, the propensities to spend are different.
Note that in the special case of no administrative costs, Tc =  0, expression (3.23) 
becomes:
ctf = d f  J_
da dy r*
Similar to the model only with administrative costs, this extension predicts a propen­
sity to spend out of grants larger than the propensity to spend out of local income.
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